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EDITORS’ NOTES
This will be the final issue of the Journal of Microfinance before it changes
its title and focus as explained below. As we mark this transition, we look
back with appreciation on the genesis of the journal. Particular thanks go
to Gary Woller and Warner Woodworth for their vision in seeing the need
for a journal that would formalize microfinance as a serious topic of academic research.
This vision of a journal that would open the dialogue between practitioners and academics on the topic of microfinance was only realized
through the hard work and support of many individuals and institutions.
Gary Woller is especially deserving for his efforts as editor in the earliest
years of the journal. He worked tirelessly to create awareness of the Journal
of Microfinance, recruiting a strong group of reviewers as well as establishing the journal’s reputation among researchers. As a result of his efforts, the
journal reached a point where only about twenty-five percent of articles
submitted were accepted for publication, putting the Journal of Microfinance
on par with other top journals in the field.
Gary was supported in this effort by the George W. Romney Institute
for Public Management and the Center for Economic Self-Reliance of the
Marriott School at Brigham Young University. Additional support came
from the School of Business at Brigham Young University–Hawaii, both
financially and editorially through Beth Haynes, who served as Book
Review Editor, while I served as co-editor of the journal.
Of course, additional thanks go out to our fine editorial board, consisting of many leaders in the field of microfinance. I also wish to express
gratitude for the fine work of our many volunteer reviewers, who worked
hard to ensure the quality of the articles that appeared in the journal.
Finally, to the authors of the research appearing in the Journal of
Microfinance, I wish to extend my congratulations for having made the
journal into a demanding and innovative publication. Your efforts have led
us all to think about the practice of microfinance in ways that will push the
movement forward for years to come. In fact, the journal’s shift from a
more narrow focus on microfinance to a broader focus on economic selfreliance is indicative of the lessons we have learned as we have sought better ways to reduce poverty throughout the world.
Again, I thank all who have been involved in trying to make this world
a better place through the use of microfinance. Your work continues to be
valuable in the push toward greater economic self-reliance and will find a

welcoming home in the new publication, Advances in Economic SelfReliance.
Norman Wright
Editor, Journal of Microfinance

With the next issue, the name, focus, and format of the Journal of
Microfinance will change—the new name will be Advances in Economic SelfReliance. In March of 2003, the Center for Economic Self-Reliance was formally established at the Marriott School of Management at Brigham Young
University. The Center was founded on a vision of improving the economic
self-reliance of individuals and families around the world by bringing
researchers, practitioners, and donors together through action research.
Microfinance deals with the provision of financial services to the poor
to establish and sustain microenterprises, thus improving their earning
capabilities. As such, the principles and practices of microfinance represent
one important vehicle through which people can improve their economic
self-reliance. Economic self-reliance is a broader concept that includes education, work within traditional employment relationships, principles of
personal prudence and discipline such as budgeting or resource management, and concerns such as risk management through social networks or
insurance. Each of these components, coupled with individual initiative,
works to create or improve self-reliance. The name change of the journal
signifies our willingness to publish articles on these important broader
topics as well as continuing to support microenterprise efforts.
The focus of the journal will be broader than before, and the writing
style and article selection policies will change as we attempt to reach out to
practitioners and donors as well as researchers. The initial issues will
include pieces from thought leaders in the area of economic development,
a theory article that outlines new and important concepts in the field, a
research and case study section, a short description of best practices in the
areas of self-reliance or NGO organizational management, and a book
review. We expect the format and content of the journal to evolve as we
better understand and model the processes of economic self-reliance. We
invite you to evolve with us and hope you will continue to see this publication as valuable to your efforts to build a better world.
Paul C. Godfrey
Editor, Advances in Economic Self-Reliance
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Nurturing Joint Forest
Management Through
Microfinance
A Case from India
K. K. Kaushal and J. C. Kala
Abstract: India has embarked upon a community involvement process to restock
the state-owned forests through a recent approach called Joint Forest
Management. But the success of the Joint Forest Management program lies in
the provision of alternative livelihoods to woodcutters and grazers. This article
presents how the forest department of a southern state of India devised a potent
tool of microfinance promotion for weaning those who are dependent on the
forest by implementing a massive externally aided Joint Forest Management
Project. Based on a study of 27 program villages in the Tamilnadu state, this
paper proves that the success of Joint Forest Management is dependent on and
directly linked to the provision of microfinance to villagers through a people’s
representative body—the Village Forest Council. The forest department was successful in this unusual task of promoting microfinance even in villages where
formal microfinance institutions have failed, which corroborates an earlier finding that microfinance is more workable and successful if it is properly packaged
in a locally suitable development program.

A

substantial track record of accomplishment and a significant
body of empirical studies worldwide together underline the
significance of microfinance as an effective antipoverty and
development strategy (Wright, 2000; Zaman, 2000; Khandker,
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2001). However, even a well-designed microfinance program is
unlikely to have a positive impact on the poorest unless it specifically seeks to reach them through appropriate product design and
targeting (Wright, 2000). It is clear from various reports that there
are strong potential synergies between microfinance and the provision of basic social services to clients. However, the services provided
need to be relevant to the needs of the target groups and not just an
add-on that is of poor quality (Marcus, Portes, & Harper, 1999).
Of the 63.72 million hectares (ha) of actual forest area of India
(most of which is state owned) almost 38% is degraded, with a
canopy density 1 of less than 40% (FSI, 2000). This degradation of
forests is mainly ascribed to the rigid state control and the resulting disempowerment and displacement of indigenous tribal and
hill communities, accompanied by the disintegration of communitybased resource management (Fernandes & Menon, 1987; Guha,
1991; Kelkar & Nathan, 1991; Gadgil & Guha, 1992).
Consequently the Government of India made a major policy shift
in 1988 and switched over to Joint Forest Management (JFM).
JFM is an evolving policy-based program, which sets out to establish management “partnerships” between local forest-dependent
communities and the state for the sustainable management and
joint benefit-sharing of public forest land (Sarin, 1995). To accomplish this, JFM seeks to shift the existing inequitable distribution
of management control by directly involving local people and
institutions in forest management (Campbell, 1996). JFM does
not involve the transfer of ownership over forests, but attempts
instead to restructure the formal system of access, decision-making,
and sharing of benefits to account for the needs of local communities. So far, 22 state governments have issued orders to implement
JFM and the states have evolved their own mechanisms of involving local communities in conformity with the proclaimed policy.

K. K. Kaushal is Deputy Conservator of Forests in Madurai District of Tamilnadu State for the
Indian Forest Service. Email: kkkaushal@eth.net
J. C. Kala is Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Tamilnadu State Government, Indian
Forest Service. Email: jckala@yahoo.com
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About 36,130 Village Forest Councils are managing a total of
10.25 million ha of forest area in the country (FSI, 2000).
It is a known fact that during the last 140 years of state control, most of the land with the potential for agriculture was cleared
of forests. The remaining forest in India is now concentrated in
rugged and inaccessible areas, and this reduces the potential to harvest and manage the forest for production purposes. The abutting
population has increased manifold; their needs have also multiplied. It is impossible to create forest-based livelihoods for all the
abutting population. Consequently, most of the states are following a two-pronged approach to involve communities: increasing
the stake of the neighboring communities in the management and
utilization of the forests, and creating alternative sources of
employment to reduce the pressure on forests (Kumar, Naresh,
Yogindra, & Kinsuk, 2000). But the resources to promote alternative income are limited and cannot wean all forest dependents
(Kaushal & Kala, 2004). However, if the limited available funds
are used for the creation of a revolving fund for microfinance provision instead of providing doles to a few individuals, then the
impact can be larger and more sustainable also.
This paper seeks to present how microfinance as a component
of the Joint Forest Management project has emerged as a potent
tool for the development of forest villages in Tamilnadu and is
reducing people’s dependence on forests to nontimber forest products and indirect benefits. Further it substantiates with field data
that the regeneration of forests is directly linked to the successful
working of microfinance.

Tamilnadu Forestry Project
Tamilnadu, the southern state of India, has a geographic area of 13
million hectares, which constitutes 3.96% of the land area of the
country. The total population of the state is 55.86 million (1991
census), accounting for 6.60% of the country’s population. The
recorded forest area 2 is 2.26 million hectares, which constitutes
17.40% of the land area of the state. But the actual forest cover3
as assessed through remote sensing is only 1.71 million hectares—
a mere 13.13% of the land area. Furthermore, half of this actual forVolume 7 Number 2
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est cover is degraded and has a canopy density of less than 40%
(FSI, 2000).
There are 15,822 villages in the state, of which 1405 are forest
abutting. The total population of these forest villages is estimated
to be 3.11 million. No separate consumption or income data are
available, but it is a known fact that forest communities are the
poorest of the poor (Tiwari, 1994; Kaushal & Kala, 2004). Because
of remoteness and a thin and scattered population, modern development and amenities have not reached them. Moreover, the development departments hardly reach these areas. Likewise, the
cooperative banks and grameen banks restrict their operations to
the villages in the plains, which have more productive lands that
allow their people to make gainful use of loans.
The Tamilnadu Forestry Project (TFP) is a Joint Forest
Management (community forestry) Project that is funded by the
Japan Bank for International Cooperation at a level of US$100
million. 4 This project has been implemented in Tamilnadu state
since 1997–98. In the Project, degraded forest microwatersheds along
with abutting habitations are selected. The forest area is divided into
three zones—Lower zone or Utility zone, Middle zone or Asset creation zone, and Upper zone or Eco-restoration zone. Normally, the
area for all three zones is 250 ha, in which the zone-wise gap planting is taken up. The unique feature of the Project is that it has a
provision of $12,000 for the development of abutting village population over a period of three years. The aim is to reduce the
dependence of villagers on forests by initiating alternate activities
for generating income.
In each of the identified management units, the people’s representative body, called a Village Forest Council (VFC), is formed
which is fully involved in the planning and execution of works, protection, harvesting, and benefit sharing, with focus on degraded
forests. One man and one woman from each household, provided
that they are willing, are enrolled as its members. Any person who
opts out from the membership of VFC is not entitled to any benefits.
The VFC meets as and when called for, but in any case at least once
in three months.
4
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Each Village Forest Council elects an Executive Committee,
with each hamlet electing at least two members; each VFC elects a
minimum of 5 and a maximum of 15 members to the Executive
Committee. The panchayat 5 members of the management unit are
co-opted as ex-officio members of the Executive Committee (EC).
The members of the Executive Committee elect a President from
among themselves who is also President of the VFC. The Forest
Ranger concerned is the Member Secretary of the Executive
Committee, who facilitates the election of the members and
President of the Executive Committee. The Executive Committee
is responsible for the day-to-day activities of the VFC and meets at
least once a month. A Memorandum of Understanding is signed in
the beginning between the Divisional Forest Officer (on behalf of
Forest Department) and the VFC President. This gives the details
of the roles and responsibilities of the Forest Department and
VFC—the partners in Joint Forest Management. All the VFCs
have been registered under the Societies Registration Act 1975.
The government order sanctioning funds from JBIC soft loan
defined the objective of the program as increasing the tree cover
through the involvement of people. But once the program was
launched, it was continuously reviewed, modified, and broadened
in consonance with the feedback from the people and the field
officers. The amount for development of forest dependents was
increased to $12,000 from $6000. The individual grants were converted into interest free loans so that the VFC can build up its
corpus fund and extend loans to the remaining forest dependents
for acquiring productive assets. The VFC President was made the
joint signatory for the withdrawl of funds and the submission of
accounts. State Government ordered the involvement of all other
line departments, like Public Works Department, Electricity,
Health, Agriculture, Animal husbandry, and Tribal Development,
etc., for the holistic development of these microwatersheds on a
priority basis. Thus the Project has come to acquire a multidisciplinary approach in which the promotion of microfinance plays the
lead role.
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TFP and Microfinance
Each VFC opens an account with the nearest post office and bank,
which account is jointly operated by the President and Member
Secretary. Income from the following sources accrue into that
account:
1. Fines imposed for offenses (like grazing or illicit removal)
in the JFM area.
2. Recovery of loans.
3. Income from the sale of nontimber forest products 6
(NTFPs).
4. Membership fees.
Out of $12,000 meant to be spent on the buffer zone in each
village, about 30% is spent on village development and community
assets like threshing floors, community halls, etc. The remaining
amount is given to individuals for acquiring productive assets.
Soon after the launching of the Project, this amount was declared
as a loan, which individuals have to pay back to the VFC so that it
can give loans to other people, as well as later further assistance to
the same individuals. In fact, this buffer zone amount is the major
source of VFC fund, as income from the sale of NTFPs will take
many more years to be significant.
Presently, extending credit is the main financial activity of the
VFC. But the term microfinance has been applied to the VFC because
it arranges insurance for the cattle purchased through its loans. Some
VFCs have also taken group insurance policies for their members.
Further, NTFP sales are done by the VFC only.

Methodology
Study Area
There are 48 field-level implementing units called Forest Divisions
in Tamilnadu State Forest Department which have been implementing TFP. Plantation Division, Madurai is undertaking TFP
6
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implementation in Madurai and Theni districts of Tamilnadu
State. So far 27 villages have been brought under the Project in this
division and this study was conducted in the 27 villages of the
Plantation Division, Madurai.

Procedural Description and Results
Data regarding the financial position and recycling of money were
collected from the records of each VFC, since each VFC maintains
the loan disbursement and loan recovery registers and cashbook.
Recovery and recycling were separately rated on a scale of 0 to 1. If
loan recovery for the village showed 100% recovery, we gave it a
value of 1, and if loan recovery was less, then the decimal value
corresponding to the loan recovery percentage was assigned. For
analyzing recycling, evaluation considered whether the funds after
recovery were kept in a bank account or given as fresh loans to new
individuals within a reasonable period, with a value from 0 to 1
assigned. We allowed a period of 1 month and an accumulation of
up to Rs 50000 for giving fresh loans. As per expectations, the values were almost the same as the better recovery villages for early
disbursal. The average of loan recovery and recycling values was
taken to arrive at the value of the combined parameter of loan
recovery and recycling.
Then a team of three Forest Range Officers assessed the protection and regeneration status of each program area. Better protection
through effective social fencing was reflected in the growth of
planted seedlings, the regeneration of existing rootstock, and the
absence of goat or cattle dung on the forest floor. The team perambulated the forest area of each of the 27 forest villages to asses
the protection and regeneration status and independently rated the
same on a scale of 0 to 1. The average of the ratings assigned by
the three rangers was taken as the value of forest protection status
for the respective villages.
Data regarding the financial position of each village is presented in Table 1, which shows the year of the formation of the
Village Forest Council, the amount extended as loan, along with
the ratings of the VFC fund and forest protection.
Volume 7 Number 2
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Table 1: Village Forest Councils’ Fund Working as of 31-03-2004 in
Plantation Division, Madurai, India
Year

(1)
1997–
1998

1998–
1999
1999–
2000
2000–
2001
2001–
2002
2002–
2003
2003–
2004

S. No.

(2)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Name of
TFP Village

(3)
Konapatti
Thethoor
Krishnapuram &
Vasinagar
Kaloothu
M.Ayyampatti
Nallathathunaickanpatti
Nagamanaickanpatti
Mondikundu
Srirangapuram
Thatchapatti
Kunnuvarpatti
Gunnuthupatti
Rengarampatti
Vannathiparai
Chithayagoundanpatti
Nottampatti
Aruguveli K.S.Puram
Sukkanodai
Solaithevanpatti
Nehrujinagar
Errampatti
Panamooppanpatti
Pommampatti
Kuranguthoppu
Sanampatti
Pandiyarajapuram
Sathiravellalapatti
Keelamettupatti
GRAND TOTAL

Total
Loan
given

Rating of
Loan Recovery
and Recycling
(0 to 1 scale)

(4)
375365
344000
270400

(5)
0.40
0.40
0.50

Rating of
Forest and
Protection
Regeneration
(0 to 1 scale)
(6)
0.60
0.60
0.50

36600
290249
310000
304000
464480
495000
397000
490000
390000
510000
516000
450000
396900
440000
510000
500000
725000
210000
472900
150000
210000
279200
287500
200000

0.50
0.40
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.80
0.50
0.70
0.70
0.70
0.70
1.00
0.40
0.50
0.70
0.60
1.00
0.70
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

0.50
0.60
0.60
0.50
0.50
1.00
0.70
0.60
0.60
1.00
0.80
0.80
0.50
0.80
0.80
0.80
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

9927794

Nur turing Joint Forest Management

Income from fines, membership fees, and NTFP sales is almost
negligible in all the villages and has not been shown. The main
source of VFC funds is the amount given by the department to
individual beneficiaries for alternative income promotion, which
they pay back to the VFC concerned. Most of the loans are for purchasing hybrid cattle, because cattle rearing comes naturally to
them, and if a village has 20 cattle, the milk procurement society
gets started at the nearest road head. Hybrid cattle are not
amenable to grazing and have to be stall-fed. They yield 10–12
litres of milk per day in comparison to 1–2 liters from indigenously bred cattle. In some cases artisans have taken loans to
improve their profession. In Rangarampatti village, people have
taken up iron file making, and as many as 102 men and women are
gainfully engaged in that trade (Kaushal, 2004). The forest department has not imposed an alternative income generation activity
and the people decide on their own. Almost all the successful VFCs
have voluntarily imposed an interest rate of 1% per month on all
the loans given by them. For instance, in Naurjinagar village only
Rs 4 Lakhs was given from the project fund, but with 1% per
month interest, the total amount has grown to Rs 7.5 Lakhs. As
can be seen in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, there is a direct correspondence between the VFC fund working and forest protection;
this shows that once the people get alternate livelihoods they need
not do woodcutting and consequently forest protection improves.
In the villages where loan recovery is poor, the remaining forest
dependents could not be provided with productive assets and they
continue to indulge in the grazing of goats or the removal of firewood from the forest. In successful villages, the people received
loans two times and are therefore able to engage themselves in other
vocations. The social fencing of the forest area is complete in such
villages and there is no reason why it should not sustain itself in
future. The concept of Joint Forest Management hinges on social
fencing, which means the local people agree through their local
institutions and mechanisms not to indulge in grazing and woodcutting and to ensure that others also comply with it.

Volume 7 Number 2
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The VFC President handles the loan collection and only in
case of default is persuasion by the VFC members and forest staff
adopted, because most of the people do not have collateral securities
and even when they do, the tedious legal process of loan recoveries
cannot be pursued by the VFC President or Member Secretary.
Since the Forest Ranger enjoys a tremendous amount of respect
and fear in forest villages, his persuasive role, if enacted sincerely,
is enough to keep people paying on their loans even in villages
where formal financial institutions have failed.
The results are the poorest in 1997–98 villages, because the
Project was launched hastily and initially loan recovery was not
envisaged. Only in February 1998 was it announced that individual
beneficiaries have to pay back the loan amounts to the concerned
VFCs. The results are better in recent years due to better interest
taken by a fresh set of Rangers in the latter years. Nurturant style of
Forest Ranger is more successful in JFM (Rishi, 2003). Also, the
Department personnel have learned the technique of fostering
the VFCs in the latter years.
The efficient working of a VFC fund is reflected not only in
forest protection but also in the improvement of the living standards of the people, as evidenced through the increase in the
number of concrete houses, people switching over to the use of
cooking gas from firewood, number of cycles and mopeds, etc.

Conclusions
1. In Joint Forest Management programs, forest regeneration
and a profit yield from NTFPs will take years; hence the
people have to be compensated for the lost opportunity
cost of grazing and illicit removal to ensure effective social
fencing of the forests. If properly applied, microfinance is
a potent tool in this regard.
2. In Joint Forest Management Program villages, forest
regeneration and protection show a direct correspondence
with the working of Village Forest Councils as microfinance institutions.

10
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3. Microfinance is more successful if it is launched as a component of a development package relevant to the people
and the area.
4. In forest villages, the Forest Department has more interaction and rapport with the people. Hence any development
initiative including microfinance implemented by the
forest department has a better chance of success.
5. The post-Project sustainability of the program is assured
in all such villages, where microfinance has been well
established, because the people need not revert to grazing
and illicit woodcutting and can pursue alternative livelihoods through microfinance. Also, the Village Forest
Councils in such villages acquire more popularity and
authority, which further helps in forest protection.

Notes
1. Canopy density indicates the extent to which sunlight is prevented from falling
on the ground by tree crowns. Canopy density of 40% and above is taken as dense
forest whereas 10–39% is taken as degraded.
2. Forest areas in all lands statutorily classified as forest, though they may not
necessarily bear tree cover.
3. Forest cover is all lands with a tree canopy density of more than 10%, though
they may not be statutorily classified as forestland.
4. US$1 = 45 Indian National Rupees.
5. The panchayat is the lowest tier of local self-government in India.
6. NTFPs are goods of biological origin other than wood that are derived from
the forests. These include fruits, nuts, tubers, mushrooms, essential oils, medicinal
herbs, spices, resins, and gums.
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Microfinance and Rural
Development
A Long-Term Perspective

Henk A. J. Moll
Abstract: The long-term perspective on microfinance starts with a discussion of
three central issues: first, views and policies, with two opposing views: “credit for
target group” and “pushing the financial frontier”; second, the performance of
microfinance institutions measured via two objectives: outreach and financial
sustainability; third, microfinance and rural development. This latter issue is
approached through analyses of the effects of financial services on rural households and analyses of long term national financial development. Both micro and
macro studies show positive effects of an expansion of savings and lending services,
financial deepening. The negative side of financial deepening, the apparently
unavoidable occurrence of bank insolvancies, is also reviewed. The concluding
section argues that the microfinance sector should be guided by “stability and
expansion”: stability to withstand shocks and to maintain the relationships established between rural households and microfinance institutions, and expansion to
include more people within the financial frontier.

T

here have been government policies on the role of microfinance in the rural development process for more than four
decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, the policies focused on
the provision of agricultural credit as a necessary support to the
introduction of new, more productive agricultural technologies
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that would simultaneously improve farmers’ incomes and feed the
nation. Later, the focus broadened to include credit provision to
the rural population engaged in other enterprises, such as trade,
handicrafts, and small-scale industry. Presently the international
development agenda is dominated by the Millennium Goals, with
poverty eradication heading the list of goals, and with microfinance firmly linked to this goal.
The implementation of rural credit policies through financial
institutions has been debated internationally. What triggered this
debate was the publication of the “Spring Review,” an evaluation
of small-farmer credit programs by USAID in the 1970s (Donald,
1976), which made available world wide experience on the achievements and failings of credit programs supported by governments
and donors. In the 1970s, the discussion shifted from “lack of capital” and consequently “the need for cheap credit,” to “cost-covering
interest rates” that would enable financial institutions to continue
to operate (Adams & Von Pischke, 1992). Later, the discussion
widened to include imperfect information as one of the distinctive
characteristics of rural credit markets (Hoff & Stiglitz, 1993) that
leads to insight into the screening, monitoring, and enforcement
problems that rural microfinance institutions face. Presently we see
a sort of consensus about the operations of microfinance institutions:
they should strive towards both outreach and financial sustainability.
The debate on microfinance largely assumes a micro perspective, with a short- to medium-term horizon. From this perspective,
assumptions about the behavior of farmers, the rural population,
or the poor, and about the constraints these groups face lead to
policies to be implemented by financial institutions. These institutions measure the effects of access to finance on their target group
after a couple of years. Finally, the objective to become financially
sustainable is to be reached in a few years’ time. Long-term analyses
of the role of microfinance institutions in rural development are
scarce. Mellor (1966) and Timmer (1988) deal in macro terms with
Henk A. J. Moll is associate professor in the Development Economics Group of Wageningen
University, the Netherlands. Email: henk.moll@wur.nl
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the role of the agricultural sector in national development and discuss the transfer of people and capital from the agricultural (or
rural) sector to the services and industrial sectors in the urban
areas. They do not, however, discuss the mechanisms for such a
transfer of capital. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) deal explicitly with the development of the financial sector within economic
development and plead for financial liberalization to enable savings to be mobilized, followed by an efficient banking system that
lends to investors with expected high return investments. More
recently, financial development and the links with economic
growth and with poverty reduction have been discussed by King
and Levine (1993) and Li, Squire, and Zou (1998). Though these
authors make no distinction between the rural and urban sectors,
their analyses are relevant for the rural sector too.
The three issues introduced above, views and policies regarding microfinance; the operations of microfinance institutions; and
the position of microfinance in rural development, are linked. In
this article I will discuss these issues and then draw overall conclusions regarding the long-term role of microfinance institutions in
rural areas.
The reason for focusing on rural microfinance is because this
differs from microfinance in urban areas in several ways. The most
obvious difference is that the dominant economic enterprise in
rural areas is agriculture, with known seasonality and unpredictable climatic conditions. This results in similar cash flow
requirements for many households and in co-variant risk.
Additionally, in many rural areas the population is widely dispersed, which means high transaction costs for clients and possibly
low volumes of services per microfinance location. These aspects
require specific attention from microfinance institutions operating
in rural areas, in addition to the general microfinance problem of
handling financial transactions for the small sums low-income
clients require.
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Views and Policies
Nowadays microfinance enjoys widespread support from governments, development agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
The reasons for this support are, however, diverse, and the term
microfinance is linked with very different views and assumptions
about the relationship between finance and development. Various
authors have attempted to classify these views. Krahnen and
Schmidt (1994), for example, distinguish four views by tracing
development thinking from the 1950s: capital as the engine for
economic growth, financing specific target groups, the focus on
financial systems, and, from the 1990s onwards, the insights from
the new institutional economics emphasizing the dominant role of
institutions in development and with specific views on the peculiarities of financial institutions. Robinson (2001) distinguishes
two approaches to microfinance: the poverty lending approach and
the financial system approach. Different views or approaches have
consequences for the policies shaping the environment of microfinance institutions, the financial services provided, and microfinance institutions themselves. Below I will discuss two opposing
views and their resulting policies. The consequences for microfinance institutions and for the role of microfinance in rural areas
will be discussed in the sections that follow.
The two opposing views are: (a) credit for target group and (b)
pushing the financial frontier. Based on Robinson’s poverty lending
approach, the first view is defined in a wider sense, with the poor
being replaced by any target group. The phrasing of the second
view echoes Von Pischke (1991), who refers to the financial frontier as the dividing line between the established formal financial
institutions with their large-scale business and private clients, and
the majority of the rural population without access to formal
finance.
Credit for target group is the oldest view and can be summarized as follows: A specified group of people lacks the capital to
undertake certain enterprises that would lead to development. The
group of people and their enterprises can be specified to a greater
or lesser degree: small farmers, fishermen, market women, or
16

Volume 7 Number 2

Microfinance and Rural Development

small-scale entrepreneurs with their respective enterprises in agriculture, fishing, trade, and industry. The specification of development too may differ: improved health, food security, poverty
reduction, or improvement in general welfare. The perspective on
the financial environment of the specified group is limited: the
only way the target group can access credit is through private
moneylenders whose interest rates are unacceptably high and
would nullify any positive effect of the credit.
It was this view that led many governments in the 1960s and
1970s to provide targeted credit with or without support from
donors; for example, to enable small farmers to use modern production technologies, such as hybrid seeds or imported dairy cows.
This credit would increase their incomes and provide enough and
sufficiently diversified food for the domestic market. The credit for
target group view is still widespread and nowadays is generally targeted at “the poor,” in line with the international attention for
poverty eradication. The micro-credit summit (not microfinance
summit) held in Washington in 1997, for example, advocated providing credit to the world’s poor to enable them to shed their
poverty. Barrett (2003) mentions targeted microfinance (together
with land reform, targeted school meals programs, and subsidies
for agricultural inputs) as one of the “cargo net policies” that can
lift people out of poverty. In short, the credit for target group view
is based on the following two central assumptions:
1. The factor constraining development is capital.
2. The target group is unable to mobilize this capital under
acceptable conditions.
The policy implication of these assumptions is straightforward: lend capital to the target group.
The pushing the financial frontier view developed in the 1970s
to the 1990s from an increasing understanding of the financial
capabilities of low-income rural households and the existing formal
and informal financial institutions in rural financial markets.
According to this view, rural households are economic units that
make daily decisions about production, consumption, and the
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resource base under conditions that are characterised by (a) seasonality that rules rural economic life, (b) uncertainty about future
production and consumption requirements, and (c) income levels
that are generally not far above subsistence. The decisions are
reflected internally in the size and composition of the household’s
assets and in the enterprise choice, and externally in the household’s participation as buyer and seller of financial assets in rural
financial markets (Moll, 1989).
This sharper focus on rural households was accompanied by
insight into the rural financial markets (Von Pischke et al., 1983),
defined as the totality of relationships between buyers and sellers
of financial assets who are active in rural economies. Rural financial markets are characterized by having a range of institutions that
are usually divided into formal institutions, such as state or private
banks, semiformal institutions such as cooperatives and NGOs
involved in financial services, and informal institutions, ranging from
private moneylenders and traders to relatives and friends and groups.
Despite the wide range of institutions present, individual rural households generally have access to only some of the institutions and the
products these institutions provide, as rural financial markets are
highly segmented (Moll, Ruben, Mol & Sanders, 2000).
New, comprehensive explanations for the observed segmentation in rural financial markets have been offered by Bell (1988),
Hoff and Stiglitz (1993), and others. These focus on the information asymmetry between lender and borrower as a central issue in
credit provision, with as consequences the absence of credit relationships where information on borrowers was perceived as insufficient, and the failure of government-supported financial
institutions if these information asymmetries were neglected.
The insights gained firstly contradict the two assumptions of
the credit for target group view: (a) low-income rural households
can and do save both in kind and in financial assets through a variety of informal arrangements, and (b) the existing savings capacity
in rural financial markets refutes the assumption that capital as
such is the major factor constraining rural development. Secondly,
the insights into rural households and the rural financial market
18
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institutions revealed the limitations of the informal financial institutions in mobilizing and storing savings, dealing with co-variant
risk, and transforming small, short-term savings into larger loans
of medium-term duration. In this way, these insights revealed an
unfulfilled demand for financial services that formal institutions
can address more readily than informal ones:
1. Mobilizing savings together with providing unrestricted
withdrawal.
2. Short-term lending for working capital, as and when
required.
3. Medium- and long-term lending for investments.
The overall conclusion was that rural households would benefit
from the presence of formal financial institutions with services
adjusted to their capabilities. The policy implications are twofold:
(a) government policy attention for rural finance was vindicated,
though not policies with the aim to provide capital, but policies to
enable formal financial institutions to intermediate between savers
and borrowers; and (b) policies should encourage financial institutions to participate in pushing the financial frontier to include
new, low-income rural households as their clients, by tackling the
information problem through innovative screening, monitoring,
and enforcement procedures.

The Performance of Microfinance Institutions
The views and policies described above translate into the operations
of microfinance institutions and thereafter into the assessment of
their performance. The credit for target group view results in microfinance institutions that focus on providing loans, generally in specified quantities and possibly provided in kind and earmarked for a
specific enterprise. These loans are provided to the defined target
group, to be used to attain the specified development goals. The
loans are generally at subsidized interest rates, as the target group is
poor—in whatever terms poverty is defined. The assessment of the
performance initially focuses on the number of loans provided, or
the number of people who have received one or more loans,
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because this number of people is assumed to reach the anticipated
development goal. The latter assumption can be tested through
impact assessment,1 for which elaborate methodologies have been
developed. This operational approach can be summed up as “supply
leading finance.” Adams and Von Pischke (1992) are among those
who have analyzed this approach in detail and shown that government interference adversely influences lending and causes the basic
economics of banking to be bypassed. The consequences of these
failings have been that microfinance institutions incurred losses
and sooner or later ceased operating—but not before destroying
repayment morale in the population and giving bank staff wrong
ideas about banking. Most importantly, the target group was only
partly and temporarily reached, and after the demise of the financial institution was again left without financial services.
Two developments in the 1980s and 1990s changed the situation. The emerging pushing the financial frontier view showed the
importance of permanent financial relationships for rural households, and thereby the permanence of financial institutions. The
“cost-covering interest rates” for microfinance institutions (instead
of the subsidized interest rates) advocated by Adams and Von
Pischke were a major step towards achieving such permanence.
Financial sustainability became part of the microfinance discussion
and Yaron (1992) made this operational by devising the subsidy
dependence index with two levels of achievement: operational sustainability and financial sustainability, whereby the latter indicates
the total independence from subsidies. New microfinance institutions took on board the increased insight and the attention for
financial sustainability and used new approaches to reach people
who had previously lacked access to institutional financial services.
The emergence and expansion of microfinance institutions was
greatly facilitated by a second development: financial liberalization. This meant a reduced role for government in the allocation of
capital, less interference with banking, and thus new opportunities
for banks and microfinance institutions to engage in the central
function of financial institutions: intermediating between savers
and borrowers. Less interference with banking generally meant the
20
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abandonment of interest rate control on savings and credit, and
that enabled the microfinance institutions to pay attention to
financial objectives.
By the end of the 1980s, case studies had become available on
microfinance institutions that had succeeded in reaching lowincome households with savings and credit services (Moll, 1989;
Patten & Rosengard, 1991; Yaron, 1992) and that showed a wide
variety of organizational structures and operations. These case
studies provided the material for comparative analyses and the
emergence of “best practices” in microfinance literature. These best
practices offer a wealth of experience, but as the description of the
background that shaped the specific institutions is generally limited, these best practices need to be tested, assessed, and adapted to
the individual circumstances.
Presently there seems to be consensus on at least the objectives of microfinance institutions: outreach towards low-income
people and financial sustainability. Given these two objectives,
microfinance institutions must deal with two central issues in
their day-to-day operations:
(a) the information issue: how to establish borrowers’ ability
and willingness to repay; and
(b) the cost issue: how to handle cost-effectively the small
financial transactions with a short duration generally
required by low-income people.
The first issue requires screening, monitoring, and enforcement
procedures that comply with the specific circumstances of lowincome people and that deviate widely from the usual banking
practices. The second issue requires operating with transaction
costs (including information costs and risk) that necessarily lead to
interest rates that are well above commercial bank rates, but that
are nevertheless still competitive and thus attractive for the
microfinance institution’s clients.
Microfinance institutions generally experience a trade-off in
their operations between the two objectives: a focus on the somewhat better known clients who require somewhat larger loans eases
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the cost issue and brings financial sustainability closer. This,
however, leaves the smaller clients outside the financial frontier.
Conversely, a focus on new clients with small financial capacities
who require small loans does bring new clients inside the frontier,
but also brings more costs and risk due to an initial shortage of
information on the new clients. The consequence is that it is more
difficult to achieve financial sustainability. It is in this trade-off
between the two objectives that the two views sketched in the previous section have maintained their roles up until today. The credit
for target group view complies directly with the outreach objective,
as outreach can be made operational in terms of reaching a specific
target group. Successfully reaching the target group with loans,
possibly measured through impact studies, may easily provide a
justification for slackening the financial sustainability objective by
accepting “structural subsidies” or by postponing the date for
achieving sustainability. The pushing the financial frontier view
offers more opportunity for a better balance between the two
objectives, as financial sustainability is required to keep lowincome people inside the financial frontier. The resulting greater
emphasis on financial sustainability may, however, slow the flow of
new people across the frontier.
The balance between the two objectives often remains hidden
in management decisions on organization, operations, and the
financial products offered. The consequences of these decisions
are, however, reflected in the annual accounts; whether or not
these are considered acceptable depends on the views of the governing body of the microfinance institution.

Microfinance and Rural Development
No studies have been done on the long-term effect of microfinance, most likely due to the relative youth of many microfinance
institutions and the generally still limited coverage within their
areas of operation. However, an exploration of studies on the
effects of microfinance on rural households and studies on the role
of finance at national level provides indications of what the longterm effect might be. As a start, an overview of the position of a
22
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Figure 1. Formal Financial Services in the Rural Financial
Market: Demand and Supply

microfinance institution in the rural financial market is given in
Figure 1.
The potential demand for formal financial services by the rural
population is depicted by the triangular segments. The population
in the lowest income quintile has a demand for saving services and
short-term credit. Higher income quintiles require more types of
services and a larger volume of these services, with the volumes
measured along the Y-axis. The position of commercial banks is on
the left: serving the highest income groups with a range of services.
Microfinance institutions focus on the population in the lower
quintiles and offer a limited range of services. Over time, successful microfinance institutions will reach a steadily increasing share
of the rural population and most likely will expand the range of
services offered. Commercial banks may also expand their presence
by offering services to somewhat less well-off people. In the long
run we can envision a gradual change from complementarity to
competition between the two types of financial institutions.
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The effect of microfinance on individual low-income households has been studied through microeconomic impact studies.
Three aspects are generally highlighted. Firstly, there is an increased
capacity to deal with risk through the withdrawal of savings or
obtaining credit in the case of an emergency. This may mean that
productive assets (machinery, inventory, land, livestock) need not
be sold during an emergency and thus that the flow of income is
not interrupted. Secondly, there is an improved management of
consumption requirements over the year, to maintain adequate
levels of food intake (Pitt & Khandker, 1998). This is of major
importance, as labor is often the main resource of low-income
households. Thirdly, opportunities to invest in productive enterprises increase. These increased capabilities of rural households to
produce, consume, and invest may be reflected only partly in the
actual credit and savings relationships with microfinance institutions, because reliable access to microfinance forms a potential
that can be tapped if and when required. This potential may, for
example, mean that the household’s own resources will be utilized
more fully for production, with access to microfinance being relied
on if there is an emergency.
Extrapolating the effects of microfinance on individual households to rural areas in total gives some idea of the overall consequences. The increased individual capacity to deal with shocks
reduces the effects of a co-variant shock for the rural population as
a whole, at least when a substantial proportion of the population is
within the financial frontier. Further, increased saving in financial
assets means a shift away from storing wealth in assets with zero or
low productivity. The financial savings become available for investment in agriculture, in agriculture-related trade and processing,
and in a host of other enterprises with expected benefits for technological progress and rural employment. In a later stage, when
remunerative investment opportunities in rural areas become limited and the volume of savings overtakes the volume of credit,
excess capital can be channelled via microfinance institutions and
the national banking system to urban areas where large-scale industries and services offer extensive investment opportunities. In this
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way, rural savers will benefit from those investments and the children of the savers might find the urban jobs they are looking for.
The above process of increased saving in financial assets followed by intermediation by the banking system and investment
by borrowers has been studied extensively at the national level.
In their theory of financial development, Shaw (1973) and
McKinnon (1973) describe this process as financial deepening.
This theory was developed in the 1960s when governments used
the banking system to support investment in their priority sectors
(often industry), thereby bypassing efficiency considerations in
many cases and neglecting domestic savings. Since the 1980s, many
countries have shifted policy from financial repression towards
financial liberalization, or from shallow finance to deep finance.
The relationship between financial development and economic
growth at the national level has received renewed attention now
that databases covering many countries over prolonged periods
have become available. In a cross-country sample of 80 countries
over the period 1960 to 1989, King and Levine (1993) found a
positive relationship between financial depth, measured through
four indicators, 2 and economic growth. They also showed that
financial development has predictive power for future growth,
indicating a causal relationship between financial development and
growth. Khan and Senhadji (2000) reviewed methodological issues
regarding the relationship between financial development and
growth and applied these insights to a data set covering 159 countries over the period 1960–1999. Their results are in line with the
findings of King and Levine, and they conclude that financial
depth is an important determinant of economic growth.
The analysis of the relationships between financial development and economic growth has been expanded to include poverty.
Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) studied income inequality in a large
data set from 112 developed and developing countries for the years
1947–1994. They found that financial deepening helped reduce
inequality and raise the income of the lower 80% of the population. Honohan (2004) gives a recent overview of financial
development, economic growth, and poverty and concludes that
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finance-intensive growth is empirically associated with lower
poverty ratios.
The discussion of financial deepening, economic growth, and
poverty cited above considers these issues at the national level.
However, the central tenet of financial deepening, a shift to saving
in financial assets followed by intermediation by the banking system
and investment by borrowers, has direct relevance for microfinance
in rural areas, since providing rural households for the first time
with access to savings and credit through local intermediation is
the core of financial deepening. The effects of financial deepening
go beyond the individual links between microfinance institutions
and households, because a reduction of the capital locked up in
poorly productive assets and the availability of capital for new,
trustworthy clients with productive uses fundamentally affects
economic relationships in rural areas. Rajan and Zingales (2003),
for example, state: “a healthy financial system can be a powerful
anti-monopoly tool, providing the lubrication for the emergence of
competitors that can undermine the power of incumbent firms,
and the means for poor households and small-scale producers to
escape the tyranny of exploitative middlemen.” Microfinance thus
positively affects economic life in rural areas; expanding outreach,
enlarging the microfinance oval in Figure 1 to include a substantial
proportion of the rural population, will make these effects more
visible.
The review of long-term financial development at the national
level also provides a perspective on a potentially negative side of
financial deepening: the occurrence of bank insolvency. Caprio
and Klingebiel (1996) give an overview of bank insolvencies in 69
countries since the late 1970s. The list includes countries from all
five continents and covers industrialized, transitional, and also
developing countries. A number of countries saw more than one
crisis in the period covered. The crises involved government
banks, private banks, savings banks, and rural banks and ranged
from a few banks to the entire banking sector in a country. The
costs or losses ranged from less than 1% of GDP to as much as
55% of GDP and were borne by taxpayers, savers, or a combina26
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tion of both. The factors cited as reasons for the crises range from
macroeconomic factors, through weak incentives for banks to act
prudently, to lack of managerial skill and fraud.
The widespread occurrence of national bank crises means that
viewed from a long-term perspective, financial institutions are at
risk irrespective of current apparently stable situations. For
microfinance institutions this risk has special dimensions. A possible collapse of a microfinance institution in a national banking
crisis means a loss of savings for their low-income clients, and
this is the more damaging as a financial crisis is usually followed
by a period of economic recession. Less visible, but with similar
grave consequences, is the loss of the relationship-specific social
capital built up between the microfinance institution and clients.
This social capital cannot be replaced without again overcoming
the information gap and building up new confidence between
financial institution and clients—a costly affair that will take
years. Finally, in a national banking crisis the government’s priorities are usually with the larger commercial banks. These banks
are more likely to be rescued in the name of national interest and
with taxpayers’ money than the smaller, less visible, rural microfinance institutions.
The exploration of microfinance and rural development shows
a potentially positive impact of microfinance institutions on rural
economic life, as they are the primary vehicles for the process of
financial deepening in rural areas. This process is not without risk,
however, as a failure of a microfinance institution, whether
induced by a national bank crisis or by the institution’s own
actions, will result in a loss of both financial capital and the relationship-specific social capital built up between institution and
client.

Discussion
The foregoing review of views and policies on microfinance and
the operations of microfinance institutions vis-à-vis the position of
microfinance in the long-term process of rural development leads
to the conclusions given below.
Volume 7 Number 2

27

Journal of Microfinance

First, the generally accepted objective of microfinance institutions—financial sustainability, or independence from subsidies—
seems to be outdated. It was certainly relevant in the 1980s and 1990s
when microfinance institutions were struggling into existence.
Nowadays, many microfinance institutions are operational and the
established relationships with clients deserve to be safeguarded. This
is the more relevant as history has shown that bank crises are the
rule rather than the exception. The financial objective must therefore be raised towards financial stability, defined as the ability to
withstand financial shocks, whether the shocks come from inside
due to the adverse conditions of clients or from outside, transmitted
through the financial links with the national economic and financial sectors. Financial stability must be approached from two sides:
diversification of the loan portfolio to minimize the negative
effects of co-variant risks facing the rural population, and building
up reserves. The latter means making a profit, not as an objective
as such, but as a requirement for continuation.
Second, outreach in the sense of reaching a more or less narrowly defined group is, in the long run, not justified. First, a focus
on one group of clients makes a microfinance institution vulnerable,
thereby endangering financial stability. Second, a focus on one
type of clients overlooks the indirect positive effects of wider access
to financial services for the rural population as a whole. Therefore,
the objective that is beneficial for all rural households in the long
run is expansion towards new clients and the provision of new
financial services. Profit comes in again for two additional reasons:
profitable microfinance institutions are more likely to be able to
draw capital from the national market for expansion, and profit is
required for experiments to include new groups of clients and to
develop new financial products to serve old clients better.
The two opposing views on microfinance, credit for target
group and pushing the financial frontier can be united into one new
perspective for policy formulation: stability and expansion. From
this perspective the first priority is to achieve financial stability to
maintain what has been achieved; the second is to expand towards
new clients. It is interesting to note that from a long-term perspective,
28
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there is no trade-off between stability and expansion, as financial
stability is a necessary condition for an expansion of services.
Government policies that are based on stability and expansion
must support microfinance institutions in two ways. First, they must
pass legislation that allows microfinance institutions to mobilize
savings, to provide credit, and to undertake other services, such as
insurance and money transfers. This combination of services
results in economies of scale and scope, which strengthens the
financial position of individual microfinance outlets and thus
allows geographical expansion and financial deepening in rural
areas. Second, prudent regulations are required that buttress the
financial stability of microfinance institutions in their specific
circumstances.

Notes
This article is based on a paper presented at the International Seminar on BRI
Microbanking System, Bali, Indonesia, 1–3 December 2004.
1. Impact assessment may include an assessment of the effect of credit on clients
as well as a study of the appropriateness of credit services.
2. (1) The ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) of the financial system to GDP; (2) the
ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank assets plus central bank domestic assets; (3) the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to
total domestic credit; and (4) the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to
GDP.
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Data Standards for Connecting
to Commercial Sources of
Capital

James Dailey
Abstract: The importance of data interchange between commercial sources of
capital and the microfinance sector is generally acknowledged, if not well
detailed. But microfinance institutions (MFIs) and commercial sources of capital
often need a different depth and breadth of information. As the industry grows
and accesses more commercial capital, there is a need to enable standardized
reporting from multiple MFIs to multiple sources of capital, rather than a proliferation of one-to-one reporting relationships. IT professionals and managers of
microfinance institutions need to recognize this need and push vendors and
industry associations to agree on specific standards of data elements, quality,
and transmission protocols. This paper aims to provide the reader with a grasp
of the issues involved and to recommend a sample set of data standards for MFIs
to use in communicating with commercial sources of capital.

O

ngoing financial innovations in the microfinance market—
equity investments, portfolio securitization, and credit
facilities—demand comprehensive scrutiny of microfinance institutions (MFIs) to ensure that their operational systems
meet the requirements of such financial instruments. In addition,
careful attention must be paid to the value and the quality of the
data MFIs produce.
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According to an article about financial transparency published
online by the World Bank’s Consultant Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP, n.d.),
Only a handful of microfinance providers currently include
enough information to comply with International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and industry-specific disclosure
guidelines. Industry-specific disclosure requires certain information in addition to that required by IFRS to permit a fair
assessment of the profitability and asset quality of microfinance operations.
The importance of enabling data interchange between commercial sources of capital and the microfinance sector has been
underscored in multiple forums. The microfinance industry needs
an estimated US$300 billion to grow to scale. However, this figure
may be too conservative, given that approximately three billion
people globally do not have regular access to financial services.
That number continues to grow.
An analysis of the industry's needs by a group of funders and
microfinance practitioners shows three related obstacles (personal
communication, July 28, 2004):
1. Lack of diversified sources of capital for microfinance
investing.
2. Lack of sufficient market infrastructure to facilitate efficient
information and resource flow.
3. Lack of business expertise and capacity among leading MFIs
required to reach scale.
From these concepts, we can derive broad requirements:
• Diversification of portfolio financing by MFIs requires more
sophisticated segmentation of the loan portfolio and loan servicing concepts, better data for regulatory agencies to allow

James Dailey is the Technical Project Manager for Innovations in Microfinance at the Grameen
Technology Center, an initiative of GFUSA located in Seattle, WA. Email: jdailey@gfusa.org
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registered deposit taking, and more customer data to enable
the modeling of the risk profile of any derivative securities.
• The market infrastructure factors that will enable resources
and information to flow are the ability to send information,
the need for data to be understood, and the need to create
norms, audit standards, and mechanisms to comply with the
requiremens of rating agencies.
• Organization-wide norms, expressed through systems, are a
key part of operational capacity. These systems must also
have the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions.
This paper proposes an overall strategy to meet the emerging
need for data standards in the microfinance industry. These standards should, nominally, leverage large parts of the existing financial
services standards with some important caveats. However, the
microfinance industry, precisely because it deals with the nonbanked, does not always have the same level of information that is
found in the formal sector.
Data standards should cover the following areas:
• Financial reporting, such as those embodied in the Mix
Market platform.
• Connections to commercial capital markets (e.g., the securitization of portfolio).
• The information needs of credit bureaus and regulatory
players.
• Remittances and external payment systems.
• Remote transactions and third-party transactions.
The remittance market, which is currently estimated at
US$150 billion annually, is particularly interesting to note as a
potential source of capital.
Third-party transactions include connections to global transactional systems such as point of sale (POS), automated teller
machine (ATM), credit card, or ACH transactions (an inter-bank
automated clearinghouse system). Such transactional networks typically operate through agreements with regulated banking entities
in each country, a fast growing market globally. Currently, these
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networks are absent in microfinance operations in rural environments, but this seems to be mostly a function of connectivity.
Other reporting standards not covered in this document
include those used by credit bureaus and other regulatory or standard financial documents used to evaluate an organization’s
strength.

Microfinance Open Source and
Establishing Standards
The microfinance open source project (Mifos) developed by
Grameen Foundation USA focuses on integrating data standards
and protocols for financial transactions into an operational system.
To maximize the effectiveness of the system and to move towards
common standards, input from others in the industry is critical,
particulary because one effective strategy for pioneering new standards is to encourage partner institutions to adopt them.

Intended Audience
The audience for this paper is composed of those concerned with
the technical interface between the back-office systems used by
microfinance institutions and those used by banking entities.
Vendors of back-office systems for MFIs and the Mifos software
itself will benefit from having specifications from these important
data flows.
General Approach
In the context of promoting financial instruments and the information requirements to enable the aforementioned financial
mechanisms, the intent of this report is to look as broadly as possible. Requirements for data standards should reflect current
trends away from legacy systems in the commercial sector, with
their strong systems-in-isolation approaches, and toward “marketplace” approaches, where interoperability and data exchange are
key drivers. There is probably little need in the microfinance sector to be backwards compatible with legacy systems in the commercial sector.
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There are numerous sources which can be used to determine
the information requirements for back-office systems of microfinance institutions. These include work on portfolio management
systems and financial accountability funded by the World Bank. As
noted by Dailey and Parekh (2003),
One of the most important kinds of information exchange
conducted at microfinance institutions is basic financial
reporting. Many different kinds of financial reports are needed
for the effective functioning of an institution. . . . These
reports can be intended for a variety of audiences, and encapsulate different subsets of data for institutional performance
and operations.
The financial reports typically used by MFIs include the
following:
• Teller/operational reports guide the teller or loan officer in
transactions.
• Portfolio reports provide qualitative analysis of the payment
performance of a loan portfolio, including such indicator calculations as loan aging, portfolio-at-risk, and credit scoring.
• Financial statements are the most common documents,
including balance sheets and income statements.
• Cash flow reports provide monitoring data for actual and
predicted cash flows; they are used in evaluating performance
and forecasting problems.
• Summary reports provide aggregate reports for upper management to guide institutional strategy and planning.
While useful to specific audiences, these reports focus only on
a high-level data summary. The financial instruments being considered by GFUSA and the MFIs, however, focus more on detailed
portfolio transactional data.
For the commercial banking sector and other sources of capital, the format and type of data needed is dictated by its use.
Whereas in equity investments, only summary data validating the
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strength of the organization and transparency about weaknesses is
necessary, for portfolio securitizations, more complex data is required.
To date, financial deals with microfinance organizations have not
demanded changes to the MFI-customer relationship. Therefore,
while the financial paper corresponding to that segment of the
portfolio may be traded (as in the case of ICICI Bank of India’s
purchase and subsequent sale of a segment of the portfolio of a
leading MFI to another Indian bank), the actual “loan servicer”
does not change. The requirements for the bank in these types of
deals, according to interviews conducted in August 2003 with
ICICI, will involve the following components:
• Elements of risk within the portfolio by segment (indentifying diverse sources of risk, such as geographic focus, industryspecific or MFI-management–specific issues, etc.).
• Determinants of that risk, including loan size, terms, and
loan purpose.
• Current loan terms and loan repayment history.
These elements determine how the funding bank would ideally
stratify the portfolio into risk-based segments and are thus the
basics for determining the appropriate pricing for the overall loan
portfolio. Until such pricing becomes outsourced to credit rating
agencies and similar entities, or there is sufficient industry history,
individual deals will require a willing bank to look at the risk factors and determine their pricing. Grameen Foundation USA and
Grameen Capital India could have a key role to play in determining how these types of data formats are generated and evaluated.
An article in the Deloitte and Touche Journal (Caplan, 2001)
points to three areas of data for the commercially traded loan:
1. Pedigree information—who issued the loan originally, under
what facility, etc.
2. Pricing information—how one should value the loan (largely
automated through algorithms in developed markets).
3. Back-office information—how a third party can service the
loan and what information is transferred to enable that.

38

Volume 7 Number 2

Data Standards

For microfinance, the third area of loan servicing is now
underway in limited areas. In contrast, the second area is still
unclear to the markets, and the first is relatively easy, since few
deals have happened. The second area deserves the most attention
because this is where the microfinance industry is the least standardized, and the availability of such transactional data sets is also
unclear, at best.
With regard to loan servicing, it is generally held that only the
original institution has the relationship and the operational reach
to service the customer. Actual field conditions are proving otherwise. Currently it appears true that only institutions with relatively
similar methodologies, rotating staffs, and similar geographic outreach can actually do loan servicing for another MFI or, through
acquisition, easily absorb the other MFI’s customer portfolio.
Although the industry is a long way away from offering investors
clear options for loan servicing, it is interesting to note that this misconception is already giving way to the real needs of the industry.

Reporting versus Transactions
As noted previously, banks with a typical lender relationship with
a microfinance institution are interested in standard financial
statements, such as balance sheets, profit and loss statements, cash
flow reports, and portfolio-at-risk ratios. They may have no interest
in the transactional data that underpins the portfolio-at-risk calculations but will be interested largely in the debt-to-equity ratios
and solid cash flows from external sources. These relationships do
not explicitly recognize the asset valuation of the portfolio.
Commercial sources of capital seeking to work with MFIs in the
same manner as a typical bank should structure the deal so that
either the asset of the loan portfolio is used as collateral or the asset
is effectively purchased, as happens in a securitization deal.
According to Jennifer Meehan (2004), director of GFUSA’s
Capital Markets Group, “In the largest individual microfinance
securitization to date, ICICI paid US$4.3 million for 25% of
SHARE’s loan portfolio. SHARE’s cost of funds was approximately
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8.75%, below the 12 to 13% it has traditionally paid borrowing
from commercial banks, including ICICI.”
It is clear that the ability to use the MFI portfolio as a readily
priced asset class requires a greater degree of reliability and accuracy
for the portfolio data, frequent or on-demand reporting on portfolio quality, and better transparency with regard to debt servicing by
the customer. Those standard financial practices do not necessarily
have to be specific to the microfinance industry, but they must exist
within it. They must also be enforced via commonly accepted mechanisms, such as true ratings agencies. The rating agencies must be
bonded and must be able to accurately assess the microfinance
portfolio through meaningful audits and analysis.
An important step toward data standardization in the microfinance industry is the creation of a set of data standards that are
universally accepted and understood by all MFIs.

Developing a Data Standard
The next section sets out a high level data standard. The first part
is concerned with the data elements that one would expect to find,
and the second part covers data protocol issues. The data standard
is given from the perspective of a flat file transmission.
The rationale for this is that in most electronic data interchanges, the database is flattened out to provide a simple hierarchy
of the multidimensional data, rather than sending a multitable
database.
The data elements should include annotations, which are
meant to magnify a particular grouping of data elements. For
example, the data element “extend” is a common annotation for
XML-based standards and indicates those places in the file format
where additional data elements can be added. Determining
optional or required elements and specifying data types are both
part of the standards settings and part of the implementation.
The process imagined for setting this data standard in the
microfinance industry is, briefly:
1. Determine minimum requirements of a specific bank.
2. Sketch out overall sector requirements (this document).
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3. Review the document (performed by the range of institutions that may be involved).
4. Develop a prototype solution between two entities.
Borrowing from Fannie Mae’s approach to data standards, the
Mifos project envisions a data dictionary, a conceptual data model,
and a conceptual XML shema.

Data Dictionary
The data dictionary will present the portfolio data standards in a
list form and will build on the data list below. It will include information for each data attribute, including standard business names,
screen names, definitions, data types and lengths, allowable values,
and XML names.
Conceptual Data Model
The conceptual data model will show the relationships between
groups of data, such as the recursive loan details and the client
information to which those loan details relate.
Conceptual XML Schema
The Mifos XML schema for this data set type will consist of references to the specialized microfinance schema (groups, methodologies) and standard financial data. It will essentially capture the data
dictionary in XML with attribute and element names, enumeration
values, and definitions.
Data Elements
Data elements can be described as having four segments:
1. Metadata—annotations and fields describing the data set,
its origins, and general information about the institution.
2. Customer data—basic determinants of risk with regard to
the profile of the customer.
3. Account data—information about the product (e.g., loan)
provided to the client.
4. Account transactions—the core of the data set, which
describes the payments and relationship to arbitration values
for being “on time.”
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Protocols for Data
Beyond the basic data format, there are many questions about how
data will be generated within the system. In the formal financial
sector, the relationship between transactional data and actual
accounting events is generally understood; knowledge of the microfinance sector, however, is limited. Data quality includes the concepts of reliability according to a set of financial operational
standards.

Table 1. Data Elements
Metadata

Customer data

Account data

Account
transactions

Data set information:
Number of records
Date or report
Annotations
Extend
Facility information (Tanche ID):
Bank deal identifier
Bank deal type
facility amount
Facility start date
Extend
Institution
information:
Name
Primary Location
National ID
Banking sys ID
Admin Contact
Technical Contact
Institutional rating
Rating by
Annotation
Extend
Portfolio
information:
Size of portfolio
overall
Size of portfolio
data in data set
Extend

Customer
(recursive):
Identifying
information—may
be stripped out
(Name, Address,
ID)
Age
Gender
Household income:
-Household income
component one
(opt)
-Household income
component two
(opt)
Extend
Determinants of
risk
-Length of
relationship with
institution (e.g.,
group membership
term)
-Type of work
-Type of industrial
sector (e.g.,
farming)
-Extend

Loan (recursive)
Loan Purpose
Loan amount
Extend
Terms of loan
Length
Interest
Collateral (opt)
-Type
-Value
-Date of value
-Depreciation
method
-Verification
method
Co-guarantors (opt)
Revolving loan
type?
Restrctured loan
type?
Extend

History of loans
Percentage of
payments
previously on time
Extend
Payments on this
current loan
(recursive)
Date of payment
Payment amount
On time? (flag)
Extend
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One of the successes of microfinance is the relatively high
repayment rates. This has been achieved through a combination of
personal touch (the officer goes to the customer), expectations
management (repayment schedules are structured with minor grace
periods that are not shared with the client), and group-based risk
management. The group-based risk management is the most
important factor and has several components, all of which are well
documented in microfinance literature. The first is loan issuance,
where the group operates as a kind of business plan review committee, ensuring that only the most productive business ideas are
advanced for funding. Secondly, it implies, depending on the situation, that the group entity is either the loan guarantor or the loan
recipient. Since these group entities are not legal entities, the individual is usually the stated borrower on the loan. Because the
group may, in some institutions, be required to make up any payment shortfalls, 97% to 100% repayment rates are not uncommon.
This creates a fundamental question for the data protocol: how
much intra-group payment dynamics are required to accurately
account for risk management?
It is at this level that the Mifos project hopes to have the greatest impact by allowing for metadata that explains the techniques
utilized by the MFI to manage such risk components. The protocol f o r c o m m un ic a t in g su c h r isk c omponents w il l need to
be f u r ther developed through surveys of existing MFIs and better
understanding of the intra-group dynamics that are captured in
internal back-office systems. One suggestion is to flag when individual payments are made in part or in full by the group, rather
than the debtor.

Metadata
Capturing the unique characteristics of microfinance requires a type
of metadata for the portfolio data. By structuring how those intragroup risk mitigation dynamics are described, the information system can manage the complex data and use it for risk analysis.
As detailed in the data elements section, metadata about the
transaction record set allows for the data quality and integrity to be
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described. Building on this, the metadata should allow for full
transparency to the appropriate parties of:
• Coverage, periodicity, timeliness.
• Data access and privileged rights.
• Data integrity.
• Data quality.
Coverage refers to the data set within context. Providing the
total portfolio of the organization and then the relative size of
the portfolio covered by the data set provides one type of context.
Periodicity of providing data can be regular or irregular, and if regular, the period should be noted in the metadata. Timeliness is a
judgment as to how well the data has been provided according to
the reference of the periodicity. Data integrity refers to the ability
to trace the data back to data generated at the source institution,
data quality refers to how well that data reflects actual occurrences.
Data access and privilege rights are self-explanatory.

Conclusions
The global financial services industry is a very large consumer of
data about customers and financial products. Microfinance, as a
part of that industry with a social mission, should also be able to
promote and use a set of standards for data about asset quality and
profitability. This data should be both meaningful to the commercial
sector and in keeping with the long-term mission to have customers
of microfinance become full economic participants in society.
Secondly, data that is sorted in different ways can reveal patterns and information beyond the initial intent. At a minimum,
microfinance institutions should be aware of the value of their customer database to the commercial bank, which may or may not be
thinking about these microfinance customers as their next market.
Lastly, Grameen Foundation USA and others are promoting
innovations in the financing of microfinance institutions to achieve
greater effectiveness in serving the poorest with access to credit.
Commercial data interface standards have an important role to play
in terms of leveraging the exiting portfolio quality for funding.
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Commercializing Microfinance
and Deepening Outreach?
Empirical Evidence from Latin
America
Francisco Olivares-Polanco
Abstract: Does commercialization mean mission drift? Christen (2001) argues
that commercialization, which is characterized by profitability, competition, and
regulation, does not have any effect on large differences in loan size between regulated and nonregulated MFIs. I used data from 28 Latin American MFIs to
conduct a multiple regression analysis to test for some of Christen’s conclusions,
as well as for other factors that, according to the literature on microfinance, may
affect loan size. The results of the regression indicate first that the type of institution, in terms of NGO versus financial institution, regardless of being regulated or not, has no effect on loan size. Second, the age of the institution
predicts loan size in a direction contrary to that suggested by Christen. Third,
competition turned out to be significant, in contradiction to Christen’s conclusion; it appears that more competition may lead to larger loan sizes and less
depth of outreach. Finally, the models confirm an old belief in microfinance:
there is a trade-off between depth and sustainability.

M

icrofinance institutions (MFIs) in Latin America are in
the midst of a commercialization process. International
organizations are encouraging this process and inviting
NGOs to join it, while the perception of MFIs as profitable businesses has increased (Christen, 2001). In an MFI inventory carried

Journal of Microfinance

out by Christen in 2001, 205 MFIs were identified in Latin
America. Seventy-seven MFIs (37.6% of the total) were regulated
and accounted for 73.9% of a US$877 million portfolio. In general, this phenomenon has been called the commercialization of
microfinance. Commercialization is characterized by profitability,
competition, and regulation, but at the same time large differences
in loan size are observed between regulated and unregulated institutions (Christen, 2001). While unregulated MFIs recorded an
average outstanding loan size of US$322 in 1999, regulated institutions recorded US$803, which is 2.5 times larger. Assessed in
terms of relative wealth, the average outstanding loan size for
unregulated MFIs represented 24% of GNP per capita in 1999,
versus 49% for regulated MFIs.
Do these large differences in loan size mean mission drift?
Christen concludes that larger loans do not necessarily indicate
mission drift, and they could simply be the function of different
factors, such as choice of strategy, period of entry into the market,
or natural evolution of the target group. Consequently, in the first
place this paper discusses the points of view on impact assessment
and the use of loan size as a “proxy” measurement for poverty
level, and more important, it tests through a multiple regression
analysis for commercialization factors, as well as for those factors
that may also affect depth of outreach, in terms of loan size.
A preliminary sample of 30 Latin American MFIs was chosen
and finally 28 were included, based on the availability of operational and financial information. 1

Some Points of View on Impact Assesment
Microfinance scholars and practitioners are divided into two fields:
the welfarist and the institutionalist (Bhatt & Tang, 2001; Woller
& Woodworth, 2001). Morduch (2000) refers to these two positions as the microfinance schism. Each position differs in their views
on how microfinance services should be delivered (NGO versus
Francisco Olivares-Polanco is currently working as a Consultant for CANTV, the largest
telecommunication company in Venezuela. Email: folivares@alumni.pitt.edu
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commercial banks), on the technology they should use (financial
services, or “minimalist,” approach versus an “integrated” service
approach), and on how their performance should be assessed,
among other subjects.
On the last mentioned discrepancy, the welfarists believe that
MFI performance should be assessed in terms of the impact on the
welfare of the poor. In short, the welfarist approach is not only
concerned with the question of how poor the clients are, but
whether or not they are less poor after they borrow the money
(Cheston & Reed, 1999). Hence, their methods are aimed at determining whether the institutions are achieving their poverty reduction objective. On the other hand, the institutionalists believe that
performance should be assessed in terms of the institution’s success
in achieving self-sustainability and breadth of outreach. Breadth
and depth of outreach, although desirable for both institutionalists and welfarists, are perceived as contradictory objectives, thus
representing a trade-off for the institutions.
For the welfare-oriented practitioners, microfinance should
focus on reaching the poorest and help alleviate both material and
nonmaterial poverty, even with subsidized operations. On the
other hand, the institutionalists foster financial broadening, where
microfinance should focus on providing services to a large number
of poor people and reaching financial sustainability through more
efficient operations, market or higher-than-market interest rates,
and economies of scale (Bhatt & Tang, 2001).

Methods, Advantages, and Disadvantages of each Approach
The methods used by the welfarists assess the impact of the program on their clients by measuring changes in dependent variables,
such as the level of income, the level of production, sales, assets, or
the general well being of the client (Alfaro, 1999; Bhatt & Tang,
2001). The underlying assumption is the existence of a direct causal
relationship between the credit and the observed change in the dependent variable (Rhyne, 1994). The methodology to assess the impact
generally consists in collecting data ex-ante and ex-post the program intervention through direct interviews, and sometimes in
comparing the results against a control group.
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Eventually, the advantage of this approach is that it would
allow knowing whether the MFI has a positive impact in fighting
poverty. However, there are diverse criticisms to this approach.
Selection bias, lack of control groups, and inability to gather longitudinal data are common concerns (Bhatt & Tang, 2001).
Validity of the data also seems to be problematic, because such
studies “rely on the often unreliable memories of clients to determine their status before receiving a loan” (Cheston & Reed, 1999).
In addition, conducting these may take time and may be too
expensive to be absorbed by MFIs on a regular basis (Alfaro, 1999).
Additional fundamental problems still remain with this
methodology. First, credit is not an input for the production
process, but rather a financial instrument that increases purchasing
power. The fungibility of financial instruments implies that establishing a causal relationship between the credit and the dependent
variables would require controlling for the rest of the unit of analysis’s sources and uses of funds (Alfaro, 1999) and probably for
other factors different from money that may have an effect on the
dependent variables under study (i.e., the level of education of
the borrower). Second, the credit does not necessarily represent an
addition of 100% in purchasing power. In some cases there is
financial substitution and deviation (Von Pischke & Adams, 1980;
Alfaro, 1999). 2 In addition, even though an impact analysis
includes control groups, there is the problem of achieving equivalence between the control group and the group actually receiving
loans. As an efficient financial system or institution should discriminate between good and risky clients, the control groups
would be essentially different (Alfaro, 1999). Finally, looking for
equivalent control groups may also lead to other dilemmas.3
Contrary to the welfarist methods, the analysis of the institution’s performance carries lower costs and becomes more feasible to
assess continually in the long run. Basically, the institutionalist
approach employs two measurements of success: outreach and sustainability. Outreach is measured in two dimensions: depth, or
how poor the clients are; and breadth, or how many people the program is reaching. There is no causality chain analysis, and the
50
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indicators for depth of outreach are various measures of loan size.
For international comparisons, a ratio of loan size to per capita
GDP is also commonly used (Alfaro, 1999; Schreiner, 2001), and
breadth is usually measured as the number of clients or the types
of instruments offered (Bhatt & Tang, 2001).
The level of sustainability is measured through financial indicators such as the Subsidy Dependency Index (SDI), suggested by
Yaron in 1992, or through other similar indicators such as the
Explicit Subsidy Dependency Index (ESDI) or the Implicit Subsidy
Dependency Index (ISDI). Other more common measures such
as the Return over Equity (ROE) or the Return over Assets (ROA)
are also employed, but they do not account for subsidies when they
are recorded in the Profit and Loss statement. Contrary to the
welfarist approach, subsidies adjustments are necessary under this
approach, and they have to be reduced to a minimum level when a
MFI is looking for sustainability. In addition, Rhyne (1994) recommends the inclusion of one additional measure: the quality of the
service provided or quality of outreach. When an institution
records high repayment rates and high growth rates in terms of
clients, retains a large number of clients, and its clients are willing
to pay interest rates that allow for institutional self-sustainability,
then the services provided by the institution are considered of
“good quality” because they are “appreciated and relevant to its
clients” (Christen, Rhyne, Vogel, & McKean, 1995; Alfaro, 1999).
Due to the availability of data to carry out an analysis under
the institutionalist point of view, the methodology of this study
is framed within this approach. The shortcomings of the study will
be addressed when explaining each variable. Consequently,
the final results of this study are influenced and affected by these
limitations.

Models and Data
The goal of the study is to test for commercialization factors, as
well as for other factors that according to the literature may have
an impact on the depth of outreach. I use the Ordinary Least
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Square (OLS) regression method to find out which variables are
good predictors of loan size.

Dependent Variable: Depth of Outreach
Within the institutionalist approach, reaching the poor means
small loan sizes. The basic assumption is that the smaller the loan
size, the deeper the outreach, or the poorer the client. Thus, loan size
has been consistently used as a “proxy” for the level of poverty. In
his study, Christen uses two widely used measures of loan size:
average outstanding loan (AOL), obtained by dividing the outstanding loan portfolio by the number of active clients at the end
of the period of analysis; and the ratio of AOL to per capita GNP
(AOL/PCGNP), usually used in cross-comparative analyses. For
the initial sample of 30 Latin American MFIs, the AOL from the
NGOs was US$769, while financial institutions recorded
US$1,026 (1.33 times the NGO loan size). This result is much
lower than the ratio obtained by Christen (2.5 versus 1.33), which
may be the result of a selection bias problem, which is discussed in
detail in the section on data.
Schreiner (2001) critiques the use of both AOL and
AOL/PCGNP because they do not take into account other aspects
of loan size, 4 especially term to maturity. Schreiner argues that
AOL is imperfect, because it measures the resources held in the
term of the loan but does not consider the length of the term to
maturity. Since finance is the exchange of resources through time,
then loan size should account for it. Additionally, in many countries, especially in poor countries, per capita GNP can be distorted
by inequalities in income distribution. In countries with higher
inequalities, per capita GNP exceeds both median GNP and the
poverty-line income (Schreiner, 2001). Hence, AOL/PCGNP may
not be a useful measure for cross-comparative analysis. Schreiner
also criticizes the fact that the numerator and denominator pertain
to different time frames. The numerator (AOL) is a flow disbursed
in a specific moment, while the income (PCGNP) is generated in
an entire year. Within a year, there can be more than one disbursement. Schreiner suggests an alternative measure to adjust for time:
dollar-years of resources from loans over dollar-years of resources
52
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from annual income, if it were all saved (denoted as $-years loan/$years income). Regrettably, there was not complete information on
the average disbursed loan for all the institutions under study;
thus, AOL substitutes this variable in Schreiner’s original formula:
Average outstanding loan
$-years loan/$-ye ars income =

12
2
Average term to matur ity 1
Per capita GDP / 2

I regress three measures of loan size—the two used by Christen
and the third suggested by Schreiner—on 7 independent variables,
but adjusting two of the measures of loan size containing income:
the AOL/PCGDP, and $-years loan/$-years income. In his critique
of the use of either per capita GNP or GDP, Schreiner suggests the
use of poverty-line income or median income but recognizes that
the first is measured in different ways across countries and that the
data for the second is hard to find. Therefore, I substitute per
capita GDP by per capita GDP of the 20% poorest when measuring both AOL/PCGDP and $-years loan/$-years income. Thus, the
new measures are AOL/PCGDP20% and $-years loan/$-years
income20%.
The average income of the poorest quintile could be a better
indicator than per capita GNP in order to compare outreach
among MFIs. This indicator is closer to the target group that MFIs
should be serving, and probably, there are no problems of significant inequality within the group. Although there are almost no
studies on income distribution aimed specifically at the poorest
quintile, 5 this study assumes that income distribution among the
lowest 20% is not as unequal as for the whole population. For
instance, when using AOL/PCGDP and the value of 1 as the upper
limit usually used as the indicator of depth of outreach (Alfaro,
1999), 24 out of 28 institutions would be classified as having a
“deep” outreach; that is, their AOLs represent less than the average
income. But when per capita GDP of the poorest 20% is used,
then only three institutions may claim that their AOLs were lower
than the income of the average person in the poorest quintile.
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This analysis suggests that most of the MFIs, whether they are
NGOs or banks, are not reaching the very poor when using these
adjusted measurements of loan size. Contrary to the expected
result, AOL/PCGDP and AOL/PCGDP20% are highly correlated
(0.924). A possible explanation is that the income share held by
the lowest 20% across the ten countries included in the analysis is
very similar (mean= 3.43%, standard deviation= 0.95). Similarly,
$-years loan/$-years income and $-years loan/$-year income20%
are also highly correlated (0.9608). In fact, and less expected,
AOL/PCGDP and $-years loan/$-year income also show a high
correlation (0.8374), and when adjusting by GDP of the lowest
20%, the correlation increases (0.9138), which suggests that, for
this specific analysis, accounting for time should not make much
difference.
Finally, the main limitation of loan size measures as a “proxy”
for poverty measurement emerges when the basic assumption—the
smaller the loan, the poorer the client—does not hold. This
assumption is based on another assumption: people with access to
traditional banking services do not find small loan sizes attractive,
since they have to wait months or even years to get large loans
(Woller & Woodworth, 2001). However, when access to credit is
restricted in an economy, there is a possibility that the well-off will
be willing to assume the high opportunity costs of borrowing small
amounts of money (Dunford, 2002; Hatch & Frederick, 1998).
Loan size is the only available information from most MFIs and is
used for the purpose of this analysis, despite the fact that some
scholars and practitioners do not recommend its use due to its
weakness in accurately determining the poverty level of clients and
beneficiaries (Hatch & Frederick, 1998).

Independent Variables
Type of Institution. In his paper, Christen (2001) compares the
loan size of regulated and nonregulated microfinance institutions
in Latin America and found substantial differences in loan size
between the two groups. Because regulated MFIs are associated
with increasing commercialization, Christen asked whether com54
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mercialization has drifted the MFIs’ mission of reaching the poorest of the poor. In his conclusion, Christen disregards mission drift
and suggests that large differences in loan size may be caused by
factors such as choice of strategy, maturity of portfolio, or client
group. Commercialization, characterized by profitability, competition, and regulation, has no effect.
To assess for the type-of-institution effect, I include a “dummy
variable” on whether the unit of analysis is a NGO (1) or not (0).
From the initial sample of 30 Latin American MFIs, there are 11
NGOs and 19 banks or nonbanking financial institutions, a group
that I called “financial institutions.” Regrettably, the sample is
mainly composed of regulated institutions—only three NGOs were
unregulated—and the simple dichotomy is not enough to characterize the variety of MFIs operating in Latin America. The results on
the adjusted loan sizes for each group are surprising. The ratio
AOL/PCGDP is larger for NGOs than for financial institutions
(0.80 versus 0.56), and the ratio AOL/PCGDP20% is again larger
for NGOs than for financial institutions (5.50 versus 2.90). A
similar outcome is also observed when using Schreiner’s loan size
measure. Given these large differences, and despite the fact that
MFIs are mostly regulated, it is still relevant to test for the type of
institution.
Age of the Institution. As mentioned in the previous section,
the differences in loan sizes found by Christen may be caused by
choice of strategy, maturity of portfolio, client group, or a combination of these causes. On choice of strategy, Christen argues that
“larger loan sizes could simply be the result of deliberate strategy
or choice . . . all the older, more established microfinance institutions (including in their previous incarnations as NGOs) in Latin
America started with an explicit objective to generate employment
in the urban microenterprise sector, so that their initial mission
was not reaching the poorest of the poor.” Christen mentions as a
choice of strategy the choice of operating as a regulated or nonregulated institution (instead of the NGO versus financial institution
dichotomy that is tested in this study), and in this case “large differences . . . may simply reflect the fact that the two groups started
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out to serve quite different populations.” On the maturity of portfolio, Christen argues that “[w]hat appears to be mission drift may
also be nothing more than the natural evolution of the average loan
balances of NGOs that transformed themselves into regulated
financial institutions . . . [t]hey all engaged in incremental lending,
in which loan balances start well below the client’s ability to pay
the installments and are subsequently increased through many
short-term loans.” Dunford (2002), Christen et al. (1995), and
Jansson and Taborga (2000) offer similar arguments.
Two of these three factors have a common element: the age of
the institution. Hence, years of operation are used to control for the
effect of time. In fact, Christen et al. (1995) consider that “in judging whether a given institution has achieved extensive outreach,
comparisons must be made with achievements of other institutions,
keeping in mind the program’s age.” In this case, the prediction
would be: the older the institution, the larger the loan size.
Sustainability. Throughout this document it has been stated
that financial sustainability and depth of outreach are perceived as
contradictory objectives. The basic assumption is that lending
small credits to the poor carries a higher cost of operation, hence
the prediction would be: the larger the loan size, the more profitable and sustainable the institution. On this issue, Schreiner
(2001) says, “greater loan size usually means more profitability for
the lender but less depth of outreach for the borrower.” He later
adds that “the drive for profits for the organization tends to
improve all aspects of outreach, except perhaps depth” (Schreiner,
2002). Woller and Woodworth argue that “the unsatisfied credit
demand among the disadvantaged non-poor, the not-so-poor, and
the poor, together with the high costs of targeting and reaching the
very poor, created an almost irresistible pull for MCIs 6 to move
upscale to wealthier and more profitable market segments.”
For this study it was not possible to find data on self-sufficiency
that excluded explicit or implicit subsidies, as Yaron suggests.
Hence, a measure of Return over Assets (ROA) without these
adjustments is used as the sustainability variable, instead of Return
over Equity (ROE), which may be distorted by the leverage or
56
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differences in the financing structures between NGOs, non-banking institutions, and banks.
Breadth of Outreach. For this study, breadth of outreach is the
number of active borrowers. As breadth and sustainability are positively related, then both are inversely related to depth, so the larger
the number of clients, the lower the depth or the larger the loan
size. However, in absolute terms, the picture can still be optimistic.
As Schreiner (2001) argues, wider breadth offsets depth, when an
institution reaches “as many of the very poor as poverty-oriented
organization with narrow breadth,” even when recording high
average loan balances.
Competition. According to Christen, “in regular markets, classic enterprises usually respond to competitive pressures by offering
new and better products at more competitive prices and by
improving productivity. As microfinance institutions increasingly
find themselves operating in markets where competition abounds,
their behavior more and more resembles that of classic enterprises.” Does competition increase the loan size? Christen argues
that commercialization, and therefore their characteristic components, does not have an effect on loan size. Hence, there should not
be any relationship between these two variables. I use the percentage of concentration of the four largest MFIs by country: the
higher the level of portfolio concentration, the lower the competitive pressures. Concentration is measured as the market share held
by the four largest MFIs in a country, and is calculated with data
from Christen (2001).
Gender. Depth of outreach has been also associated with gender distribution of the portfolio (Alfaro, 1999; Navajas, Schreiner,
Meyer, Gonzales-Vega, & Rodriguez-Mesa, 2000; Bhatt & Tang,
2001). Studies on women and development show that women are
relatively poorer than men; therefore, any institution engaged in
reaching mostly women should provide smaller loans. In this
study, gender is measured as the percentage of women clients in
the portfolio.
Credit Methodology. Two broad methodologies have been regularly used in microfinance: individual loans and group lending
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(solidarity groups). Using the latter methodology, each member
guarantees the repayment of every other member’s portion, which
creates social pressures within the group to avoid defaulting.
Christen found that the tendency of Latin American MFIs during
the last 10 years is toward an increasing number of individual
loans. What would be the effect of this tendency on loan size? For
Woller and Woodworth, “the process of loan-group formation also
can work to exclude the very poor. Lending groups typically
assume joint liability for loan repayment, which can create an
incentive to exclude the very poor, who are seen by other group
members as poorer credit risks.” This vision, however, contradicts
the generally accepted assumption that lending groups reach
poorer subjects of credit who do not have enough collaterals to
apply for an individual loan. An analysis of five Bolivian MFIs carried out by Navajas et al. (2000) found that “the group lenders in
Bolivia reached the poorest better than individual lenders.”
Besides, lending groups are mainly associated with microfinance
programs aimed at women, and as it has been argued above,
women are considered to be relatively poorer.
Usually, MFIs do not engage in only one credit methodology;
rather, they use both. Then, in order to assess the impact of credit
methodology on loan size, individual loans as the percentage of the
portfolio is used, with the prediction as follows: the larger the percentage, the lower the depth of outreach and the larger the loan size.

Sources of Data
Information on most of the variables is drawn from each MFI and
is mainly public. MFIs elaborate the primary data either for actual
variables used in this study or for their construction (e.g., loan size
measures and return over assets). Although sources of data were
various, the majority of the information for the years 1999, 2000,
and 2001 is available from the Microfinance Information Exchange
Program (Mix) web page (www.themix.org), a not-for-profit private
organization supported by CGAP-World Bank, the Citigroup
Foundation, and other private foundations. Specifically, the data
are available from those institutions with high or full disclosure of
58
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information—rated by the Mix as 4 and 5 diamonds; however, not
all the MFIs rated as 4 or 5 diamonds had complete data for the
study. In total, there were 36 MFIs rated lower than 4 and 5 diamonds, but only 28 MFIs had information on most of the variables
either from the Mix Market or from other sources. To fill the gaps
of information, I used other sources, such as the web sites of
Accion International (www.accion.org), MFIs, and banking regulatory agencies, as well as MFIs’ annual reports and audited financial
statements. Most of the annual reports and financial statements
were also available through the Mix Market in the form of pdf documents. Because the data are presented or have been translated
from local currencies into US$ and contained in a period of four
years, I did not adjust the financial statements by inflation nor
restate them in a year-base currency, assuming that the statistical
effect would be negligible.
Missing values on gender and credit methodology were substituted in both cases by the mean obtained from the rest of the
sample. Two additional institutions were added to the original 28
MFIs; one from a case study written by the author (Financiera
Calpia, El Salvador), and the other from information released by a
banking regulatory agency (Bangente, Venezuela). The only data
not generated by the MFIs were GDP, population, income share
held by the lowest 20% of the population, and the average and
year-end exchange rate. The source of this information was the
International Finance Statistics (CD-ROM) from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF).
Some comments on the data and the sample are relevant at this
point. First, as the author constructed, fully or partially, some of
the variables, there is the possibility of error. Second, although the
sample represents only the 13.6% of the MFIs inventoried by
Christen in 2001, there could be a selection bias problem because
the sample was not randomly selected. As this is the only public
information available on Latin American MFIs for the purpose of
this study, and most of the information was drawn from the Mix
Market database, it is possible that this sample is substantially different from the actual MFI population. The Mix Market promotes
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transparency among MFIs worldwide, and the fact that only 3 out
of 11 Latin American NGOs from this database are unregulated
could be an indicator that most of the institutions reporting to the
Mix Market are following a more commercial-oriented strategy
than the actual population of MFIs as a whole. In fact, two of the
three unregulated NGOs operate in Nicaragua, where, according
to Christen, “commercialization has not entailed the transformation of financial NGOs into licensed banking intermediaries . . .
[s]purred by direct competition, commercialization is beginning
even though traditional profit-seeking entrepreneurs, such as commercial banks, have not yet entered the market.” For these reasons,
it is possible that the results from this study cannot be generalized
to the entire population of Latin American MFIs and reflects more
accurately the reality of commercial MFIs in the region.

Results
OLS was conducted to determine which of the seven variables are
predictors of loan size. For this study, three measures of loan size
were used, resulting in three sets of models. Data screening allowed
the identification of outliers, and two institutions were eliminated
in each of the three sets: Compartamos and FMDR, both from
Mexico. Compartamos is a regulated nonbanking institution, while
FMDR is an unregulated NGO. Therefore, the final database
ended up with a total of 28 observations, where only two were
unregulated NGOs—from Nicaragua—and eight were regulated
NGOs.

Model Containing AOL
The regression results for the model containing AOL (US$ per
loan) as the dependent variable and seven independent variables do
not indicate that the model significantly predicts loan size, R2
=0.185, R2adj= -0.100, F (7,20) = 0.649, p[0.712. This model
accounted for only 18.5% (zero when adjusting for degrees of freedom) of the variance in loan size, and none of the coefficients
proved to be significant, suggesting that these independent variables are not useful in predicting loan size in terms of absolute
value—US$ per loan.
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Table 1. Database of Selected Latin American MFIs
Institution

Country

Year of
Data

AOL
(US$)

AOL/
PCGDP
20%

$-years
loan/ $-years
income 20%

1

ACODEP

Nicaragua

1999

291.00

5.652

24.452

2

ACTUAR-Tolima

Columbia

2000

340.17

1.180

3.357

3 ACTUAR-Antioquia

Columbia

2001

608.76

2.108

5.727

4

ADMIC

Mexico

2000 1,588.70

1.548

3.286

5

BancoSol

Bolivia

2000 1,279.70

6.484

12.238

6

Crear-Tanca

Peru

2000 1,433.00

3.126

13.227

7

Eco Futuro

Bolivia

2000

655.33

3.320

12.826

8

EDYFICAR

Peru

2000

599.49

1.308

5.207

9

FADES

Bolivia

2000

529.13

2.681

5.984

10

FAMA

Nicaragua

2000

433.63

7.980

37.131

11

Finamerica

Columbia

2000 1,032.78

3.583

10.081

12

FINCOMUN

Mexico

2000

993.62

0.968

6.690

13 Génesis Empreserial

Guatemala

2000

442.33

1.396

4.066

14

PRODEM

Bolivia

2000

782.18

3.963

11.097

15

Visión de Finanzas

Paraguay

2000

659.47

5.072

18.876

16

WWB-Medellín

Columbia

2000

325.48

1.129

4.438

ADOPEM Dominican Rep

1999

17

386.22

0.719

2.081

Bolivia

1999 2,945.07

14.609

24.029

19

Banco ADEMI Dominican Rep

2000 3,088.14

5.155

11.429

20

Caja los Andes

Bolivia

1999

919.33

4.560

12.043

21

CMAC-Arequipa

eru

2001 1,001.38

2.221

7.650

22

CMAC-Maynas

Peru

2000

314.93

0.687

3.000

23

FIE

Bolivia

2000

962.51

4.877

10.876

24

FINDE

Nicaragua

1999 1,136.15

22.065

91.500

25

MiBanco

Peru

2000

636.35

1.388

2.094

26

PROEMPRESA

Peru

2000 1,160.31

2.531

12.469

27

Financiera Calpia

El Salvador

2000

802.68

2.311

6.619

28

Bangente

Venezuela

2001 1,412.76

1.832

10.916

18

AgroCapital

Table 1. Database of Selected Latin American MFIs (continued)
Institution
ACODEP

Type Age Sustainability
(ROA)
1 10
10.67%

Breadth of
Outreach
15,073

Gender

Credit
Level of
Methodology Competition
62.0%
98.75%
0.632

ACTUAR-Tolima

1

14

-14.68%

3,444

52.7%

69.00%

0.757

ACTUAR-Antioquia

1

18

2.98%

8,913

57.5%

100.00%

0.757

ADMIC

0

20

-0.88%

4,424

90.0%

100.00%

0.793

BancoSol

0

14

0.89%

60,976

72.0%

65.00%

0.587

Crear-Tanca

0

8

4.51%

2,637

40.0%

95.00%

0.935

Eco Futuro

0

1

-12.00%

17,400

52.0%

42.00%

0.587

EDYFICAR

0

3

2.74%

16,451

45.0%

95.00%

0.935

FADES

1

14

0.08%

22,582

35.0%

80.45%

0.587

FAMA

1

9

5.34%

14,301

66.0%

100.00%

0.632

Finamerica

0

7

-2.87%

16,049

48.0%

44.50%

0.757

FINCOMUN

0

6

-1.25%

3,300

46.0%

100.00%

0.793

Génesis Empreserial

1

12

1.41%

25,217

58.0%

77.90%

0.908

PRODEM

0

14

0.29%

30,227

49.0%

34.43%

0.587

Visión de Finanzas

0

8

2.89%

34,531

57.5%

100.00%

0.842

WWB-Medellín

1

15

8.52%

8,883

5803%

100.00%

0.757

ADOPEM

1

17

10.70%

17,847

88.0%

39.00%

1.000

AgroCapital

1

7

0.04%

4,524

57.5%

100.00%

0.587

Banco ADEMI

0

17

9.73%

16,408

36.0%

100.00%

1.000

Caja los Andes

0

4

-15.74%

36,814

54.0%

100.00%

0.587

CMAC-Arequipa

0

15

4.83%

49,246

57.5%

100.00%

0.935

CMAC-Maynas

0

13

4.33%

14,053

57.5%

100.00%

0.935

FIE

0

15

1.59%

23,402

53.8%

100.00%

0.587

FINDE

1

6

13.02%

2,837

62.0%

100.00%

0.632

MiBanco

0

8

3.39%

58,088

59.0%

80.45%

0.935

PROEMPRESA

0

14

2.80%

3,559

44.0%

92.00%

0.935

Financiera Calpia

0

12

4.29%

37,621

60.6%

100.00%

0.867

Bangente

0

2

-3.93%

5,221

49.0%

100.00%

1.000
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Table 2. Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of
Average Outstanding Loan (AOL) on Selected
Independent Variables
Independent Variable
Type of institution (NGO – Financial Inst.)

Model
-545.863
(-1.526)

Age of the institution (years)

15.363
(0.503)

Sustainability (ROA)

12.580
(0.518)

Breadth of outreach (# clients)

-0.0102
(-1.072)

Competition (concentration)

-6.103
(-0.587)

Gender (% women as clients)

-5.901
(-0.485)

Credit methodology (% of individual loans)
Constant
R2
Adjusted R2
F-value (model)
Number of MFIs

5.213
(0.760)
1,524.557
(1.196)
0.185
-0.100
0.649
(7, 20)
28

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values, except for F-value (degrees of freedom).
* p [ 0.05
** p [ 0.01
*** p [ 0.001

Models Containing AOL/PCGDP20%
In these models, AOL/PCGDP20% is the dependent variable and
the regression results indicate that the full model significantly predicts loan size, R2 =0.57, R2adj= 0.42, F(7,20) = 3.790, p[0.01.
This model accounts for 42% of the variance in loan size adjusted
for degrees of freedom, and three coefficients (age, sustainability,
and competition) are significantly different from zero, suggesting
that they do have an effect on loan size. The reduced model is a
more parsimonious one: only the three significant independent

Volume 7 Number 2

63

Journal of Microfinance

variables were included, and although R2 decreased, adjusted R2
increased.

Table 3. Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of the
Ratio Average Outstanding Loan (AOL) to Per Capita
GDP of the Lowest 20% on Selected Independent
Variables.
Independent Variable

Model 1 (full)

Model 2 (reduced)

Type of institution (NGO – Financial Inst.)

0.431
(0.251)

_____

Age of the institution (years)

-0.347*
(-2.360)

-0.334*
(-2.520)

Sustainability (ROA)

0.332**
(2.837)

0.374**
(3.663)

Breadth of outreach (# clients)

-0.000029
(-0.637)

_____

Competition (concentration)

-0.174**
(-3.490)

-0.178***
(-4.123)

Gender (% women as clients)

0.035
(0.601)

_____

Credit methodology (% of individual loans)

0.027
(0.803)

_____

Constant

17.094*
(2.789)

20.977***
(5.778)

R2
Adjusted R2
F-value (model)

0.57
0.42
3.790**
(7, 20)

0.531
0.472
9.053***
(3, 24)

Number of MFIs

28

28

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values, except for F-value (degrees of freedom).
* p [ 0.05
** p [ 0.01
*** p [ 0.001

Models Containing $-years loan/income 20%
The last set of models include $-years loan/income of the lowest
20% as the dependent variable. For this case, the regression results
indicate that the full model significantly predicts loan size, R2
=0.593, R2adj= 0.451, F(7,20) = 4.164, p[0.01. This model
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accounts for 0.451% of the variance in loan size corrected for
degrees of freedom, and again the same three coefficients from the
model containing AOL/PCGDP20% (age, sustainability, and competition) are significantly different from zero, suggesting that they
do have an effect on loan size. In a way similar to the previous
model, the three significant independent variables were included in
a separate model (2). For the reduced model, although R2
decreased, adjusted R2 increased, as it was observed previously.
Interestingly, adjusted R2 are very similar for both sets of models
(0.472 versus 0.471).

Table 4. Unstandardized Coefficients from the Regression of the
ratio $-years of resources from loan to $-year of resources
from per capita GDP of the lowest 20% on Selected
Independent Variables.
Independent Variable

Model 1 (full)

Model 2 (reduced)

Type of institution (NGO – Financial Inst.)

1.349
(0.213)

_____

Age of the institution (years)

-1.623**
(-3.005)

-1.561**
(-3.115)

Sustainability (ROA)

1.433**
(3.334)

1.587***
(4.112)

Breadth of outreach (# clients)

0.000195
(-1.154)

_____

Competition (concentration)

-0.539**
(-2.933)

-0.550**
(-3.372)

Gender (% women as clients)

0.173
(0.804)

_____

Credit methodology (% of individual loans)

0.081
(0.668)

_____

Constant

57.401*
(2.548)

70.628***
(5.143)

R2
Adjusted R2
F-value (model)

0.593
0.451
4.164**
(7, 20)

0.530
0.471
9.016***
(3, 24)

Number of MFIs

28

28

Note: numbers in parentheses are t-values, except for F-value (degrees of freedom).
* p [ 0.05
** p [ 0.01
*** p [ 0.001
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Conclusions
I assessed the effects of commercialization factors and other variables that, according to the literature on microfinance, may also
affect loan size. Using data from diverse sources, the analysis on the
first measure of loan size—average outstanding loan in US$—led
to a nonsignificant model: independent variables do not explain
any variance in loan size. Because this measure of loan size has been
widely criticized, additional models with different measures of loan
sizes were used.
Using the ratio of average outstanding loan to per capita GDP
of the lowest 20%, the main finding was that the type of institution has no significant effect on loan size. Using a modified ratio
derived from Schreiner’s formula—dollar-years from borrowed
resources to dollar-years from per capita income of the lowest
20%—the results are similar. The same independent variables were
the significant ones in both sets of models: age of the institution,
sustainability, and the level of competition. In addition, the type of
institution, breadth of outreach, gender, and credit methodology
turned out to be not significant as well.
Additional research could assess other possible predictors of
loan size, such as urban/rural scope (Thys, 2000), deposit deepening, importance of nonfinancial products, or business strategies for
microfinance operations (i.e., downscaling, upscaling, etc.).
Further studies may also include measures of average disbursed
loan as the dependant variable. In this study, it was not possible to
find appropriate information to test for these factors. There is also
the question of whether this analysis should follow a more dynamic
approach, in which changes in the unit of analysis should be
assessed over time (3 or 5 years), as Schreiner suggests (2001, pp.
22). This type of analysis could be more useful in understanding
MFIs’ operations, but longitudinal information for five years is
even harder to gather.
Conservatively, these results should not be generalized to the
entire Latin American MFI population. As I argued before, most of
the information came from MFIs that seem to be engaged in a
more commercial approach: they are reporting to the Mix Market,
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an institution that is looking for and encouraging more disclosure
of information and transparency. Part of its purpose is for investors
to make the better investment decisions based on available information, and for MFIs to obtain needed resources for growth.
Therefore, it could be the case that the entire population of MFIs
in Latin America is different from this sample, which in fact may
resemble instead the population of commercial MFIs.
The results deserve some comments, however. First, the sign of
the coefficient for the age of the institution suggests a negative
relationship: the older the institution, the lower the loan size; this
finding contradicts two of Christen’s arguments: the target group
of pioneering NGOs was not the poorest of the poor, but a higher
income group, and their engagement in incremental lending.
Statistically, the process seems to be the other way around: newer participants may be serving higher income clients than older
participants.
Second, the sign of the coefficient for the level of competition
indicates that the higher the concentration—or the lower the competition—the lower the loan size. If this variable accurately predicts loan size, then more competition in a microfinance market
will also result in larger loan sizes, suggesting that institutions will
probably search for more profitable clients.
Finally, the sign of the coefficient for sustainability (ROA)
confirms an old belief in microfinance: there is a trade-off between
profitability and depth of outreach.

Notes
1. These institutions are ACODEP (Nicaragua), ACTUAR-Tolima (Colombia),
ACTUAR-Antioquia (Colombia), ADMIC (Mexico), BancoSol (Bolivia), CrearTacna (Peru), Eco Futuro (Bolivia), EDYFICAR (Peru), FADES (Bolivia), FAMA
(Nicaragua), Finamerica (Colombia), FINCOMUN (Mexico), Génesis Empreserial
(Guatemala), PRODEM (Bolivia), Visión de Finanzas (Paraguay), WWB-Medellín
(Colombia), ADOPEM (Dominican Republic), AgroCapital (Bolivia), Banco ADEMI
(Dominican Republic), Caja los Andes (Bolivia), CMAC-Arequipa (Peru), CMACMaynas (Peru), FIE (Bolivia), FINDE (Nicaragua), MiBanco (Peru), PROEMPRESA
(Peru), Financiera Calpia (El Salvador), and Bangente (Venezuela).
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2. For example, financial substitution occurs when a borrower receives a loan to
buy two bags of fertilizer, but without the loan, the borrower would have bought one
bag anyway. In this case, the loan resulted in 50% of addition and 50% of financial
substitution (Adams et al., 1990; Alfaro 1999).
3. For instance, when two prospective clients are good credit subjects, then why,
or under which criteria, should the institution discriminate against one of them?
4. In his article “Seven Aspects of Loan Size,” Schreiner (2001) argues that loan
size depends on how the borrowers give more importance to some of the seven aspects
than others. The seven aspects are: term to maturity, dollars disbursed, average balance, dollars per installment, time between installments, number of installments, and
dollar-years of borrowed resources.
5. Most of the studies on income distribution are developed at the total population level.
6. MCI stands for Microcredit Institution.
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Building Economic
Self-Reliance
Trickle Up’s Microenterprise Seed Capital
for the Extreme Poor in Rural India
Jan Maes and Malika Basu
Abstract: The Trickle Up Program is a US-based organization engaged in microenterprise development for very poor households in 14 core countries, including
India. Because it targets the most vulnerable sections of the population, such as the
rural landless, women-led households, people with disabilities, and economically
disadvantaged minorities, TUP employs a seed capital grant strategy to facilitate
its clients’ movement from absolute poverty toward economic self-reliance. TUP
clients cannot risk taking a loan because they have no spare income to make
payments if their enterprises do not generate an immediate profit. A conditional
grant, in contrast to credit, exposes its recipients to less risk and allows them to
grow a business with a longer payback period. This paper draws from a recent
study of the Alternative for Rural Movement, one of TUP’s partner agencies in
rural Orissa, India, and shows that its TUP clients moved successfully from a
position of extreme vulnerability to one of significantly improved economic
self-reliance.

T

he Trickle Up Program (TUP) is a US-based organization
engaged in microenterprise development for very poor1
households in fourteen core countries, including India.
TUP achieves its mission, to enable the lowest income people
worldwide to take the first step out of poverty, by providing

Journal of Microfinance

conditional seed capital, business training, and other relevant services essential to the launch of a microenterprise, by working in
partnership with local organizations. These partner agencies integrate TUP’s services into their model to achieve their own contextspecific approach to poverty alleviation. Trickle Up refers to the
individuals selected for participation in the program as TUP
entrepreneurs, even though in most cases this level of enterprise
would be better described as launching or expanding an incomegenerating activity. Very poor TUP households commonly engage
in multiple income-generating activities and use the TUP seed
capital to capitalize both existing and new activities.
While a discussion among microfinance practitioners as to
who constitutes the poor or very poor is ongoing, suffice it to say
that TUP’s local partners target the poorest and most vulnerable
sections of the population residing in the communities they serve,
including the rural landless, women-led households, people with
disabilities, and economically disadvantaged minorities. These
people often cannot afford to take the risks associated with a loan,
even though many are capable of running successful and profitable
enterprises. Over the past two decades most microenterprise development and microfinance initiatives have been targeted at the socalled working poor, the majority of which are clustered just above
and just below the poverty line. Most microfinance institutions
that are driven by financial sustainability standards exclude the
very poor, because loans to the very poor are seen as too risky and
too labor-intensive. Even microfinance programs that deliberately
target the very poor do not always manage to provide this target
group with access to financial services, because the very poor often
exclude themselves from such programs or are excluded by less
poor clients.
Jan Maes is a consultant in microenterprise development and impact assessment; from 2000 to
April 2005 he was a program officer and then a program evaluation officer with the Trickle
Up Program. Email: janpmaes@yahoo.com
Malika Basu is a freelance consultant in the field of rural and social development, and
presently a Ph.D. Fellow at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague, The Netherlands.
Email: basu@iss.nl
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TUP clients, on the other hand, typically belong to the very
poor living below the international US$1-a-day poverty line. Some
TUP clients, including those portrayed in this study, can be
labeled the extreme poor, 2 as they live on less than $0.50 a day (taking into account purchasing power differences as with the international $1-a-day standard). Most microfinance practitioners would
consider these extreme poor people unsuitable for microloans or
any microenterprise interventions, since they are unable to provide
for even the most basic daily needs or cope with frequently occurring emergencies. Although they struggle to survive in this condition of extreme vulnerability, owning little or no land or animals
and suffering for long periods of time from chronic food deficits and
illnesses, Trickle Up believes that even the extreme poor are capable
of running a successful microenterprise. The key ingredient of
TUP’s microenterprise development program is the provision of a
seed capital grant, typically in the amount of $100, given in two
consecutive installments, and based on certain conditions, to be
explained later in this paper. Trickle Up’s seed capital poses less risk
and therefore represents a more acceptable option for the extreme
poor to invest in the start-up or expansion of income-generating
activities.
While the use of grants as a microfinance strategy is controversial, proponents agree with the Consultative Group to Assist the
Poor (CGAP) that microgrants can be “the first step in a strategy
to graduate the poor from vulnerability towards economic selfsufficiency” (Parker, 2001, p 7). The research reviewed in this paper
reveals strong evidence that extremely poor households can achieve
economic self-sufficiency after receiving seed capital grants, and
that access to a range of business and non-business support services
provided by local NGOs are at least as critical for success.
The objective of this paper is to understand the effectiveness of
the TUP seed capital grants in the creation of profitable and sustainable income-generating activities, and to highlight additional
microenterprise program factors that facilitate progress from a
situation of extreme poverty to one of improved economic selfreliance. This self-reliance can be typified by a sustainable increase
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in household income and productive assets, enabling a household
to continue to build up its economic strength. Finally, it should be
emphasized that in its evaluation of the effectiveness of the TUP
model, this paper focuses almost exclusively on the intended primary program outcome, household economic empowerment, while
paying less attention to the hypothesized link between economic
progress and the ultimate goal of social impact.

Methodology: A Brief Overview
At the time of this study in January 2005, TUP was working with
19 partner agencies in India, mainly in the eastern states of Uttar
Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and Orissa. The findings
in this paper are the result of a study conducted in rural Orissa
with one of TUP’s partner agencies. Known as the Alternative for
Rural Movement (ARM), this agency is one of TUP’s most successful partners in Asia in moving a majority of their TUP clients
from extreme poverty to a situation of significantly improved
economic self-reliance.
The objective of the study was not to prove the impact of
Trickle Up seed capital grants on the economic capacity of the
extreme poor, but rather to learn about the types of incomegenerating activities in which TUP entrepreneurs choose to invest
their seed capital, to understand their reasons for making certain
business decisions, and to assess how these income-generating
activities contribute to the diversification and strengthening of the
household income portfolio. 3 Therefore, the study methodology is
best described as a practitioner (as opposed to academic) approach
to impact assessment. Through the use of focus group discussions
and a standardized survey, the research produced cost-effective and
credible information on the most important economic changes
that take place when TUP is implemented. The goal was also to
understand the reasons for success or failure as well as the constraints faced by TUP households when conducting their microenterprise activities, thereby offering immediate insights as to how
program operations can be improved in the future. By no means
does the research aim to attribute specific household changes to
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certain program inputs or to distinguish between Trickle Up’s and
the local partner agency’s contributions towards achieving impact.
The study leaves no doubt, however, that ARM’s own development
activities are at least equally as significant as its implementation of
TUP’s microenterprise program for achieving sustainable impact
on a household’s economic portfolio and well-being.
ARM is a local Indian NGO that targets more than 50 villages
in Baliapal Block, which is part of the coastal district of Balasore in
Orissa, India. In addition to its proven success in implementing
Trickle Up, the primary reasons for choosing ARM for this study
were the following:
1. Its long-term association with TUP, which yielded a large
pool of long-term TUP entrepreneurs, thus enabling the
researchers to gauge the sustainability of the economic
changes believed to be facilitated by TUP.
2. The variety of income-generating activities undertaken by
TUP entrepreneurs in this area, which allowed for comparing
the utility of seed capital in initiating or expanding different
income-generating activities.
3. The rural context in which ARM operates, which is common for most of TUP’s target populations in India and
worldwide.
In addition, ARM’s excellent track record with TUP’s microenterprise development program made ARM a suitable organization
for field-testing a quantitative survey on the use of TUP grants and
its effect on the household income portfolio of TUP entrepreneurs.
An analysis of these results is expected to provide the program staff
at TUP headquarters and at the local partner agency with concrete
recommendations to improve the program’s impact and costeffectiveness. This is particularly important as partner agencies
move to adapt the key program features, such as grant size and
business training, to the specific requirements of different incomegenerating activities.
The field study started with a focus group discussion with
ARM’s staff members who are directly involved in the implementaVolume 7 Number 2
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tion of the Trickle Up program. This consultative process allowed
for taking up issues that were considered important by the staff
and provided additional questions or phrasing for the questionnaires and focus group discussions for TUP entrepreneurs. The
staff also provided valuable feedback for translating and adapting
the field questionnaire to local conditions. Since ARM implements
almost all its development programs, including the Trickle Up
Program, through Self-Help Groups (SHGs), 4 two such groups
that had Trickle Up entrepreneurs among their members were
selected at random. The field study consisted of two in-depth focus
group discussions with these SHGs and individual interviews with
their TUP members. The group discussions focused on different
aspects of the Trickle Up program (selection, size of grant, and
quality of training and business counseling) or issues related to
their own SHGs (savings amount and frequency, loan availability,
and group meetings). Immediately after each focus group discussion, individual TUP entrepreneurs were interviewed for one hour
using a Household Income-generating Activities Survey, which is a
set of mostly quantitative questions related to the nature and profitability of the various income-generating activities funded by TUP
grants and the role they play in the overall household income portfolio. These were conducted with the help of ARM staff, who acted
primarily as translators. One-third of the interviews were supplemented with further qualitative questions that aimed to provide
more in-depth insights into the motivations of TUP entrepreneurs
in relation to their business and investment decisions. Table 1 provides details about the sample used during the study.

Table 1. Self-Help Groups and TUP Entrepreneurs in the Study
Sample
SHG

Number of
TU P Clients
11

Sample Size

Kenduaria

Total
Members
18

Rashal pur

15

7

6

6

6

24

19

Total

76

33

7

TUP Grant Installments
Received
1st in October 01
2nd in May 02
1st in October 01
2nd in May 02
1st in Janua ry 04
nd
2 in August 04
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As is illustrated in Table 1, among the members of the two randomly selected SHGs, 11 (of 18) and 13 (of 15) were TUP entrepreneurs, of which 7 and 12 were interviewed, respectively. The
entire sample of 19 TUP entrepreneurs represents 6.3% of a total
of 300 entrepreneurs assisted by ARM during the last 3 years. Of
these 19 TUP entrepreneurs, 13 received their seed capital grant
nearly 3 years ago, while the remaining 6 received theirs 6 months
ago.

Trickle Up’s Seed Capital Approach to
Microenterprise Development for the Very Poor
Trickle Up partner agencies provide seed capital in two consecutive
$50 installments to selected TUP entrepreneurs. While a grant may
appear contrary to current development thinking, the TUP model
does not begin or end with a seed capital grant, which constitutes
only one of four cornerstones of the integrated Trickle Up
approach to microenterprise development for the very poor. The
other three are careful selection of participants, business training
and counseling, and continued access to capital through savings or
loans. While TUP provides most of the financial inputs, it is the
partner agency’s role in selecting and training TUP entrepreneurs
and linking them to savings and loans that ensures long-term sustainability of their strengthened household income portfolios.
Moreover, before describing the four cornerstones of the TUP
model in more detail, it is important to mention ARM’s own development activities, which play a vital role alongside TUP’s contribution in moving households toward economic self-reliance.
Whereas TUP’s principal input to the business is the financial
capital to acquire business assets, ARM’s own programs address
human and social capital limitations that extremely poor people
face in their efforts to build sustainable livelihoods. Like many
TUP partner agencies in India, ARM delivers the Trickle Up model
through SHGs, which are also the point of entry for other programs, including group capacity building, advocacy, literacy training, nonformal education, health, and sanitation, among others.
ARM focuses on human capital development through education
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programs for adults and children and through a sophisticated
health program that includes health awareness training, access to
basic health services through a mobile clinic, and a life insurance
program. This strong focus on health is uncommon among TUP
partner agencies and strongly contributes to the success of ARM’s
microenterprise programs, as chronic illness continues to be a very
common obstacle to microenterprise success by TUP entrepreneurs
worldwide. ARM also assists SHG members in building up their
social capital through group solidarity and mutual help, increased
negotiation power with local institutions, and linkages with business and market networks. ARM believes that a focus on the development of human and social capital of TUP entrepreneurs is vital
both for improving the quality of life of the extreme poor and for
improving the entrepreneurs’ ability to run successful microenterprises. ARM integrates these social safety net programs with the
four cornerstones of Trickle Up’s microenterprise program that are
described in the next sections.

Selection
Local partner agencies select new TUP entrepreneurs by using a
poverty assessment tool that scores new applicants according to five
locally relevant poverty criteria, identified by the partner agencies
themselves. ARM’s poverty criteria include lack of land ownership
(most TUP households are landless), illiteracy (80% of TUP
entrepreneurs are illiterate), lack of access to credit at affordable
interest rates, official “Below Poverty Level” (BPL) status, and
rural residence. Those who receive the highest score according to
these criteria (and thus experience the highest poverty) are eligible
for participating in the program and receiving the seed capital.
Since the poverty assessment tool selects households based on relative poverty only, Trickle Up also focuses geographically on
countries with high poverty incidence according to the Human
Development Index and on mostly rural areas within those countries to ensure that it reaches the very poor worldwide.
In order to promote sustainable income-generating activities, a
strong preference goes to business groups of at least two people,
typically adult members of the same household who designate one
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among them as their business leader. Since illness is often a major
obstacle to business success, having more than one person involved
improves the continuity of the business. The motivation of the
candidates, although assessed in a much less formal way than their
poverty, is in most cases an equally strong requirement to pass the
selection process.

The Trickle Up Seed Capital Grant
Before participating in the Trickle Up program, most households
are already involved in one or more undercapitalized and usually
seasonal income-generating activity, while others derive their
income exclusively from daily labor. In both cases capital is often
the most limiting factor to unleashing the profit potential of existing or new income opportunities. Given their very low and irregular incomes, the extreme poor cannot risk taking a loan to invest
in a microenterprise activity, because, as one of the women stated,
they can never jeopardize the inadequate resources required to feed
their children in case the profit of the business would not be
enough to pay the loan. And even if profit is ensured, many of
these income-generating activities are difficult to finance with a
loan because they generate unpredictable returns or need an incubation period after investing in the required productive assets.
Agricultural income-generating activities require an especially long
lag period before actual production, which prevents immediate
loan repayments. Finally, the very poor often need to consume a
significant part of their production, which leaves insufficient cash
to pay back a loan.
TUP seed capital, in the form of two $50 grants, has the capacity to unlock latent profit opportunities, especially, as is the case at
ARM, when preceded by training in basic business concepts and
followed by regular business counseling sessions. The seed capital
grant is not a handout but is conditioned on a strong commitment
by the TUP entrepreneur. In order to receive the first seed capital
installment, she must attend training and, assisted by partner
agency staff, prepare a business plan for her intended microenterprise as well as commit to saving or reinvesting at least 20% of her
profits in business. After working for at least three months and
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completing a business report, a successful entrepreneur is eligible
for a second $50 installment, which she can use to expand the original income activity or start a new one. The bulk of Trickle Up seed
capital is used to fund the expansion of existing undercapitalized
income-generating activities, but some recipients use at least a portion of the TUP grant to start a new activity.

Business Training and Counseling
The seed capital grants are most effective when combined with
appropriate business training, geared toward mostly illiterate TUP
entrepreneurs. ARM’s field personnel organize training sessions
that cover immediately relevant business topics, such as conducting a simple feasibility study, estimating and calculating profits,
marketing, reinvesting profits, and so on. Equally important is
regularly encouraging entrepreneurs to think of their incomegenerating activities as businesses, many elements of which they
have control over. After an initial business training in a group, subsequent follow-up counseling sessions are typically one-on-one;
these sessions are vital to nurture self-confidence and to address
individual and specific business issues. These sessions also enable
field staff to monitor the use of the capital for productive purposes
according to the business plan and to assist entrepreneurs in calculating their profits and reinvesting a portion in the business before
using the remainder to meet daily household needs.
Continued Access to Capital
The majority of TUP clients generate a profit within the first year
after receiving the first grant, thereby increasing their overall
household income and strengthening their economic portfolio.
Most partner agencies encourage or require TUP entrepreneurs to
participate in formal or informal savings (and loan) programs.
These programs can provide additional capital for new business
opportunities and help to protect group members against future
economic or natural shocks as well as prepare for costly life events,
such as a marriage or the death or illness of one of their household
members.
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At ARM, TUP entrepreneurs form SHGs that pool their periodic savings to provide loans to their own members and to serve as
collateral for bank loans, often three to four times the amount of
their combined savings. While such savings-led microfinance
approaches for the poor have been immensely successful, they tend
to work less well with the extreme poor whose savings usually accumulate too slowly to provide sufficient capital to invest in profitable income-generating activities before a new disaster wipes out
their savings. This study shows that the extreme poor can kick-start
sustainable income-generating activities much faster if they have
sufficient capital to invest in the minimum assets needed for their
microenterprise activities. When microcredit is too risky or not
available to them, or when their savings rates are very slow, seed

Figure 1. Trickle Up’s Seed Capital Grant Approach
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capital grants are a more effective alternative to provide the very
poor with this minimum amount of capital.
Figure 1 represents an overview of the Trickle Up seed capital
grant approach. Central to this model are the acquisition of physical (productive) capital through the use of seed capital grants and
the strengthening of human capital through business training. As
mentioned previously, however, the role of the partner agency
often extends much further than the implementation of these two
TUP inputs. The quality and frequency of monitoring and counseling by the partner agency is also crucial for sustainable business
success, as well as facilitating access to new markets for inputs as
well as products.

Improved Economic Self-Reliance
This study’s findings relate mostly to changes at the individual
enterprise (or income-generating activity) level and at the broader
household income portfolio level. At the enterprise level, impact is
seen through changes in profitability, employment, assets, and
level of production, while impact at the overall household economy level becomes visible through changes in household income,
labor productivity and dependency ratio, asset accumulation, and
income diversification. The Household Income-generating
Activities Survey focused on the uses of the seed capital grants, the
underlying decision-making factors, the diversification and profitability of household income-generating activities, and the accumulation of productive assets and savings.

Poverty Conditions and TUP Entrepreneur Data
The study took place in Baliapal Block in Balasore District, a
coastal area in the northeast of Orissa, one of India’s poorest states.
This predominantly agricultural area is prone to frequent natural
disasters, such as cyclones, droughts, and floods. During the last
census in 2000, 74% of the households in Balasore District were
below the poverty line (BPL), the official State poverty line set at
324 Indian rupees (Rs) 5 per capita per month, which translates
into approximately 10 Rs per capita per day. The better-off among
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these BPL households are small farmers (12%), followed by marginal farmers (28%), and seasonal farm workers (60%) who have
no land except for their homestead. While most agriculture is
subsistence-based, some farmers produce cash crops, such as betel
leaves and coconuts. The extreme poor in Baliapal Block are predominantly members of Scheduled Tribes 6 (8%) and Scheduled
Castes (23%), who constitute ARM’s main target population.
More than 500 SHGs have been created in Baliapal Block, 200
of which have been formed with assistance from ARM in 40 villages and hamlets. The majority of Trickle Up entrepreneurs
selected by ARM are landless and their main source of income is
daily wage labor, which pays an average of 45 Rs per day for men
and 40 Rs for women and is available for fewer than 100 days each
year. Even though some households manage to supplement this
with paddy cultivation through leasing land or sharecropping,
their harvest meets only home consumption needs for a maximum
of two to four months. In this study, household income levels were
estimated by combining annual incomes calculated for each of the
various income-generating activities taken up by a household,
including labor and the household’s own food production. These
estimates suggest that before entering the Trickle Up program, the
majority of the sampled households (14 out of 19) belonged to the
extreme poor, with daily per capita incomes below 4 Rs, which is
equivalent to 25% of the international $1-a-day poverty line.
Table 2 below shows that two-thirds of the Trickle Up entrepreneurs in the sample were women. In the case of male-led

Table 2. TUP entrepreneur data
Category

Male

Female

Number
Percentage
Average age
Average years in school
Can read
Can add and subtra ct

6
32%
39 years
3.5 years
100%
100%

13
68%
38 years
2.3 years
46%
92%

Note: n = 19
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income-generating activities, female SHG members had been
selected for TUP, but they used their seed capital grant to sponsor
a business activity led by their husbands. The average age of both
male and female TUP entrepreneurs was slightly below 40 years.
Most men were literate and had attended school longer than the
women, of whom less than 50% are literate. Both men and women
could add and subtract numbers.
Table 3 shows that the average household size in the sample
was six and had a dependency ratio (the number of income earners
divided by total household members) of 0.6. Smaller families had
higher dependency ratios and tended to rely proportionally more
on women to provide income. Four out of five households were
headed by a married couple, and the majority of households
belonged to Scheduled Castes, the largest disadvantaged social
group in ARM’s target area.

Table 3. TUP Household Data
Category

Average

Minimum

Maximum

Number of members
Dependency ratio

6.0
0.58

2
0.30

11
1.00

Marital status of TUP client

Married
79%
SC

Divorced/Separated
5%
GC

Wid owed
16%
OBC

Cast e

58%

26%

16%

Note: n = 19. SC=Scheduled Caste, ST=Scheduled Tribe, OBC=Other Backward Castes

Seed Capital Grant Use and Asset Accumulation
Of all Trickle Up entrepreneurs interviewed, only two used part of
the seed capital for a different purpose than investment in productive assets. One household had spent a portion of the grant to pay
off a high-interest loan with a local moneylender, while another
had used a portion to pay for the children’s school expenses. Even
though these actions by both households might have been good
long-term investments affecting their economic potential, TUP
guidelines allow the use of the seed capital grant only to purchase
income-generating assets or to pay for business-related expenses.
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Data on ARM entrepreneurs indicate that during the past four
years the most common types of businesses supported by Trickle
Up grants are paddy cultivation (17%), goat raising (12%), vegetable cultivation (10%), rice processing (9%), bamboo and cane
work (7%), betel cultivation (6%), fishing (4%), poultry raising
(4%), and leaf-plate making (4%). The majority of income-generating activities are agriculture related (crop production and processing, fishing, and small animal husbandry), with the remainder
involved in the production of simple household items, such as baskets. The participants in the survey (n=19) show a similar trend in
their choice of income-generating activities for TUP funding; the
most frequently selected income-generating activity is paddy cultivation (9), followed by rice processing (6), and followed in turn by
basket making (3), fishing (3), and trading fruits (3).
When asked what factors they had considered when selecting a
certain income-generating activity, the most common responses
were market demand and profitability (18), advice from a family
member (10), and familiarity with the work or an example by others (9). Given their initial condition of food insecurity, many
invested at least part of the seed capital in paddy cultivation and
rice processing. These households typically keep a portion of their
harvest or processed product for home consumption, thus providing them with an income in-kind rather than in cash. Paddy cultivation remains popular, perhaps because of its importance for the
household’s own food security, even though it is by far the least
profitable of all the income-generating activities analyzed in the
study. Interestingly, the majority used only the second seed capital
installment, and in most cases only a portion of it, to either expand
or start paddy cultivation enterprises. This seems to suggest that
there are fewer profitable opportunities available to TUP households when they receive the second grant or that they prefer to
address food shortages by producing rice themselves rather than
buying rice from enterprise income. Rice processing (dehusking)
on the other hand generates better profits than paddy cultivation
and is the most common income-generating activity funded by the
first seed capital installment. The fact that this microenterprise
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activity can be done by women in their homes and requires few
skills probably explains its popularity.
One-third of TUP entrepreneurs used their seed capital amount
exclusively to expand existing income-generating activities, whereas
two-thirds used at least one of the two grant installments to start a
new income-generating activity. The TUP households participating
in the survey spent about 40% of the seed capital on long-term
assets (tools, means of transportation, equipment, animals) and
60% on working capital items (raw materials, inventory, agricultural inputs, transportation expenses). This ratio, however,
depends strongly on the type of income-generating activity. For
instance, betel-leaf cultivation requires almost exclusively longterm assets, while rice dehusking requires mostly working capital.
Two-and-a-half years after receiving the second grant disbursement, all households still owned the fixed assets they had originally
purchased with the TUP seed capital, and many had acquired additional assets from subsequent profits and savings. This accumulation of long-term assets is a significant step toward self-reliance, as
the assets not only provide a secure source of income but also
increase a household’s resilience against economic shocks, as they

Table 4. Reinvestment of Profits in Productive Assets by TUP
Entrepreneurs
Type of Assets Purchased from Business Profits

Number of TUP
Households

Percentage

Small tools or accessories, such as cooking utensils, hoes,
pl ow, baskets, bas ins, barrels

12

63%

Tools, s uch asstoves, e quipment, ma chinery

10

53%

Means of transportat ion, such as a bicycle, pushcart

6

32%

Building or storage structure, including house
improvements
Minor investments for marketing,s uch as chair, tabl e,
shed, or the like

3

16%

4

21%

Ani mals, including livestock, p oultry, fish

9

47%

Land, bought or leas ed

3

16%

Other

4

21%

Note: n = 19
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are typically the last assets to be sold in a crisis. Table 4 shows how
TUP entrepreneurs have reinvested profits for investment in both
production and household assets.
More than half of those interviewed had acquired the following asset categories from their enterprise profits: small tools,
utensils, and accessories; larger tools and equipment; and animals.
An average household invested in 2.7 different types of assets, and
only one household was not able to reinvest any profits in new
assets. These high reinvestment rates are a good indication that the
new and expanded income-generating activities have sustained
profits for several years since the disbursement of the Trickle Up
seed capital.

Profits and Diversification
Since most available income-generating activities are seasonal and
time is usually not a limiting factor for engaging in them, most
households conduct a certain income-generating activity for as
long as the season lasts. Therefore, rather than comparing daily
profits of different income-generating activities, it makes more
sense to evaluate their annual profits. Unlike time requirements,
gender roles and the number of people required to run a business
impose strong limits on the type of income activities households
can choose from. For instance, fishing ideally requires three
(preferably male) household members, whereas fruit vending can
be done by one male household member and rice dehusking by one
or more female members. A profitability analysis of the various
income-generating activities selected by the TUP entrepreneurs
interviewed shows that there is a significant variation in profits
among different income-generating activities, but when considered
on a per capita basis, annual profits for the various incomegenerating activities are very similar. Table 5 provides a comparison of profits for the most common income-generating activities in
which those interviewed were engaged. Even though profits are
annualized as explained above, they are shown as average daily
profits by dividing the profit by 365 days, to better understand
each activity’s contribution to daily incomes, comparable to the
international $1-a-day poverty line. The reader needs to keep in
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Table 5. Profit and Income in Kenduaria and Rashalpur Villages
IGA Type
Average daily
profit per IGA

Fruit Vending

Fishing

Betel Leaf
Cultivation

Bamboo
Cane Work

Rice
Dehusking

Vegetable
Cultivation

Paddy
Cultivation

34.7

33.1

21.6

21.3

17.1

15.1

6

Profit ranking

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20.8

9.1

8.7

8.5

8.3

7.5

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Daily income
per worker
Income
ranking

Note: IGA = income-generating activity.

mind that these are not actual daily profits, since most incomegenerating activities are not conducted on a daily basis. For example,
while an actual daily labor wage is 45 Rs (for men), the average
daily labor wage is only 6 Rs, because agricultural wage labor is
only available for an average of 50 days during the year.
When considering the profitability of each income-generating
activity, regardless of the number of people engaged in it, fruit
vending (34.7 Rs per day) and fishing (33.1 Rs per day) are by far
the most profitable. As stated earlier, paddy cultivation provides
the lowest average daily income (3 Rs per day). However, there
is much less variation in average daily income for each incomegenerating activity when considering per-worker incomes: all but
two provide average daily worker incomes between 7.5 Rs and 9.1
Rs, a difference of only 21%. This suggests that annual profits are
not a strong discriminating factor for selecting an income-generating activity. Only fruit vending, at 20.8 Rs per worker per day, is
significantly more profitable, and paddy cultivation, at 3 Rs per
worker per day is significantly less profitable. In other words,
compared to the average daily income of 6 Rs from labor, most
alternative income-generating activities (except rice cultivation)
generate a higher average daily income (on an annualized basis).
Since most households are underemployed before they receive the
TUP grant, they often supplement rather than replace their labor
wages with income from microenterprise activities, at least to the
extent that agricultural labor and microenterprise activities can
be performed during different times. In addition to such timemanagement constraints, other factors, such as the composition of
the household work force, caste and gender roles, and previous
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experience with an income-generating activity, are more important in
the selection of a microenterprise than its expected annual profits.
The study also revealed a marked increase in the diversification
of household income sources after the TUP seed capital intervention. Figure 2 shows the number of income-generating activities
per household before and after TUP. 7 The average number of
income-generating activities per household before TUP was 2.1
(median = 2) and after TUP increased by 41% to 2.9 (median = 3).
In other words, an average household managed to add one new
income-generating activity to its household income portfolio, not
only increasing overall household income, but also decreasing
risk and vulnerability through diversification. On closer examination, it appears that pre-TUP households with one incomegenerating activity added two new ones, while those with two
income-generating activities added one new one (with one exception
among nine cases), and those with three or more income-generating
activities before TUP added none. This strongly suggests that the
combination of three income-generating activities per household

Figure 2. Diversification: Number of IGAs per Household
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represents an optimal number. It also suggests that household
employment not only improved but perhaps reached a maximum.
All nineteen respondents confirmed that their household
income had increased since receiving the TUP grants. The average
increase in household income for those households who added one
new income-generating activity to their economic portfolio was
113%. The average increase in household income for those households who added two new income-generating activities to their
economic portfolio was 152%. See Figure 3 for a household annual
income distribution before and after TUP. Before TUP, the majority
of households were found in the two bottom income categories,
below 5,000 Rs and between 5,000 and 10,000 Rs. After TUP,
most households had moved up at least one category and all had
annual incomes above 5,000 Rs. Figure 4 shows daily per capita
household income data, which can be compared with the $1-a-day
international poverty line, equivalent to approximately 16 Rs at
the time of the survey in January 2005. Before TUP, the majority
of households had a per capita daily income of less than 4 Rs.
After TUP, most households were in the 4 to 8 Rs and 8 to 12 Rs

Figure 3. Household Annual Income Distribution (Rs)
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Figure 4. Per Captia Daily Income Distribution (Rs)
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categories. After TUP, the average daily per capita income level was
7.1 Rs per day (roughly equivalent to $0.50 a day), and only one
household was able to cross the 16 Rs per day equivalent to the
international $1-a-day poverty line. More telling than a comparison with the international poverty line are the perceptions about
their poverty shared by TUP entrepreneurs themselves during
focus group discussions. During these discussions the following
changes were almost unanimously cited as the most significant
ones: reduced debt burden and ending of dependency on local
moneylenders; increased household income, especially during the
lean period; and the ability to eat three meals a day instead of one,
as was the case before.

Access to Capital
Since capital had been a limiting factor for expansion or start-up of
income-generating activities, the seed capital grants enabled most
TUP entrepreneurs to reach a higher level of business activity than
before. Some had been in a perpetual state of indebtedness with
local moneylenders, and surpluses in-kind or in cash could never
Volume 7 Number 2
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be realized because they were withheld by the moneylenders as payments for high-interest loans. Even without this debt burden most
households never had enough cash flow to expand their working
capital or to buy additional assets for an existing or new incomegenerating activity. As a result, the household labor force remained
largely underutilized and income sources were mostly limited to
daily wage labor and sharecropping, supplemented in some cases
by the meager profits of undercapitalized microenterprises. In
almost all these cases, the TUP seed capital injection boosted
microenterprise profits by optimizing the amount of working capital needed or by providing for the purchase of new fixed assets.
Also, one-third of the interviewed households bought or repaired a
bicycle with TUP seed capital, and another 25% did the same with
profits subsequent to the TUP seed capital injection. The resulting
increased mobility enabled many to bypass middlemen and to
access new markets for their products and their raw materials.
For each type of income-generating activity, a critical minimum amount of capital seemed to be necessary to jump-start the
business to a level that more fully employed household labor. Some
microenterprises, such as basket making and rice dehusking,
require less than $50 to enable the household to produce at maximum capacity or to generate a surplus from the profits and gradually increase inventory. In the case of basket weaving, for example,
$10 was enough to purchase a stock of raw materials to last for
weeks. In many cases, the ability to buy greater quantities of raw
materials (bamboo or paddy for instance) enabled these microentrepreneurs not only to bargain for lower bulk prices, but more
importantly to buy raw materials at times when prices are low. For
instance, the biggest investment to start a rice dehusking business
is equipment (a large boiling pot, a tarp to dry the boiled rice, and
a scale with weights) and amounts to approximately 1,000 Rs or
$20. The remaining cash amount from a grant is more than sufficient to purchase adequate amounts of paddy and firewood to
operate a profitable business for at least several weeks. After that,
the TUP entrepreneur is able to gradually increase the inventory of
paddy by reinvesting a portion of the profits.
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In other instances, the $50 capital grant is insufficient, especially for start-up businesses. For instance, betel leaf growers
needed more than the initial $50 to buy all the assets and betel
saplings necessary to start a minimum size betel vine. Given the
high start-up cost as well as the required skills, only those who
were already engaged in betel leaf production before TUP used the
seed capital to expand this type of income-generating activity.
Moreover, one betel leaf producer borrowed additional money
from her SHG to supplement the first TUP grant so as to increase
her investment. She later used the second grant to pay back this
loan. Finally, some income-generating activities simply require a
much higher investment than $50. Operating a grocery shop and
trading coconuts and bananas are good examples. None of the TUP
entrepreneurs interviewed owned a grocery store, and only those
who were already engaged in buying and selling fruits were able to
use the TUP seed capital for expansion of this type of business.

Conclusions and Recommendations
TUP’s primary objective for this study was to better understand its
microenterprise development process and to learn how the TUP
model could be improved and adapted within each local context
where the program is implemented. Therefore, rather than focusing on social impact, this paper was mostly concerned with how
TUP entrepreneurs invest their seed capital grants, what types of
assets they buy with the grant money, and how they are able to
improve their household income portfolio. As TUP starts to better
understand and systematically analyze, beyond mere anecdotal evidence, the various determining factors for success of the microenterprises it funds, it and its partner agencies can use these findings
to make program inputs more fitting to the partner agency’s own
development approach and more relevant to each different socioeconomic context as well as more fitting to the different types of
income-generating activities that are available to would-be TUP
entrepreneurs. This in turn can be expected to provide recommendations for increased impact and for a more cost-efficient program.
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Experience has shown that before participating in the Trickle
Up Program, many extremely poor people are by necessity already
involved in various income-generating activities that are often seasonal, barely profitable, and undercapitalized. Others, such as the
rural landless, can only resort to labor as their source of income,
but they often have the skills and interest to engage in certain
income-generating activities. Capital is often the key to unleashing
the profit potential of such income activities, but the high risks
involved make loans unattractive to both lenders and entrepreneurs.
Trickle Up’s capital grant eliminates most of these risks to the
entrepreneurs who, in the case of ARM, have been able to expand
existing activities and start new income-generating activities,
resulting in significantly increased household incomes. That the
capital grant plays a critical role in strengthening the household
income portfolio is evident from the direct link that exists between
the investment of the grant in productive assets and the increased
profits these assets in turn have generated. Whether the capital
grants are the main factor in this process, however, is less certain,
since ARM, like many Trickle Up partner agencies, provides a
range of additional financial and nonfinancial services that may
contribute directly or indirectly to the sustainability and profitability of the income-generating activities funded by TUP grants.
In the absence of a control group and a large sample size, it is
impossible to attribute impact to specific program elements. But
the fact that ARM is one of TUP’s most successful partner agencies
in improving the economic capacity of extremely poor households
is likely to be related to the type and quality of the services it provides to its target clients in addition to the TUP inputs.
As for the role of capital itself, the study did not attempt to
compare the effectiveness of Trickle Up grants versus loans taken
from SHG members’ own pooled savings in improving the household income portfolio. But since it would take most SHG members
years to save the equivalent amount of the TUP grant, it is easy to
see that a large one-time TUP grant represents a stronger potential
than slowly accumulating savings for boosting household incomes.
The fact that TUP entrepreneurs are saving two to three times
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more than non-TUP SHG members also suggests that grants are
capable of improving household profits faster than just savings
alone. Nevertheless, it would be valuable to conduct further
research to assess to what extent non-TUP SHG members, of the
same poverty level as TUP entrepreneurs, are able to increase their
household incomes, relying on savings as their only source of
financing their income-generating activities.
When microcredit is too risky or not available and their own
savings rate is limited, seed capital grants are an effective method
to provide the extreme poor with a minimal amount of capital to
start or improve income-generating activities. Moreover, grants
provide more flexibility than loans for several microenterprise
activities, especially in rural areas, as these activities often generate
unpredictable returns or need an incubation period after investing
in productive assets. In addition to making immediate loan repayments difficult, microenterprises that involve food production
often provide the household with food for home consumption,
leaving little or no products to be sold for cash to pay back a loan.
As mentioned before, ARM assists TUP entrepreneurs in various ways in their efforts to initiate or expand productive and sustainable income-generating activities. For instance, SHG
membership provides TUP entrepreneurs with an opportunity to
save as well as a platform to discuss their businesses with each other
and to jointly sort out difficulties that may be hindering their
income-generating activities. TUP entrepreneurs also found the
regular business counseling sessions with ARM staff very useful,
and they recommended that these sessions cater more to their
needs by addressing specific issues relevant to each different type of
income-generating activity. As mentioned before, ARM’s nonbusiness services, such as healthcare and education, also play a crucial
role for achieving long-term economic progress by the extreme
poor targeted for the TUP program.
The study points at several ways whereby TUP can increase the
impact of its programs and make them more cost-effective. Given
the different amounts of seed capital required by different incomegenerating activities, TUP should consider varying the amount of
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seed capital according to business needs instead of the current onesize-fits-all approach of two $50 installments. In the case of higher
capital needs for a certain business, TUP could disburse a higher
amount for the first grant installment and a lower one for the
second. Some of the evidence also suggests that in the current
two-installment system, the second $50 grant has less potential for
improving the household income than the first one. If further
research confirms this, then increasing the first installment and
possibly eliminating the second has the potential to make the program not only more effective but also less costly. Some microenterprise activities, as mentioned in the study, require a total
investment of less than $50. Reducing the amount of seed capital
for these types of business therefore is justifiable but might seem
unfair to those who engage in these business types. To address this
issue, TUP could consider providing all entrepreneurs with an
equal amount of seed capital (for instance, $25 instead of the current $50 first installment), enough to invest in low-capital business
types, and to provide access to loans (in the case of ARM, from the
SHG savings pool, for instance) for those who require a higher
capital investment and can take on some risk. This or similar innovations (such as matching savings with a grant amount, for
instance) would not only increase the entrepreneurs’ ownership in
their businesses but also offer great potential to reduce overall program cost, of which a large portion is currently allocated to capital
grant expenses.
The finding that the TUP entrepreneurs at ARM were able to
significantly increase their production and profits after investment
of the grant in working capital and long-term assets suggests that
their microenterprise activities were undercapitalized before.
Moreover, since their per capita income levels were estimated to fall
below $0.50 per day before TUP, they lived in extreme poverty.
The TUP entrepreneurs themselves stated during focus group discussions that they had led a hand-to-mouth existence, often with
only one meal a day for the entire family and virtually no cash surplus. In addition, many faced permanent debt and their moneylenders would demand any cash surplus as soon as it became
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available. The seed capital grant enabled them to accumulate a critical minimum of productive assets to reach a state of economic
self-reliance, characterized by a significantly increased household
income and employment level. Through increased microenterprise
profits they were able to improve their food security from one meal
to three meals a day, pay off long-term debts, and start saving.
These households were able to shift their focus from consumption
and immediate survival to production and longer-term survival.
Whether these households are able to continue to accumulate
wealth and invest in new profit opportunities remains to be seen.
Several factors seem to indicate that their income has reached a
plateau. First, almost all households in the study had arrived at a total
of three income-generating activities, which seems to present an
optimal household income portfolio in the given circumstances.
Second, since the majority of microenterprise activities generate
very similar profits (annualized) and very few households were able
to specialize in only one microenterprise as their only source of
income, there seems little room for expansion and improved profits
unless other factors such as increased demand, skill development,
or technological innovations improve the profits of their microenterprises. In order for these households to move further out of
poverty, TUP and its partner agency ARM should explore the
impact potential of business development services, such as businessspecific training, new ways to add value to product and services,
and linking TUP entrepreneurs to new markets for their raw
materials and products.

Notes
1. Recent US legislation defines the phrase very poor as those households living
in the bottom 50% below the nationally defined poverty line or those living on the
equivalent of less than $1 per day, which is the international poverty line, adjusted for
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). While TUP does not formally measure the poverty
levels of its clients, the majority of its clients in India are believed to live significantly
below the international poverty line.
2. The TUP-assisted households in this study can be described as the extreme
poor because they all live below $0.50 per day (per capita income) and a majority live
on less than $0.25, based on poverty estimates derived from the annual income from
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their entire portfolio of income-generating activities, including labor and food production for home consumption. Sebsted and Cohen (2000) distinguish among different
poverty levels: destitute (the bottom 10% below the poverty line), extreme poor (the
bottom 10–50%), moderate poor, vulnerable non-poor, and non-poor. In January
2005, when the study was conducted, the $1 per day international poverty line was
equivalent to approximately 16 Indian Rupees, compared to the market exchange rate
of 45 Rupees per $1.
3. In this study the household income portfolio is simply the set of income sources
within a household, which is much less encompassing than the term household economic portfolio as defined by Chen and Dunn (1996). The household income portfolios in this study are mostly agricultural in nature and consist of income-generating
activities (earning an income through selling a good or service), wage labor and
employment, and production for home consumption.
4. In India, a typical Self-Help Group is a voluntary group of 10–20 low-income
women who collectively save a monthly amount into a group fund. After a sufficient
period of internal lending, the group is able to access bank credit for larger needs.
Peer pressure is said to ensure regular repayment and accountability. Often SHGs
provide nonfinancial benefits to their members, who use their meetings as a forum to
discuss issues of mutual concern and resolve matters collectively. Many community
development NGOs in India aim to facilitate economic and social development by
targeting their programs to SHGs.
5. For the time frame of the study, which focused on incomes earned during the
last 12 months before the interviews took place, the average exchange rate was 47 Rs
per $1.00. Most income data in the study were either kept in local currency or converted into dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), which takes into
account the local purchasing power of the Indian rupee.
6. The Indian constitution allows the government to compile a schedule (list) of
castes (Scheduled Castes, SC) and tribes (Scheduled Tribes, ST) who are economically
and socially disadvantaged and are therefore entitled to protection and specified benefits under the constitution. Other Backward Castes (OBC) are also officially recognized as being traditionally subject to exclusion, while still having a higher status than
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
7. Since SHG membership often precedes the TUP intervention by only a few
months, it would be misleading to suggest that the TUP program is solely responsible
for the observed changes in the household income portfolio. It is more likely that the
combined effects of SHG membership (giving members access to a range of services)
and TUP facilitated some of these changes.
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Microfinance Institutions in
Transition
Fonkoze in Haiti Moves toward
Regulated Banking Status
Michael Tucker and Winston Tellis
Abstract: Microfinance institutions (MFIs) established to provide the poor with
access to capital have typically operated outside of their countries’ regulated
banking environments. Many have relied on donor grants and low-interest funds
to support loan portfolios and social programs. As MFIs mature they aspire to
become more efficient and attain economic sustainability because hey understand that greater numbers of the poor can be serviced by economically sustainable institutions. Many MFIs collect savings deposits but are often barred from
using them for loans by their countries’ laws. Fonkoze, an MFI in Haiti, has
sought regulated status, which would provide access to deposit assets and enable
Fonkoze to better compete with other MFIs, some of which are regulated subsidiaries of commercial banks. In the midst of political and economic turmoil,
Haiti’s Central Bank has delayed Fonkoze’s transformation. A different solution
is now moving forward, with Fonkoze becoming two entities, Fonkoze Financial
Services and Fonkoze Foundation.

M

ost microfinance institutions (MFIs) have been outside
of or at least partially removed from the banking regulatory system of their respective countries. The poor also
lack access to traditional forms of banking capitalization and are
frequently reliant on donor organizations, typically nongovern-
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mental organizations (NGOs). One such NGO is Fonkoze, which
started in Haiti as an organization to help the poor and grew into
an MFI. Fonkoze started with an office in Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, and quickly expanded into an organization with 18
branches throughout the country to meet rising demand from the
poor. From its inception in Haiti, Fonkoze has been financed by a
combination of outright donations and loans at below market
interest rates. As with many MFIs, adhering to the mission of providing capital to the poor was more important than profits for
Fonkoze. Financing continuing and growing operations without
access to depositor funds limited operations to whatever could be
raised or borrowed from donors, necessitating continuous rounds
of fund-raising. Like a growing number of MFIs, Fonkoze is in the
process of making the transition from an MFI to a regulated banking institution legally able to mobilize deposit capital for its loan
portfolio. While transformations have been successfully negotiated
in other developing countries, Fonkoze is the first applicant for
transformation in Haiti. Each MFI contemplating transformation
is in a unique situation, but there are similarities as well as countryspecific differences that illustrate the promise and pitfalls of
becoming a regulated financial institution.
Larger MFIs with operating assets in place may not be able to
realize economies of scale without becoming regulated institutions.
Expansion of loan portfolios that could be accommodated by MFI
infrastructure already in place may not be possible, due to funding
constraints. Such constraints can be overcome with the establishment of or access to already existing savings deposits. Becoming a
regulated bank would also mean focusing on profits. Since profits
are not the focus of all MFIs, some may not be candidates for
transformation to regulated institutions. MFIs with missions heavily
tilted toward servicing the poor incur expenses far beyond those of
banking operations that would make transformation to an operationally profitable entity difficult if not impossible. In Bangladesh
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there was concern that a focus on profit-making could reduce service to the existing clientele, 90% of whom were women
(Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002). Programs focusing on serving
the poorest can at best cover 70% of operating costs (Morduch,
2000). Donors believe that as few as 5% of MFIs with a social welfare orientation may be able to attain financial sustainability.
Fonkoze, with its mix of social and educational services as well as
lending to the poor, has been a social-welfare-oriented MFI.
Fonkoze plans to address mission drift, a preeminent issue in MFI
transformation, by splitting its organization into a profitable bank
with plans for becoming regulated and a foundation that would
continue as a separate organization for social services. Splitting the
functions and the funding sources will set up a synergistic relationship. The poor can receive rudimentary education and instruction in running small businesses, making them more creditworthy
borrowers from Fonkoze the foundation and eventually move on to
doing business with Fonkoze the bank.
Competition can also be a motivating factor behind seeking
regulated status. In Haiti, regulated banks have created spin-offs or
have directly entered microfinance. While their services differ
considerably from those offered by Fonkoze, over time and with
perhaps government intervention, they could become dominant
players in an altered lending environment.
Regulation means stepped up reporting requirements and
audited financial statements. For most MFIs receiving support
from multiple donors, financial reporting is nothing new. They
often need to satisfy multiple and time consuming reporting
demands. Some NGOs funding MFIs have also insisted on audited
statements. Transformation to a regulated institution streamlines
these reporting requirements while simultaneously making those
loose requirements more stringent. Regulated institutions are subject to far more scrutiny than unregulated MFIs. Regulation means
higher standards, and the necessity of profitability translates into
focusing on greater operational efficiencies. Regulated unprofitable
banks cannot continue to function while losing money, unlike
unprofitable MFIs. Improving operational efficiency can be a good
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thing for clients but may move regulated institutions away from
serving the more expensive clientele, the poorest of the poor. As
Fonkoze moves steadily towards transformation, it has much to
learn from the experiences of similar organizations around the
world.
The first two sections of this paper trace the origins of
Fonkoze and place it in the context of recent Haitian history. The
next sections discuss and review microfinance institutions and
banking in other countries and how some of these MFIs have
transformed into regulated banks. The paper proceeds to examine
the banking regulatory body in Haiti, the National Bank of Haiti
(BRH), followed by an overview of MFI competition in Haiti. The
final section and conclusion of the paper describe the impediments
to Fonkoze’s transition toward transformation into a regulated
bank and how these impediments were overcome, allowing the formation of a new entity, Fonkoze Financial Services (FFS), a transitional entity that is partway to achieving that transformation.

Origins of Fonkoze in Haiti
Fr. Joseph Phillipe founded Fonkoze in 1994. One year later it
became a foundation under Haitian law. Since it is a membership
organization, only other organizations, with the exception of political parties, can be members of Fonkoze. Organizations with membership in Fonkoze represent the organized poor. Governance is
through a democratic General Assembly, with organizations having
memberships greater than twenty-five sending two delegates and
those with fewer than twenty-five sending one. The delegates elect
nine members to a Board of Directors.
It was not until 1996 that funding levels began to rise and
Fonkoze began making loans to the poor. In 1996 an organization
of Haitians living in Canada donated $10,000, which was matched
by the Canadian government as seed capital for a loan portfolio.
Soon after that an organization of women in Louisiana, USA,
donated funds. In 1997, the Doen Foundation of the Netherlands
provided a combination grant and loan of $100,000, allowing
Fonkoze to have a major impact on loans to the poor. To assist
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Fonkoze in Haiti, Fonkoze USA was formed in 1997 as an independent 501(c)3 charitable organization incorporated in the
United States with a separate board of directors. Sixty-eight percent of Fonkoze’s loan portfolio is financed through Fonkoze USA.
Funds raised in the United States have come from three sources:
• Progressive Donors: those making tax deductible donations.
• Solidarity Investors: those who loan $1,000 or more for a
period of one year at little or no interest.
• Dedicated Partners: individuals or organizations donating
expertise (Fonkoze, 2004).
Fonkoze requires that borrowers maintain savings deposit
accounts, but because of Haitian banking regulations, it cannot
mobilize those savings for any purposes. The savings are effectively
segregated from Fonkoze’s other accounts by being held in separate
commercial bank accounts.
Meeting rising demand for loans had been possible with the
participation of Fonkoze USA, international donors, and lenders.
Political instability in Haiti in recent years, however, has increased
the difficulty of maintaining donor funding. Satisfying different
reporting requirement of the various NGOs has also become increasingly burdensome particularly since there is no standardization.
Gaining legal access to deposits in order to minimize and possibly
even eliminate the need to continue to seek outside funding, which
is a time consuming and costly pursuit for management, would set
Fonkoze as a bank firmly on the road to self-sufficiency.
Deposits on hand were much greater than the loan portfolio in
both 2001 and 2002, reaching over 270% of the loan portfolio.
Interest paid on deposits held by commercial banks in 2002 was
5% per annum. Fonkoze charged borrowers upwards of 3% interest per month. The spread between rates charged and rates Fonkoze
would need to pay depositors leaves considerable room to cover
operating expenses. Not all deposits would be available for loans.
BRH set reserve requirements at 31%, well above the 8% standard
set by the Basle Capital Accord of 1988 (Basle Committee, 1988).
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Even at this level, considerable deposit funds would be available to
fund a loan portfolio larger than current levels.
In 2001 and 2002 Fonkoze had net operating losses and sustainability ratios of 40% and 54% respectively. These numbers in
isolation would seem to be poor indicators of the ability to survive
without subsidies in the form of donations. Low sustainability
margins, however, reflect both expenditures serving the poor, such
as literacy and business practices classes, and a strategy of purchasing assets in preparation for the transformation into a larger
regulated entity. Transformation would enable Fonkoze to utilize
economies of scale by tapping deposits. With fully staffed branches
throughout the country and considerable fixed assets ready to be
utilized, Fonkoze in 2002 was poised for regulated status and
expansion.

Recent Historical Background
Fonkoze was founded at one of the many turning points in Haitian
history. A military coup had taken over the country from Bertrand
Aristide, the first democratically elected president in Haiti’s history, forcing him into exile. By September 15, 1994, having
exhausted diplomatic negotiations to reinstate the elected president, the United States along with twenty other countries decided
to intervene in Haiti (Ambassade d ‘Haïti, 2004). Four days later
troops landed, and coup leaders stepped down and left the country.
On October 15, Aristide returned from exile and resumed what
had become an abbreviated presidency. In June 1995, former Prime
Minister René Préval was elected president to succeed Aristide,
who could not succeed himself.
Parliamentary elections were held on May 21, 2000. Results
were delayed and then in June Haiti’s top election monitor fled the
country, casting doubt on the election’s legitimacy (Associated
Press, 2000). Even with this hasty departure, local and international observers expressed a willingness to accept the election
results as marred but legitimate. Opposition parties were less sanguine, continuing to express outrage. They accused former
President Aristide’s Lavalas Family Party of fixing the election to
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ensure an overwhelming victory prior to Aristide’s own run for the
presidency later in the year. Led by the United States, the international community rejected the May 2000 elections and subsequently embargoed all aid to Haiti (CIA, 2004). The Haitian
economy has been shrinking since, with approximately $500 million in aid suspended only worsening the plight of 80% of the population already mired in extreme poverty (Janet Matthews, 2004).
In early 2004, unrest fomented by extremists, some of whom
were convicted murderers, participants in the prior military coup,
and retreads from the Baby Doc Duvalier dictatorial regime of the
1980s, led to the late-night February 29 departure of President
Aristide under questionable circumstances. Chief Justice Boniface
Alexandre was sworn in as caretaker president (Janet Matthews,
2004). New elections were scheduled for late 2005. The US military returned with a multinational force to restore order at least in
some portions of the country. The Haitian government functions
were reconstituted without Aristide and the possibility of a
resumption in aid with the promise of stability seemed imminent
in mid-2004.
Corruption and lack of security were rampant before Aristide’s
departure. In June 2003, Police Chief Jean-Robert Faveur resigned
after only a short time on the job. His predecessor had lasted only
three months before he resigned after being accused of a 1991
murder. With law enforcement minimal, Haiti has become a transshipment point for cocaine to Europe and the US, with 15% of all
US cocaine consumption passing through the country (Janet
Matthews, 2004). In 2002 GDP was down 1.5% following a 1.7%
decline in 2001. Inflation was down to 8.7% in 2002 from the
2001 level of 14.2%. There was a run on bank deposits after a
rumor was spread that BRH would require forced conversion of all
US denominated deposits to Haitian gourdes. While exports in
2002 held to 2001 levels, coffee exports, a mainstay of the rural
economy, continued to decline from the 1995 level of $25 million
to just $2.6 million. Manufacturing exports fell from $100 million to $85.9 million, although this was still considerably above
1995’s $30 million. Imports were off by $77 million to $980.2
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million, seven times the level of exports. US currency reserves
dropped to $45 million, barely sufficient to cover two weeks of
imports. Foreign investment undaunted by political instability rose
slightly in 2002 to $99.1 million, more than double the
1995–1998 annual averages (Janet Matthews, 2004).
The budget deficit rose to 3% of GDP as taxes fell to just 5.3%
of GDP, covering only 50% of government expenditures. The IMF
in 2003 called for privatization of telecommunications and energy
along with substantial infrastructure improvements. It would be
difficult to imagine where the funds to accomplish any rebuilding
would come from other than foreign aid, which in 2001 had fallen
to $20.40 per capita from $43.40 in 1997, significant sums in a
country where average wages are $1.20 per day (CIA, 2004).

MFIs and Banking in Other Countries
Microfinance institutions’ ability to attract capital is in part dependent on the stability of the country’s political climate (Campion &
White, 2001). Sri Lanka’s experience of political unrest impinging
on commercial development (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002)
could be instructive to countries like Haiti undergoing similar
disruption. Indonesia also endured sectarian violence, but the
government introduced enabling measures to assist in microfinance
development (Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003). In Bangladesh,
creating an MFI enabling environment is not the highest priority
of a government that has been faced with occasional instability.
Even so, government subsidies do contribute to enhancing the
41% of loanable funds that come from donations to MFIs
(Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002).
Some countries, recognizing the lack of capital and banking
services available to the poor, often encouraged and assisted the
establishment of institutions. In the Philippines the Rural Banking
Act of 1952 promoted the establishment of rural banks. The
Central Bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP)
provided free technical assistance and access to loans at preferential
rates (Charitonenko, 2003). The way was open to entrepreneurs or
cooperatives to own rural banks. That is not to say that Philippine
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rural banking was always successful or that government assistance
was not without a price. In the 1970s, BSP forced rural banks to
act as a conduit for unsecured loans to rice farmers by threatening
to fund new competitors if they did not cooperate. The loan program was a disaster, creating economic hardship and even bankruptcy for some rural banks. Similarly, Indonesia began deregulating
the financial sector in the 1980s by liberalizing interest rates. The
government has tried to strengthen the Central Bank since 1998
(Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003). Sri Lanka addressed the issues
across several areas: the policy environment, the legal framework,
regulation and supervision, money and capital markets, and support
institutions. Sri Lankan government support was not always beneficial. Government subsidization and debt forgiveness significantly
compromised movement toward best business practices and sustainable viability of the microfinance industry (Charitonenko & de
Silva, 2002).
The governments of Bangladesh, Chile, Sri Lanka, and
Indonesia directly subsidized microfinance lending for selected
institutions, sometimes causing serious harm to those outside the
orbit of such aid (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002). In Chile, the focus
of the subsidies was the country’s largest banks. MFIs were
bypassed even though they had built a base of 81,000 loan clients
over ten years. Quickly, the three largest banks attracted 70,000
microcredit clients (CGAP, 2001). NGO-established MFIs, locked
out of the subsidization program because it was open only to regulated banks, eventually closed down. Many MFI employees ended
up working for banks in their microcredit departments. While
profitability was not up to the standards of other sectors of Chilean
banks, efficiencies achieved by economies of scale aided by government subsidies made loans more available. More of the poor may
have been assisted by the government subsidized expansion of
microfinance lending in the end, but the process destroyed existing
MFIs.
Since MFIs are costly to operate, the ability to set interest rates
high enough to cover operating expenses is crucial to survival.
Government laws capping usury rates can be restricted to regulated
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institutions or in some cases extend to all lending institutions in
the economy. In Nicaragua, where the microfinance industry has
grown rapidly in both rural and urban areas, the legislature capped
all loan interest rates at such low levels, reportedly at the behest of
the commercial banks in the country, that the survival of microfinance organizations was threatened. Since the cost of administering small loans is higher for MFIs than the cost of administering
larger sized bank loans, MFI profit margins are particularly susceptible to the imposition of interest rate caps. In 1986, ACP
Group in Peru had become the largest MFI lender in Latin America
with over $5.8 million in loans and better than nine thousand borrowers (Campion, Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). To fight inflation, the
government capped interest rates at 32% in 1987, an extremely
unrealistic figure, as inflation rates climbed to over 7,000%. By the
following year ACP’s loan portfolio was below $100,000 and two
of its four branches had closed. Fujimori’s election led to reforms
that lifted the usury cap in 1990. ACP expanded its loan portfolio
to $6.8 million and 19,100 clients. Though inflation was also
down, ACP still had to charge an effective annual interest rate of
125%. Without the ability to adjust interest rates, ACP would certainly not have been able to expand or possibly even survive.

Progress and Challenges to MFI Transformation
Ideally a country’s political and economic climate should nurture
new financial institutions. Some specific legal and economic conditions that are seen as favorable to the growth and prosperity of
financial institutions include the following:
• The elimination of policies that inhibit transformation,
such as rate caps on commercial institutions.
• The elimination of government sponsored loan programs
that undercut private and NGO sector loans.
• A legal system that allows for the creation, registration, and
repossession of claims against borrowers.
• Banking supervision that both regulates and assists in the
mobilization of savings.
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• The existence of both money markets for short-term credit
and capital markets for longer term funds.
• The existence of institutions or the ability to create institutions that compile credit information, credit rating, and
collections agencies.
• MFI trade organizations that provide training and technical
support (Campion & White, 2001).
Favorable conditions did exist in Sri Lanka, so much so that
microcredit saturation is reported to be around 80%. Some of
these MFIs are at a fairly early stage of transformation. A few
NGO-sponsored MFIs were attempting to transform, but most
were economically unsustainable. There is limited involvement in
microfinance by commercial banks. Government policies and interventions now discourage new entrants into microfinance and
hinder the transformation of existing MFIs (Charitonenko & de
Silva, 2002). Saturation of the microcredit market “Has led to
many cases of over-indebtedness and appears to be undermining
the primary incentive to repay . . . increasingly, clients appear
willing to default . . . safe in the knowledge they can access the
financial services from one of its competitors if follow on loans are
not made available” (Wright, Christen & Matin, 2001). In
Bangladesh, the government estimates that 45% of the population,
or 12.2 million families, are poor. If this estimate is correct, the
microcredit market is largely saturated, with MFIs reaching more
than 70% of the poor households (Charitonenko & Rahman,
2002).
Bolivia was also fertile ground for MFIs. The number of
microfinance lenders reached such high levels in the 1990s that
borrowers began to obtain loans from one MFI to repay another
(Rhyne, 2001). By 2002 as much as 34% of all Bolivian MFI loan
portfolios were for borrowers with obligations at more than one
MFI. Insolvency at some institutions and excessive debt burdens
forced the government to intercede.
The tendency to subsidize interest rates to borrowers and to
forgive loans during adverse weather conditions was perhaps the
most inhibiting factor faced by MFIs in Indonesia as they moved
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towards transformation (Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003). Sri Lanka
was also hampered by government intervention, which had a chilling effect on organizations considering transformation to regulated
status (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002).
Many MFI boards and NGO sponsors are reluctant to consider
transformation to regulated status, fearing that the founding mission of serving the poor will be lost in the pursuit of profits.
Focusing on profits can raise the size of the average loan, effectively
locking out the poorest of the poor. By contrast, mission drift may
be low in semi-formal MFIs that are content with serving a localized market on a competitive basis (Charitonenko & de Silva,
2002).
Indonesia had a sound regulatory framework, but with lax
enforcement MFIs circumvented regulations banning the use of
savings deposits to finance loans. Indonesia lacks deposit insurance—there is no deposit insurance institution—and public savings have reached 70% of total bank assets, which makes the
lending of deposits even more dangerous without appropriate
supervision and control. Indonesia also lacks a Credit Information
Bureau and like Sri Lanka lacks microfinance training centers
(Afwan & Charitonenko, 2003).
MFIs in Sri Lanka overemphasized the social mission, which in
turn curtailed progress towards transformation. In Sri Lanka there
is a legacy of ad hoc debt forgiveness that damages the repayment
culture. Sri Lankan cooperatives mobilized over 1 billion Sri
Lankan Rupees (US$11.2 million), but an inadequate legal and
regulatory framework places customers’ funds at risk. Most MFIs
in Sri Lanka consider transformation to a regulated bank as the
best survival option, but the high minimum capital requirement—
500 Million Sri Lanka Rupees (US$5.6 million)—is likely to be
difficult to meet (Charitonenko & de Silva, 2002).
In Indonesia, transformation has allowed large scale, sustainable microfinance outreach. Indonesian MFIs are averse to the
term transformation and instead invoke the phrase greater business
orientation. The more “business oriented” MFIs have a good record
in reaching the poor and have not experienced significant mission
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drift. However, MFIs have not had to deal with competition from
new entrants.
Indonesia’s Bank Rakyat (BRI) is the largest microcredit institution in the world. It is also 100% state owned. Such market
dominance can inhibit other MFIs from making the transition to
regulated institutions that would entail greater scrutiny and reporting requirements. Only a few Indonesian NGOs have made efforts
to formalize their microfinance activities. Prohibited from mobilizing savings deposits for use in loan portfolios, they set up credit
unions to circumvent the law. Moslem religious prohibitions
against usury are another impediment to lending practices in
Indonesia. Here government-sponsored changes in the late 1990s
to banking laws have paved the way to creative lending that accommodated the ban on charging interest (Afwan & Charitonenko,
2003). In the Philippines, restrictions on MFI access to mobilizing
savings are more flagrantly violated. Many MFIs regularly loan savings, effectively challenging regulatory authorities to intervene
(Campion & White, 2001).
In Peru, APC faced two choices when it considered transformation to regulated status in 1994. One choice, Financieras,
required capitalization of $3 million, less than the second choice of
the traditional full-service bank, but Financieras was restricted
from offering savings accounts and other banking services
(Campion, Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001). Later in 1994 legislation
created a third alternative specifically designed for MFIs, the
EDPYME, with an even lower capital requirement of $256,000.
EDPYME organizations were to be a first step in a transformation
process eventually leading to becoming a full service bank.
Mobilizing savings deposits, however, was barred until the transformation was complete. The cautious step-by-step approach
appealed to ACP until Fujimori, after attending a Microfinance
Summit in 1997, proposed establishing a full-fledged microfinance
bank in Peru. Rather than create a new MFI institution, Fujimori
saw ACP, the largest MFI, with capitalization exceeding the $5.6
million minimum, as the logical choice. The new entity would also
be permitted to collect passbook savings.
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The Haitian Banking Sector
The National Bank of Haiti (BRH) was founded in 1880 but did
not assume the role of a national bank until 1934 (U.S.
Department of the Army, 1989). Since then it has had multiple
roles, including the issuance of Haitian currency, the gourde.
Under 1979 legislation, BRH gained authority to control credit,
and to set interest rates and reserve requirements. It exercised that
authority in the 1980s to implement conservative monetary policy
requiring high reserves and low interest rates on loans made by the
country’s commercial banks. This policy effectively limited credit
availability, slowing the economy and curtailing inflation.
The bulk of banking profits were made on the spread between
the interest rates banks could earn on their investments and what
they paid out to depositors. With rates on deposits low, commercial banking was a money machine. In the 1980s imposed caps on
loan rates made commercial bank lending unprofitable and undesirable, particularly when money could be made on the spread
between rates paid and investment returns. Private-sector lending
beyond the purview of banking regulation supplied loans at very
high rates. The poor had access to loans only from loan sharks,
who were often brutal in collecting overdue debts. It was not until
the 1990s that NGO-sponsored microfinance institutions began
making loans available to the poor. MFIs were unregulated and
outside the imposed BRH rate caps, though not beyond a prohibition barring access to deposits for their loan portfolios.

MFI Players in Haiti
There are many microfinance institutions in Haiti (see Table 1) but
none offers the type of services and geographical reach of Fonkoze.
With branches in outlying rural areas, where 95% of its clients are
located, Fonkoze serves the rural poor as a lender and as a deposit
institution, though those deposits are eventually transferred and
held by commercial institutions. Fonkoze’s average loan size is well
below average loans provided by other Haitian MFIs (Table 1)
because of its dedication to serving the poor. Remittance services,
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Table 1. Comparison of Haitian MFIs (June 2002)
Outstanding
portfolio
US$1 ,432 mil.

No. of
active
loans
4283

Average
outstanding
balance
US$334

FHAF

US$1 ,431 mil.

2951

US$484

N/A

FONDESPOIR

US$1 ,126 mil.

3645

US$308

N/A

FONKOZE

US$1 ,128 mil.

10000

BUH

US$2 ,349 mil.

3000

SOGESOL

US$2 ,197 mil.

5522

US$113
US$783
(US$1500 in
Po rt-au-Prince)
US$366

US$3,152 mil

2500

US$1260

Institution
ACME

MCN

Interest rate (monthly)
3% flat + applicat ion fee

3% + application fee
3% flat + applicat ion fee
3%, 5% flat + application fee
5% declining balance +
application fee

Source: Microfinanza Ltd. 2002 and Fonkoze

i.e., money transfers from outside Haiti done affordably, as well as
foreign exchange services are not found at other MFIs.
In the early 1990s Haitian bank regulators removed interest
rate caps, motivating three commercial banks to offer microfinance
loans (Gonzalez, 2001). As in Chile, commercial banks were building on the success of NGO-backed MFIs, but unlike in Chile, the
only help from the government was the lifting of interest rate caps
to create a level playing field. With 80% of Haiti’s workforce selfemployed (CIA, 2004), the market for small loans is large. The
sophistication of borrowers, however, is limited, as it is in Sri
Lanka or Indonesia.
Legislation that removed interest rate caps from commercial
banks and lowered equity requirements opened the way for large
scale commercial lending as well as the expansion of commercial
banks into microfinance (Accion International, 2000). In 2000,
following these reforms, Sogebank, a major commercial bank, created Sogesol as a joint stock company to be its entrant in the
microfinance market. Sogesol planned to rely on Accion
International for advice. Profits were to be the focus of Sogesol
business—not an unusual focus for a commercial bank but somewhat different from the typical orientation of NGO-supported
MFIs that emphasized social benefits (Gonzalez, 2001). Another
departure from NGO-run MFIs was Sogesol’s collateral requirement. Loans would only be made to borrowers able to pledge
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collateral, which could include appliances, beds, or other household goods. Collateral requirements have locked the poor out of
capital markets in the past, i.e., commercial bank loans. Borrowers
with collateral are not the poorest of the poor, making Sogesol’s
clientele only slightly down market from Sogebank’s clients but
unlike many of Fonkoze’s clients who lacked collateral, particularly
first-time borrowers. In its first year, Sogesol had 700 clients.
Sogesol’s client base rapidly expanded to over 5500 clients, with a
loan portfolio just under $2.2 million. While Sogesol was effectively a regulated MFI, the fact that it attained this status because
it was a joint stock company owned by an already regulated commercial bank, Sogebank, did not offer any guidance or procedures
that BRH could follow in reviewing Fonkoze’s application for
regulated status.
Established in 1999 as a joint stock company, Micro Credit
National (MCN) is 50% owned by Haiti’s number two bank,
Unibank S.A., and the remainder is held by three NGOs (IMI,
2003). Loan sizes are large by MFI measures, averaging $1,000,
though MCN also has low end loans and high end loans up to
$20,000. Operations are in Port-au-Prince and ten other cities,
with 36 loan officers. As of 2002, MCN’s loan portfolio was over
$3.5 million and its clients numbered 2500.
In 1997 with assistance of loan guarantees from USAID,
Banque de l’Union Haitienne, a commercial bank, established a
microfinance subsidary BUH to provide microcredit to the poor
(USAID, 2003). By 1999 BUH had 14 branches, including 8 outside of Port-au-Prince. BUH’s loan portfolio in 2002 was over $2.3
million, with 3,000 active loans. Forty percent of BUH’s loans are
in the Port-au-Prince market and the average loan is also at the
higher end: $1500 in Port-au-Prince and $783 elsewhere.
Association pour la Cooperacion avec la Micro (ACME) is an
NGO-operated MFI founded by a Belgian professional in 1997
(Microfinanza, 2002). Like Fonkoze, ACME is registered as an
association in Port-au-Prince. Since it is not a regulated financial
institution and is not owned by a commercial bank, it has limits on
its sources of funds. It has managed to borrow from commercial
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banks, which insist on 100% equity to back loans to ACME. With
such loans composing the bulk of its funding, leverage to grow the
loan portfolio is limited. Bank loans also charge interest rates of
18–24%. To make up for these high rates and the high cost of doing
business, effective annual rates on ACME loans were 74–83% in
2002 (Microfinanza, 2002). Rates consisted of a flat 3% monthly
rate plus fees. Borrowers seeking loans do not have to pledge collateral but they do need a fixed residence, a business that has been
in operation for six to nine months, and a loan guarantor who is
not an ACME client and who has an annual income at least triple
the loan amount requested. Nearly all loans are for six month periods, averaging just over $500 in 2002. ACME puts a $2,000 cap
on loans. Twenty-four loan officers administer loans. Loans are
made on a commercial bank account from which borrowers withdraw money by ACME-issued check and to which borrowers make
deposits as payments. Clients perceive ACME as being friendlier
than banks and its staff as motivated and qualified. ACME provides no other services, such as training in business practices or
literacy, both provided by Fonkoze. Incentives paid to loan officers
succeeded in lowering an 18.7% PAR (portfolio at risk) in 2000 to
just 4.48% in 2002. But the tilt of the incentives toward larger
loans also resulted in 50% of the PAR being concentrated in
smaller loans. Collecting on bad loans is a slow and tedious process
due to inefficiencies within the Haitian court system, but ACME
has managed to collect on over 20% of the loans it writes off. In
2002 ACME had a loan portfolio of $1.4 million and over 4300
active loans (Microfinanza, 2002). It has also managed to attain
sustainability; revenues exceeded costs in both 2001 and 2002.
ACME recognizes the advantages of becoming either a cooperative
or a commercial bank but does not have plans to pursue regulated
status in the immediate future.
Interest rates on loans may be stated on a rate per month basis
but a hidden aspect of these loans that makes them less comparable
is the principal to which the interest rate is applied. Sogesol’s 3%
monthly rate appears comparable to Fonkoze’s loan rate (Table 1)
but it is considerably higher. Sogesol borrowers repay principal
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over the course of the loan installments but the interest they continue to pay is on the initial amount borrowed. It is not interest on
the declining balance, typical of installment loans. Fonkoze borrowers pay interest only on the declining balance. For example,
assuming both Sogesol and Fonkoze charge the same application
fee and the total loan is $500 for six months at 3% per month, the
effect of Sogesol applying interest to the initial amount borrowed
for the entire six-month period and collecting equal installments
results in monthly payments of $98.33 versus $92.30 for Fonkoze’s
loan. Sogesol’s actual monthly rate is 4.94%, which approximates
the 5% rate charged by MCN on declining balances.
The launching of a new MFI trade organization in Haiti,
DAI/FINNET, is a positive development. DAI/FINNET has begun
to keep track of borrower credit information. One difficulty in
compiling such information is that the poor often lack proper
addresses. Note that one of ACME’s requirements is that borrowers have a residence with a fixed address.

Fonkoze: Planning a Commercial Transformation
Making the transformation in Haiti is more of a challenge than in
many other developing countries. Haitian capital markets are
nonexistent, the legal system is in tatters, and BRH is largely without the means to properly supervise and regulate. In Haiti, the lack
of infrastructure makes normal business decisions risky. If the judicial and supervisory agencies were functional, the governor of the
Central Bank would provide a list of instructions to the applicant
MFI, which would guide the process through transformation.
MFIs seeking other avenues to access savings could have considered becoming cooperative banks. In 2000, Caisses Populaires
(CP) or savings cooperatives began expanding in Haiti. Government regulation created a boom in this banking segment with a
2001 anti-money-laundering law that forced drug money from
commercial banks into less regulated CPs (Microfinanza, 2002).
Competition for deposits heated up, with promised interest rate of
10–12% per month, much higher than annual rates offered by commercial banks. CP deposits reached $200 million. The pyramid
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scheme imploded when the volume of savings inflow slowed after
the rush to move drug money into CPs. Soon interest rate payments halted and CPs limited withdrawals. Rioting and even burning of CPs followed. The government was forced to pay off some
of the deposits but the reputation of cooperatives was tarnished.
This black mark against savings cooperatives effectively eliminated
such a transformation alternative for Fonkoze.
With Haiti under siege internationally in 2001 and aid cut off
following the parliamentary elections of 2000, just when Fonkoze
began pursuing transformation, it was unlikely that Aristide could
have undertaken an MFI transformation initiative. Transformation
to become a regulated bank would have to be proposed and managed by Fonkoze and BRH. On May 28, 2001, Fonkoze wrote to
Gustave Flaubert, Haitian Minister of Finance and Economy; Fritz
Jean, Governor of the Bank of the Republic of Haiti; and Staley
Theard, Haitian Minister of Commerce and Industry, proposing a
transformation to a commercial bank. The new entity would be
a stock company, with 40–49% owned by the foundation currently
managing Fonkoze. A minimum of 51% of the stock would be
owned by Haitians. Dismissing the idea of becoming a cooperative
in the letter, Fonkoze proposed a gradual process. First it would
become a provisional commercial bank, with $500,000 deposited
in escrow. Fonkoze would seek further funding to achieve full status as a commercial bank, with $3 million in equity.
Fonkoze reorganized itself into the Fonkoze Foundation and
Bank Fonkoze. There would be two distinct boards. The funds that
Fonkoze USA raised for the bank were turned over to a new entity,
Fonkoze LLC. Through a private offering memorandum, Fonkoze
LLC would in turn invest in Fonkoze SA, a holding company that
would control the regulated Bank Fonkoze. With $2.5 million in
funds raised, more than any prior Haitian bank had raised at
startup, Bank Fonkoze was well financed.
Fonkoze’s 2003 application for transformation to regulated
status languished in the waning months of the Aristide regime. In
2004 Fonkoze management discovered that the application was
dismissed in an August 2003 BRH report which questioned the
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capitalization of the proposed bank. The report was never delivered
to Fonkoze. The negative report revealed a basic misunderstanding
of the complex structure of Fonkoze. Although Fonkoze was well
capitalized, the main objection voiced in the report to moving forward with regulated status was doubt about Fonkoze’s ability to
honor its obligations in the event of financial failure.
Fonkoze’s board of directors, frustrated with the lack of
progress, considered an alternative strategy that would provide
legal access to savings deposits. MFIs in the Dominican Republic
similarly barred from using savings deposits in their loan portfolios
had found a way to circumvent banking regulation. They accessed
savings by creating a new debt instrument to “sell” to the public.
MFIs issued notes instead of deposit slips as a form of acknowledgement of the receipt of funds. Would-be depositors became
creditors loaning money to the MFIs at fixed interest rates. The
MFIs could then legally use these “borrowed” funds to finance
their loan portfolios.
With the departure of Aristide and the installation of Acting
Prime Minister Latortue, the possibility of moving forward with
regulated status was reopened. Latortue was known to be favorably
disposed to MFIs—his daughter was an official with the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). In May of 2004
Latortue assured Fonkoze that bureaucratic stumbling blocks
would be removed. However, it soon became apparent that the new
administration and BRH had many other pressing issues to
address, relegating Fonkoze’s application to further delay.
The board pursued the option of using a credit instrument
with which to turn deposits into loans. A new entity, Fonkoze
Financial Services (FFS), was created to supercede Fonkoze Bank as
an interim step toward becoming a regulated bank. It was to handle
the new credit instruments. There would need to be training sessions for Fonkoze employees and new forms and procedures would
need to be designed. Following legal advice, Fonkoze conferred
with BRH and explained their intention of using credit instruments instead of deposit slips. BRH was amenable to the change
but went further with a simpler solution. Each existing depositor
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was simply to sign an agreement granting permission to Fonkoze to
manage their savings. The process of gaining access to deposits
would not only be streamlined, it would effectively be approved by
BRH.
Prior to transferring funds from Fonkoze LLC to FFS, LLC
investors asked that a pilot project be run at two rural branches
and at a branch in Port-au-Prince. The change would be explained
to depositors and they would be asked for written approval. Rural
depositors were unanimous in their approval, while 85% approved
in Port-au-Prince. The lower approval rating in Port-au-Prince was
mainly because some depositors were unable to consider the proposed change, due to time constraints. Fonkoze LLC authorized
conversion of the MFI to FFS, which would serve as a transitional
entity. The $2.5 million raised and currently in escrow in the US
would be released to Fonkoze LLC and eventually to FFS.
Fonkoze would effectively obviate the urgent need to transform
into a regulated bank.
FFS was not required to adhere to banking regulations since it
would not be a regulated bank. Fonkoze’s board, however, continued to focus on the need for best practices. Planning for a future
transformation, the board mandated that the new entity act as if it
were regulated and meet BRH standards as well as international
standards under the Basle accords. BRH standards required 31% of
deposits be held as reserves. The only exception to strict adherence
to BRH regulations would be that FFS would keep the 31%
reserves in dollars and deposits in US banks rather than in Haitian
currency on deposit with BRH.
Fonkoze has been reconstituted into two separate entities. The
first entity is a continuation of the original foundation, which will
continue to provide educational programs for new borrowers and
serve as an incubator for new branches by financing and operating
them. A subset of the first entity will manage cooperative agricultural loans. Cooperative agricultural loans are a relatively new
product in Haiti. Haitian farmers have been encouraged and given
help to grow crops for export, but there was no existing entity to
purchase those crops and aggregate shipments. The agricultural
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cooperatives lacked funding to carry-over the several month period
between buying crops from farmers and receiving payments from
outside the country. Fonkoze entered into the business of providing loans to agricultural cooperatives, initially with a loan guarantee program sponsored by USAID. That guarantee program
expired without any guarantees being invoked. The foundation will
continue to provide cooperative loans. The second entity, FFS,
will operate the established bank branches and manage savings
deposits, foreign remittances, and foreign exchange. Small business
loans, which are typically longer-term, for larger amounts, and with
men being the predominant clientele, will be managed by FFS.
Fonkoze has used the Grameen model (Grameen, 2004) in
organizing its borrowers into solidarity groups of four or five
clients. Under the Grameen model between 1996 and 2001 there
were 601 NGOs operating as MFIs in Bangladesh. The loan recovery rate had reached over 95% in 2001. There were over 8 million
borrowers and over 11 million active members in Bangladesh
(Charitonenko & Rahman, 2002). Fonkoze clientele lack collateral; relying on solidarity groups for social collateral, as Grameen
does, creates incentives to make payments. Solidarity groups centralize contact between credit officers and clients. The ability of
loan officers to meet with large groups of clients makes for greater
efficiency. Currently loan officers service 320 clients. Postregulatory projections anticipate that experienced credit officers could
oversee thirteen centers consisting of a maximum of 520 clients.
Fonkoze’s fully operational small branches typically include a manager, two credit officers, two cashiers, two security guards, and one
custodian. Managers are expected to handle up to 200 clients in
addition to other tasks.
Banco Solidario in Bolivia was an MFI that employed groupbased lending exclusively prior to becoming the first MFI to make
the transition to a regulated institution. Bolivian MFI lending
quickly evolved toward individual loans, which in 2000 composed
78% of loans, up from just 41% in 1997 (Rhyne, 2001). Fonkoze
began with group loans and until recently they composed 90% of
lending activity, mainly to groups of entrepreneurial women.
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Solidarity groups went through education and literacy programs
together and borrowed together, albeit for different individual
needs. Graduates from solidarity groups were eligible for individual loans. Graduates have successfully completed the second phase
of Fonkoze’s business training program and have previously repaid
all their loans on time. It is likely that individual loans will make
up an increasingly greater portion of Fonkoze’s portfolio.
Becoming a regulated bank can often mean larger, more profitable loans and mission creep away from an emphasis on serving
the poor. Fonkoze’s strategy to avoid this is to leave the more charitable, not-for-profit operations to the Foundation. The poor will
continue to be served and perhaps served even better. One new
Foundation-based program will provide loans to poorer women
not currently served by Fonkoze. The requirement for a savings
account will be postponed and dues will be paid over the course of
time. Loans will be made to solidarity groups in smaller sums and
the women will receive basic literacy and educational services.

Conclusion
The following continuum describes typical MFI progress toward
transformation:
• Adoption of a professional, businesslike approach to MFI
administration and operation.
• Progression towards operational and financial self-sufficiency.
• Use of commercial sources of funds.
• Operation as a for-profit formal financial institution subject
to regulation and supervision (Afwan & Charitonenko,
2003).
Fonkoze has attained a professional and businesslike approach.
It has been hampered from moving toward the second phase of
transition, sustainability, because of a lack of access to savings
deposits and the need, defined by its mission, to provide social welfare programs. To continue to provide social welfare programs and
attain profitability, Fonkoze’s board came up with a plan to divide
Fonkoze into two entities: the original foundation that would
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focus on welfare programs and seek funding through donations
and a bank that would eventually attain regulated status.
Turmoil in Haiti and a lack of understanding of the complexity of Fonkoze’s tiered structure resulted in delay and denial of the
initial plan to become a fully regulated institution, even though
funding requirements were met. Fonkoze devised another plan that
would create a transitional entity, Fonkoze Financial Services
(FFS), which would circumvent the government ban against nonregulated institutions loaning savings. FFS was approved by BRH.
Savings would be considered “loans” to Fonkoze by depositors and
as such would then be legally available for its loan portfolio. Not
only did BRH approve of the plan, it suggested speeding up the
process by simply obtaining approval from current depositors to
allow FFS to manage their money.
FFS is a transitional vehicle which will conduct business as if
it were already a regulated institution while preparing for the final
transformation into a commercial bank. That final transformation
will be delayed until a more stable political situation develops in
Haiti. While this is not a predictable and smooth progression
toward attaining transformation, as has been accomplished in
other countries, Fonkoze has taken the first step to move through
the transformation continuum as quickly as the political situation
allows. FFS will for all intents and purposes function as if it were
a regulated bank.
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Microentrepreneurship and
Job Creation
A Multiple-Case Study of HUD
Microenterprise Development Assistance
Programs in Upstate New York
James O. Bates
Abstract: This multiple-case study explores local government’s use of HUDfunded microenterprise development assistance for job creation and selfemployment of low-to-moderate-income individuals. Respondent information
was reviewed and then supplemented with document analysis and interview
materials from earlier research on HUD microenterprise development assistance programs in upstate New York. Because the number of local government
respondents who self-identified as providers of microenterprise development
assistance was small, it was not possible to generalize research findings to the
overall public microenterprise development sector. However, the study of this
phenomenon, although limited, does have implications for government microfinance instrumentalities and intermediaries and for future research on publicsector microenterprise development efforts. Based on the participants’
self-report, it appears that both urban and rural HUD-sponsored microenterprise
development assistance programs create jobs and self-employment opportunities
for low-to-moderate-income persons using a myriad of strategies.

S

ince the end of World War II, the industrial economies of the
northeastern United States have undergone a fundamental
structural change. Where automotive and manufacturing
industries were once dominant employers, today’s urban economies

Journal of Microfinance

in the Northeast are now driven by growth in the service sector. With
the change from a manufacturing-based economy to one that is
service oriented, many “living wage” employment opportunities
have all but disappeared.
These changes, coupled with high unemployment and a shrinking
tax base, have compelled public-sector administrators to develop
local policies and programs that link business lending, on-the-job
training, education, and training programs to their community
development processes. These programs, albeit nascent, have created
many noteworthy economic opportunities for low-to-moderateincome persons.

The Upstate New York Context
Job creation for and self-employment of low-to-moderate-income
persons is an important policy option in New York State because
New York, like other states, has been experiencing an increase in the
number of unemployed persons and working people earning low
wages. Prospects for such programs are particularly important in
upstate New York, where poor economic conditions continue to
exacerbate local social, economic, and political problems. New York’s
poor economic conditions are evidenced in the notably high unemployment figures and poverty levels of non-New York City areas like
western New York. In recent years, the weak upstate economy has
been a political rallying cry for national and local officials seeking
political office. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (2002)
indicates that for the past two decades, the gap between high-income
and low-income New York State families is significantly wide. The
report, “Pulling Apart: A State-by-State Analysis of Income Trends”
(Economic Policy Institute, 2002), shows that in New York State by
the late 1990s,
• The richest 20% of families had average incomes that were 12.8
times as large as the poorest 20% of families.
James O. Bates is a career civil servant in the federal government and an adjunct faculty
member at the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Social Work. Email:
james_bates@bates-group.com
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• The richest 20% of families had average incomes 3.1 times as
large as the middle 20% of families.
The Economic Policy Institute’s estimate of the average income of families, expressed in 1990 dollars, shows that the average
income of the bottom fifth of New York state families was
$13,433 from 1978–1980, $12,871 from 1988–1990, and
$12,639 from 1998–2000. The top fifth of New York state families
earned $105,046 from 1978–1980, $134,061 from 1988–1990,
and $161,868 from 1998–2000. From these figures it can be
observed that the bottom fifth of New York state families has grown
relatively poorer over time while the top fifth’s income has experienced nearly a 54 percent increase between 1978 and 2000 (p. 67).
The increased income gap is partially due to the downsizing and
outmigration of many defense and manufacturing industries and to
increased job separations in low-wage retail and service sectors—
job quits, layoffs, and firing.

Why HUD Microenterprise
Development Assistance
There are two reasons for using microenterprise development as a community development policy tool: first, it is a method of optimizing the
use of indigenous resources for economic stabilization and growth;
and second, it is a method of wealth generation for groups that have
historically been economically isolated—welfare mothers, youth,
unemployed persons, and immigrants. As “supply-side” economists
and planners have learned from the economic growth periods of
the 1980s, “universal policies” fail to redistribute income toward the
poorest in our nation (Wilson, 1996). While this failure may be
partially explained by the skill mismatch between laborers and
available jobs, it is also a function of social behaviors and practices like
racism, social exclusion, the crowding of the labor force in low-wage
service jobs, the indifference of multinational corporations to local
social problems, and the absence of full-time work for the low-skilled.
A targeted microenterprise development program may be one of the
few viable vehicles—in addition to a few innovative job training
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programs—for overcoming some of these challenges and increasing
employment opportunities for many low-income persons.
Although state and local governments must play a part in
designing and implementing a public-sector microenterprise
development strategy, they are generally not able to pursue such a
strategy on their own. There are several reasons for this, including
staffing constraints, the large amount of financial resources
required to overcome macroeconomic and human capital barriers
faced by the poor in the formal economy, and the inability of local
governments to garner sustainable, broad-based political support for
means-tested programs targeted at the poor that may create few
jobs, have a potentially high failure rate, and provide limited tax
benefits. For this reason, many U.S. microenterprise development
programs are administered by not-for-profit organizations using a
variety of funding streams (the Community Reinvestment Act;
community foundation funding; Individual Development
Accounts; religious, social, and economic justice funding; and government grants). In some instances these agencies may act as the
main instruments of local governments and community foundations, directly responsible for carrying out a multitude of publicly
authorized community development activities.
In 1992, the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974 was amended to include microenterprise development as an
allowable activity under the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program. While this provision did not create a de facto
set-aside for federally sponsored microenterprise development
assistance, it did codify microenterprise development as an eligible
CDBG social and economic development activity. CDBG funds
could now be used for microloans, technical assistance, transportation,
and child-care in support of entrepreneur training. HUD allocates
CDBG funds to each state on a formula basis to support community
development activities in support of low-to-moderate-income
households whose incomes are less than 80% of the area median
family income. Based on published information from the
Consolidated Federal Funds Report (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
2002), national CDBG obligations have exceeded $3.4 billion for
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the past five years. From this information, it seems that CDBG is a
viable, accessible, and practical source of funding for microenterprise
development programs.

Microenterprise: Toward a
Definition and Initiative
There is no general consensus about what constitutes a federally
recognized microenterprise. The definition depends on the granting
agency and its objectives. For example, two agencies within the federal
government, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), define microenterprise differently. USAID
has defined microenterprise as a business with a low level of assets
that has fewer than ten employees (USAID, 2002). HUD on the
other hand defines a microenterprise as any form of business that
employs five or fewer employees, one or more of whom owns the
enterprise (HUD, 2001). With the lack of consensus in mind, this
assessment will follow the HUD definition of a business that
employs five or fewer employees, including the owner.
HUD regulations for microenterprise development programs,
as codified under the 2002 Federal Code of Regulations 24CFR
570.201 (o) state that municipalities can provide microentrepreneurs
(HUD, 2002):
(i) credit, including, but not limited to, grants, loans,
loan guarantees, and other forms of financial support,
for the establishment, stabilization, and expansion of
microenterprises;
(ii) technical assistance, advice, and business support services to owners of microenterprises and persons developing microenterprises; and
(iii) general support, including, but not limited to, peer
support programs, counseling, child care, transportation, and other similar services, to owners of microenterprises and persons developing microenterprises.
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Thus, there are three classes of activities that are eligible for
CDBG funds: (1) microenterprise establishment, (2) microenterprise
expansion, and (3) microenterprise stabilization. Microenterprise
establishment activities are designed to integrate disadvantaged
groups and nontraditional borrowers into the small business sector.
These programs assist low-income and nontraditional borrowers to
form viable businesses that will be owned and operated by entrepreneurs who otherwise have limited or no access to capital markets.
Microenterprise expansion activities attempt to increase an entrepreneur’s sales and income through extending credit or various forms
of technical assistance to him or her. Technical assistance may include
marketing, bookkeeping, legal, managerial, and tax assistance. The
objective of an expansion program is to create employment opportunities by affecting employers’ long-range demand for additional labor.1
Microenterprise stabilization activities attempt to improve the
managerial capacity of the entrepreneur or provide short-term credit
to help increase sales and revenues. It is assumed that an increase in
sales or revenue will enable an entrepreneur to retain or create jobs.
Local governments are compelled by HUD regulation to direct
microenterprise development assistance exclusively toward establishment, expansion, or stabilization. In addition, HUD regulations
require that microloan borrowers create or retain jobs for low-tomoderate-income individuals.
Conventional public and quasi-public microenterprise development programs supported by CDBG focus activities on credit
enhancement and lending. With regard to lending, four categories of
loans have been commonly made to microentrepreneurs: working
capital loans, business development loans, purchase order financing,
and inventory and equipment loans. Working capital loans allow an
entrepreneur to pay suppliers and buy equipment. Business development loans are used for site acquisition, capital improvement,
asset purchases, and working capital. Purchase order financing is
made available to businesses to make up for shortfalls in production.
Inventory and equipment loans are for the purchase of fixed assets in
support of production.
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Table 1: Community Mission Statement Summary for
Microenterprise Development Programs
Name of funded community

Mission statement summary

Cattaraugus County

Offer a comprehensive support program in response to
the diverse needs of the growing number of entrepreneurs
in Cattaraugus County.

Cayuga County

Provide financial assistance to small new and existing
businesses in the county, with emphasis on proposed
new or retained job creation.

Columbia County

Strengthen the city and county tax base through economic
development and job creation, and assist businesses small
and large with training and financial assistance.

Elmira Heights

Educate individuals on the opportunities that exist in the
village and allow them to utilize the available resources to
make Elmira Heights a more desirable community in
which to live and work.

Greene County

Provide training, technical assistance, and low-interest
financing to support the start-up and expansion of
microbusinesses.

Lewis County

Create and retain jobs within Lewis County.

Little Falls

URA plans, applies for, and administers community and
economic development projects on behalf of the City of
Little Falls.

Village of Mayville

Provide sub–market rate low-interest financial assistance
to microenterprises as well as additional business assistance
as may be required.

Niagara County

Assist low-to-moderate-income entrepreneurs in starting
or growing their microenterprises (defined as having 5
employees or less) by providing education, technical
assistance, and access to a low-interest loan fund.

Oswego County

Establish and implement sound economic development
strategies in order to enhance the economic vitality of
Oswego County’s businesses, industries, and citizens,
leading to an overall better quality of life.

Village of Saranac Lake

Improve quality of life by providing state- and federalfunded economic development supported by village
residents.

Wayne County

Provide technical and financial assistance to start-up or
expanding small businesses (5 or fewer employees) where
low and moderate income jobs will be created or retained.
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Lisa Servon and Timothy Bates (1998) have noted that providing
a small business loan to a microentrepreneur will not by itself remove
the barrier for small business creation. Entrepreneurs benefit from a
combination of programs, including neighborhood planning, leadership training, business related training, access to capital and a high
quality labor pool, and labor training programs. This is not to say that
microlending programs do not have their merit. Servon and Bates
(1998) point out that, “when well-targeted and clearly focused, . . . it
[microlending strategy] can be a critical vehicle for helping some lowincome people to achieve economic self-sufficiency” (p. 437). As
Servon points out, by their very nature, microlending programs act as
a conduit for linking neighborhood residents and businesses to banks,
business development centers, community-based organizations, and
state and local government agencies (Servon, 1996, p. 336). This
study reinforces the importance of non-lending activities in microenterprise development.

Research Questions
In the following section I lay out the research method used to review
microenterprise development assistance projects in upstate New

Table 2: Microenterprise (M.E.) Development Program
Characteristics
Name of funded
community

Number of
staff

Program
start-up date

Cattaraugus County
Cayuga County
Columbia County
Elmira Heights
Greene County
Lewis County
Little Falls
Village of Mayville
Niagara County
Oswego County
Village of Saranac Lake
Wayne County

2
0*
1
1
0*
1 p.t.
0*
0
4
5*
1
1

1996
1993
1996
1996
1998
1995
1990
---1995
1998
1996
1994

Value of
all loans
$1,687,579
$816,000
------$332,998
$852,000
$357,829
$354,200
$1,340,600
$195,000
$189,500
$584,000

*Respondents report that the program is supplemented by municipal department staff.
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York. Next, I describe the missions of microenterprise development
assistance programs. I then outline some specific program characteristics and performance indicators that address the following research
questions:
• Who is the program serving?
• How many people have been served?
• How are clients performing?
• Are there any recognizable patterns or themes among
upstate microenterprise development programs?

Methodology
The scope of the review included an examination of provider
agency program documents and a structured survey. The survey was
faxed to upstate New York municipal government grant recipients
under the HUD Small Cities CDBG program. As the universe of
active HUD-funded microenterprise development programs is not
easily identified through available information systems, municipal
government grant recipients were asked to self-identify themselves as
operators of a Small Cities CDBG subsidized microenterprise development program. Service providers were asked to supply informa-

Table 3: Performance of Microenterprise Development
Program
Name of funded
community

M.E. start-ups since
Existing
program inception M.E.s served

Cattaraugus County
Cayuga County
Columbia County
Elmira Heights
Greene County
Lewis County
Little Falls
Village of Mayville
Niagara County
Oswego County
Village of Saranac Lake
Wayne County

35
14
65
14
35
15
10
14
70
10
-045

68
21
65
--~60
15
5
24
157
5
12
50

Number of
loans issued
103
38*
-014
14
40*
15
14
64
15
12
24

Number of
jobs created
180
120
indeterminable
60
30
82
43
64
265
25
39
84

* In some instances, microentrepreneurs applied for and were issued multiple loans.
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tion about the loans issued, clients served, program accomplishments, and ancillary technical assistance provided to microentrepreneurs. The survey consisted of approximately 34 open-ended
questions. It was modeled on a questionnaire used by the Aspen
Institute’s 1999 Directory of U.S. Microenterprise Programs. This
information was then supplemented with earlier unpublished original case-study research on this topic. The earlier research was in the
form of structured interviews and documentation analysis of 15
HUD microenterprise development program operators.

Research and Discussion
Twelve municipalities responded to the survey. All respondents
identified themselves as practitioner agencies. Practitioner agencies
are defined as active agencies that provide loans, training, or technical assistance directly to microentrepreneurs. Most practitioner
agency microenterprise development programs were established in
the mid-1990s.
They operate with few staff people specifically dedicated to
microenterprise development program operations. In some instances,
programs are carried out by existing government community and

Table 5: Characteristics of Microenterprise Development
Program Clients
Name of funded
community
Cattaraugus County
Cayuga County
Columbia County
Elmira Heights
Greene County
Lewis County
Little Falls
Village of Mayville
Niagara County
Oswego County
Village of Saranac Lake
Wayne County

Percentage of
AFDC/TANF
assisted clients
N/A
--N/A
--10
----0
--N/A
0
0

Percentage of
low/mod*
assisted clients
56
50–55
61
100
60
90
13
100
58
55
80
72

Percentage of
Percentage of
unemployed
female
assisted clients assisted clients
N/A
-1
--10
1
7
25
--30
20
---

--23
50
50
50
10
13
21
41
10
--39

* Low/Mod: persons whose incomes do not exceed 80% of the Median Family Income.
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economic development staff. Annual microenterprise development
program operating budgets (survey question 14) ranged from
$10,000 to $100,000. Program performance, as measured by reported
major agency achievements (survey question 32), varied among programs. This may be partially explained by the fact that program
divisions and departments in respondent municipalities had different
program missions and operating requirements. Respondents listed the
following types of activities as major agency achievements:
• Program funding allowed the only grocery store serving the
remote, rural community to remain open.
• The microenterprise program has filled empty stores,
increased local employment, and educated individuals
while improving the overall community.
• The program has generated $1.6 million in leveraged
loans.
• The program has enjoyed eight years of continuous success. Nearly 300 individuals and businesses have been
assisted. Forty-six loans have been made, for a total of over
$1 million, with an acceptable charge-off rate for a highrisk portfolio.
• A county-wide program has been developed to train and
support small business and microbusiness development in
rural areas.
• There are 12 new businesses in town!!
The mission statements in Table 1 show that job creation is
merely one objective of microenterprise development. Filling vacant
storefronts, keeping essential services in communities, and introducing new business opportunities into the area are also important
achievements for local governments. While the distinctions between
reported major achievements are subtle, they represent significantly
different paradigmatic approaches to development—social planning
and development versus economic development. This finding is reinforced by the fact that a number of respondents consider improving
the quality of life of residents to be their mission while others consider job creation and job retention to be their mission.
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All respondents with active microenterprise development
programs indicate that their programs have created or retained
jobs.2 Most respondent communities currently operate a revolving
loan fund (RLF) concomitantly with training and technical assistance
programs. RLFs are locally administered, flexible debt instruments
that are capitalized by public and quasi-public entity grants and lowcost loans. RLFs provide affordable capital to microentrepreneurs
and nontraditional borrowers in the form of seed capital, bridge
loans, and gap financing. An entrepreneur uses a seed capital loan for
business start-up needs like real estate and equipment purchases. A
bridge loan is a form of short-term debt that is assumed by an entrepreneur until permanent financing is put in place for such activities as
the development of new commercial properties or the renovation of
existing properties for leasing and speculative development. The currently available dollars in the RLFs of respondent communities range
from $25,000 to $866,000, and the total value for all loans issued
across each RLF ranged from $189,500 to $1.6 million. The aggregate dollar value of loans distributed for all respondent microloan
programs since the inception of their programs is $9,815,206.
The primary forms of technical assistance are:
• Business training courses
• Business planning assistance
• Individual business counseling.3
One quarter of the respondents indicate that peer support and
exchange, mentoring, and other forms of technical assistance are provided to entrepreneurs. The majority of the respondents indicate that
they use a collaborative process for carrying out their microenterprise
development program. Only a small percentage of the respondents
indicate that their program is being carried out by a single government agency. Examples of collaboration cited by respondents are:
• We are the only agency in the county that offers training
and technical assistance to small business; therefore
banks and other loan funds in the area refer their clients
to us. The Department of Labor even uses our classes as
a requirement for their self-employment program.
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• We work with borrowers to secure local bank funding;
local planning staff assists with land use and environmental
issues, business groups, and real [sic] to help promote programs.
• A 30-hour course is developed through Corning
Community College Small Business Development Center.
The Small Business Administration (SBA), local law firms,
and local insurance agencies supply guest speakers.
• Some borrowers use the Small Business Development
Center (SBDC). The Urban Renewal Agency (URA)
works with local banks to meet business needs.
• The village microenterprise program interacts with other
lenders to provide additional funding for qualified applicants to ensure access to conventional lending sources.
• Niagara County Community College coordinates classroom curriculum and provides some technical assistance.
Business skills gained by program participants make their
businesses more bankable, and several participants have
obtained bank financing in addition to microloan fund
financing.
• The Industrial Development Agency (IDA) provides 25%
of each loan, using the HUD Microenterprise Program
(MEP). IDA works for bank participation where possible.
State University of New York (SUNY) Oswego SBDC contracted for microenterprise training.
Respondents were responsible for assisting 327 business start-ups
and 482 existing businesses. As a result of this, 1,237 persons have
been employed by microenterprises served by the program since its
beginning. The number of loans issued by microenterprise development agencies ranges from 12 to 103, and the number of jobs created ranges from 25 to 265. Applicants were not requested to
convert positions to full-time equivalents; therefore, nothing further
can be inferred from this description. Because these developments
are not concentrated in a specific city within the region, it is difficult to gauge the regional impact or macroeconomic implications of
this change—despite the fact that they are noteworthy.
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The microloan programs’ general characteristics appear to be
convergent. Average loan amounts are in the $20,000 range. The
average rate is approximately 5%. Loan terms range from one to
seven years. Interest rates ranged from 3% to 5%. The majority of
microenterprise programs reported income in the range of $30,000
to $50,000. Most respondents report an 89% to 90% business success rate (survey question 22). One third indicated a success rate that
is less than 70%. Additionally, most respondents indicate that less
than 10% of the loans are delinquent (survey question 24).
The respondent programs primarily serve low-to-moderateincome clients, including unemployed individuals. In three of the
respondent communities, unemployed individuals account for nearly
20% of the clients served. Most beneficiaries of microenterprise
development program assistance are Caucasian. Between 95% and
100% are Caucasian and 50% to 90% are male.

Conclusion
The results of this study appear to suggest that microenterprise development assistance is being used not only as a vehicle for general job
creation but also as an employment strategy for low-to-moderateincome persons. Several microentrepreneurs were receiving some form
of public assistance (unemployment benefits, TANF, etc.) prior to
program participation.4 Most beneficiaries of HUD microenterprise
development assistance in respondent communities are Caucasian,
and several business start-ups were in rural areas. It seems that there
is a large need for entrepreneurship programs and community development services for microbusiness development in rural areas.
Research involving framework development would be required to
investigate this issue further. Respondent communities that view
themselves as using microenterprise development programs to
address quality-of-life issues implement and evaluate their programs
slightly differently than municipalities that view themselves as merely
operating a loan pool. This is evident in the way the programs are
staffed, coordinated, and self-evaluated in terms of achievements.
Finally, municipalities that operate stand-alone programs cannot be
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evaluated in the same manner as municipalities that offer assistance as
an adjunct service in an existing institution. Scale, operating procedures, organizational systems, and staff capacity cannot be captured
by some of the standard measures of efficiency and program performance (average loan per staff, loan as a percentage of overall costs,
etc.). Although many intangible benefits of microenterprise development have not been directly addressed through a limited survey of
provider agencies and focused interviews such as this, it does raise the
question “to what degree can microenterprise development be used to
integrate low-income and the under- and unemployed into our economy?”5
Today, we are only able to measure that (1) HUD-assisted
programs have increased employment opportunities for low-tomoderate-income persons; and (2) these programs have produced
some achievements that are consistent with the diverse interest of
the sponsoring local governments. In the future, more research must
be done to understand this phenomenon and to refine the social role
the public sector should play as these programs evolve in the future.

Responses to Select Survey Questions
Question 9: For the purposes of this questionnaire, please select the response that best
describes your agency:
Assessment: All 12 respondents indicated that they were practitioner agencies,
which are agencies that provide loans, training, and technical assistance directly
to microentrepreneurs.
Question 10: Number of microenterprise development staff:
Assessment: Agencies had one or fewer microenterprise development program
staff each. In a few cases, microenterprise development activities were carried out
by municipal government staff that also carried out other duties.
Question 11: Date of agency start-up:
Assessment: Two thirds of the agencies had started up operations by the mid 70s.
Question 12: Start-up date of HUD-assisted microenterprise development assistance
program:
Assessment: Three fourths of the HUD-assisted microenterprise development
assistance programs started between 1990 and 1996.
Question 14: Microenterprise development annual operating budget:
Assessment: Annual operating budgets for microenterprise development programs
vary from $10,000 to $100,000.
Question 15: Is your program still operational?
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Assessment: All 12 respondents indicated that their programs were still operational.
Question 16: Dollar amount of loan capital fund:
Assessment: Loan Capital fund values range from $150,000 to $866,000.
Question 17: Sources of funding:
Assessment: The primary source of Loan Capital is the Community Development
Block Grant, followed by program income from Community Development Block
Grant loan repayments. The primary source of operating dollars is the Community
Development Block Grant, followed by program income from Community Development Block Grant loan repayments.
Question 19: Target population:
Assessment: The target populations served by the program are low-to-moderateincome individuals.
Question 20: (b) Number of business starts, (c) Number of existing businesses served
since the program start-up, and (d) Number of persons who have been employed by the
microenterprises you serve (including owners) since program start-up:
Assessment: (b) 327 business start-ups by programs, (c) 482 existing businesses
assisted by program, (d) 1,237 persons employed by microenterprises served by
the program since its beginning.
Question 22: What is the business success rate for your HUD-assisted microenterprise
program?
Assessment: Most microenterprise programs report an 89% to 90% business
success rate. One-third indicated a success rate that is less than 70%.
Question 23: What is the business failure rate for your HUD-assisted microenterprise
program?
Assessment: Most microenterprise development programs report a business failure
rate less than 15%.
Question 24: What are the loan repayment histories?
Assessment: Most respondents indicate that less than 10% of the loans are
delinquent.
Question 25: Who are the beneficiaries by race?
Assessment: Most beneficiaries by microenterprise development program are
white (between 95% and 100%).
Question 26: What are the percentages of beneficiaries by gender (% male, % female)?
Assessment: Most microenterprise program beneficiaries are male (between 50%
and 90%).
Question 27: How much income is being generated annually?
Assessment: The majority of the microenterprise programs reported income in
the range of $30,000 to $50,000. Two respondents had income in excess of
$150,000.
Question 29: What type of technical assistance do entrepreneurs receive—what type
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Book Review
The Private Sector in Development:
Entrepreneurship, Regulation, and
Competitive Disciplines
by Michael U. Klein and Bita Hadjimichael
Richard Norton

T

oday’s microfinance industry is stepping beyond charitable
subsidies toward commercialization, from dependency
towards self-reliance. To speed and systemize the eradication of poverty, private capital has become more crucial for
microfinance institutions (MFIs). In their book, The Private Sector
in Development: Entrepreneurship, Regulation, and Competitive
Disciplines, Michael U. Klein and Bita Hadjimichael encourage
practitioners and policy makers to enhance the private sector’s role
in a broad range of areas that impact development.
At times, the public has characterized private capital in poverty
eradication as opportunistic, exploitative, even immoral. Klein and
Hadjimichael concede some abuse has occurred “by powerful
groups” (p. 2). Yet, the recipients (the poor) feel that private firms
are important and more effective than alternatives. Klein and
Hadjimichael attribute this superiority to burgeoning ideas, competition, and best practices. Reminiscently, private sector industrialization in the 19th century in the United Kingdom doubled
average worker incomes in 60 years (p. 5). Likewise, in the last
decade private sector technical and organizational progress doubled
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average worker incomes in countries like Botswana, Chile, China,
Ireland, Japan, Korea, and Thailand (p. 5).
The authors contend that the private sector’s role in the development agenda is to complement the efforts of the public sector to
meet the needs of poverty’s many dimensions. There is enough
money in the world today to eliminate poverty (pp. 9, 15).1 The
challenge we face in eliminating poverty is not money but delivery systems and incentives that ensure intended beneficiaries are
serviced (p. 9). Combining social, political, and economic influences and resources to eliminate poverty would enhance our ability
to create the infrastructure needed to reach the poorest of the poor.
The Private Sector in Development uses microfinance as an
example of facilitating access to financial markets for the poor.
MFIs are highly capable and proven delivery systems of financial
services to the poor internationally. The authors note, “The effect
of microfinancing is likely to be greatest when sensible, marketfriendly reforms create a good business environment” (p. 84). MFI
ability to scale up is questioned when the authors observe,
Most people served continue to rely on subsidies, and risks of
excessive subsidy dependence are clear. . . . The greatest challenge is, thus, how to scale up the provision of microfinancing
on a sustained commercially viable basis. . . . Large scale
solutions are, however, unlikely to be sustained unless larger
financial institutions are able to downscale their operations
and serve the market for small credit and financing on a commercial basis—independent of continued subsidy. (pp. 84, 85)
Technology based solutions (credit cards and prepaid electronic
cards to create credit history for the poor) and governmental solutions (improve property rights to create collateral options for the
poor) are suggested as vehicles to scale up microfinance.
Throughout the eight chapters of The Private Sector in
Development, Klein and Hadjimichael measure the success and
failures of a large mix of poverty-eliminating approaches. These
Richard Norton is Founder and President of Working World, Inc.
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measures are substantiated by empirical research from the World
Bank and independent sources. The findings are well presented,
with dozens of statistics, graphs, tables, and charts strategically
placed every few pages to enhance reader understanding.
To illustrate the need to alleviate poverty through effective
delivery systems, market disciplines, and wise use of resources, the
authors draw conclusions from “Where Has All the Education
Gone?” a research project conducted by Lant Pritchett in 1996.
The study identified the correlation between education and per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth from 1960 through
1985. The research shows that educational capital growth in Asia
was about 2.7% and per capita GDP growth was about 4.1%. In
contrast, during the same time period Sub-Saharan Africa educational capital growth was about 4.2% while per capita GDP growth
was only .6% (p. 7). The authors conclude that although adequate
education is required for developmental growth, strong performance is best achieved when (1) human capital, (2) infrastructure,
and (3) institutional frameworks are capable, with capability
defined as a function of these three components combined in market operations.
Further, “studies on the effect of foreign direct investment
[FDI], the most powerful mechanism to transfer best practice
across borders, suggest that its contribution is most significant
when domestic capability is high” (pp. 7, 18, 19). Capability is
shown to be high when competitive market approaches are practiced. The private sector market approach facilitates innovation and
creates jobs and improvements in service-delivery and economic
performance—investment follows these conditions and per capita
GDP rises. Thus, education alone will not alleviate poverty.
Effective market-like delivery systems must be set in place to scale
the eradication of poverty.
Throughout the book the authors emphasize job creation and
the investment climate in development models. They point out
that simply creating jobs is not enough to solve the world’s poverty
epidemic—enterprises need to use best practices and jobs need to
be productive and raise standards of living. Research provides that
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“State-owned enterprises or subsidized private firms have generally
failed to deliver sustainable productivity growth” (p. 17). At the
same time, merely investing money into a developmental project
has not proven to alleviate poverty. A firm’s capability and investment must go hand-in-hand to ensure resources are used wisely
and improve economic performance. “The potentially biggest hope
for poverty reduction comes from mechanisms that transmit best
practice to areas where the poor live and work. The private sector
development agenda emphasizes the crucial contribution of competition in this regard. . . . Special assistance to fledgling entrepreneurs through microcredit or business development services may
help speed up the diffusion of best practice” (pp. 127, 128). Klein
and Hadjimichael are deliberate in repeatedly reporting that competitive markets create the key drivers and incentives that encourage organizations to become efficient, use best practices, innovate,
invest, create productive jobs, and raise standards of living.
The discussion of competition and investment in development
markets leads the authors to examine the pros and cons of financial
subsidies. At times, pro-poor intervention may require subsidies,
and subsidies are in demand by both non-profit and for-profit
organizations as well as the beneficiaries of subsidies. In the case of
microfinance, subsidies assist institutions in reaching the extremely
poor where, historically, other organizations have been unsuccessful. The authors explain, however, that cost-benefit analysis should
be set in place when subsidies are used, as certain challenges arise
when subsidies are granted. Although the cost of capital to organizations or individual beneficiaries appears to be less, donors, taxpayers, or investors absorb the true cost of capital. The authors
present evidence that long term subsidized debt among private
firms “results systematically in net negative economic outcomes”
(p. 74). Further, other challenges like waste, inefficiency, and
diverting funds for private gain sometimes occur when subsidies
are issued. These challenges can be avoided if monitoring systems are
set in place.
To remedy financial subsidy challenges, Klein and Hadjimichael
suggest that information systems should be implemented to create
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transparency and to assess credit opportunities. Regarding information systems the authors submit, “Informational problems make
it hard to recognize and assess credit opportunities and, thus, lead
to some good deals being left on the table. If one can overcome
these information problems, the additional deals that would be
concluded can be expected to earn the full, unsubsidized cost of
capital” (pp. 74–75). Moreover, “Transparency is further enhanced
when subsidies are unbundled, as they would be in private competitive markets. Then the subsidies provided for a particular activity could be calculated with some precision. In addition, results
could be assessed” (pp. 164–165). Ultimately, The Private Sector in
Development argues, “Subsidies can be designed to be compatible
with the market solution” (p. 129). Market solutions for subsidies
include establishing performance output goals, auctioning off the
right to serve certain people of competing providers to the lowest
subsidy bidder, and allowing information to flow so donors can
choose the most deserving charities to provide subsidized funding.
The authors also specify that “best practice appears highest if such
support measures are delivered in ways that are consistent with
market principles and that do not create unsustainable dependence
on subsidies” (p. 128). Some approaches taken to promote development in the lives of the poor produce self-reliance while others
lead to dependence.
The authors conclude, “The role of entrepreneurs and markets
is critical for poverty reduction, because the key to rapid poverty
reduction lies in transmitting advances in technology or organizational improvements across the world” (p. 167). The book outlines
methods for market mechanisms to be introduced where competition will improve poverty reduction. The last chapter recognizes
again the question of whether or not the for-profit motive will
undermine development work. The authors establish that evidence
proves for-profit market mechanisms are an integral part of the
solution, yet stress that in order to create sound markets, for-profit
motives need to be balanced between cooperation and competition. In sum, competition and market mechanisms transmit best
practices to create effective poverty-eliminating delivery systems.
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The Private Sector in Development: Entrepreneurship, Regulation,
and Competitive Disciplines holds true to its title. This work thoroughly explores the private sector’s historical role in development
with hard evidence of the successes and failures of a variety of
poverty-eliminating approaches. Klein and Hadjimichael’s suggestions for how the private sector can complement efforts under the
development umbrella—for now and the future—are well articulated and provide practitioners and policy makers a platform from
which to discover effective ways to employ market mechanisms
within their respective areas of influence. Though the book does
not focus primarily on the microfinance industry, the principles
highlighted make brilliant, practical contributions to support the
commercialization of microfinance.
The strongest poverty-eliminating principle in The Private Sector
in Development is clear: The private sector eradicates poverty and
increases the quality of life of the poor. The eradication of poverty
is a macroeconomic challenge and necessitates the cooperation of
many moving parts from both the public and private sectors influencing the social, political, and economic environment. If we are
to halve poverty by 2015 (Millennium Development Goal
[MDG]), the public sector should continually allow more opportunities for the private sector to participate and play a larger role
in development.

Notes
1. “One perspective is provided by data from the annual Human Development
Report (HDR) published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
For some years, the report has presented estimates of the additional resources it would
take to meet all basic needs in the world. The HDR for 2000 puts the number at
US$80 billion per year (UNDP 2000). That figure translates to US$1,400 for each
of the richest 1 percent of people in today’s world.”
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